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Modernizing Muslim Family Law:
The Case of Egypt
Lama Abu-Odeh*

ABSTRACT

The Author discusses the dynamics of family law reforms
in modern Egypt as an instance of similar dynamics of reforms
in other Muslim countries. The forces that push for reforms as
well as those that try to limit them are also introduced.
The Author begins by describing the historical legal
background shared by the vast majority of Muslim countries,
including Egypt. An account of the general evolution of Islamic
law-from a dominant system existing within an Islamic state
to a subordinate system existing within an overall secularized
legal system characterized by legal borrowing from European
codes-is given. Islamic law has survived in the modern era
primarily through family law, having lost jurisdiction over
most other areas of law.
The Author next describes the nature of modern reforms of
family law in Egypt. She argues that these reforms have been
structurally limited because the Egyptian elites controlling the
state pursued the policy of splitting the difference between the
demands of women activists in Egypt pushing for liberal
feminist reforms and those of a conservative religious
intelligentsiathat was antagonisticto these reforms. This policy
of splitting the difference was notable in the nature of legislative
reforms, family law adjudication by lower family courts, as well
as in the constitutional adjudication of family law issues by the
Supreme ConstitutionalCourt of Egypt.
The Author ultimately argues that the only way to push for
reforms in family law without the constraininginfluences of the
religious intelligentsia is to secularize the legal system in its
totality.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Egyptian feminists who advocate reform of Egyptian family law
are often charged with supporting changes that are un-Islamic. 1 The
charge is of such normative appeal that it is often hard to dismiss. To
understand its normative power, one has to place the charge of "unIslamicity" directed at reforming feminists by their adversaries in a
larger context, that of the modern history of the Egyptian legal
system.
During the second half of the nineteenth century, Egypt made a
historic decision to dispose of the rules of Islamic law in most areas
and fields of the law. 2 However, the Islamic rules on the family were
preserved. 3 Egyptian elites understood this to be part of a badly
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
Many friends and colleagues have read this article at various stages of its writing
and have provided me with helpful and insightful comments. I would like to especially
acknowledge the help of Janet Halley, Mark Kelman, David Kennedy, Duncan
Kennedy, Amr Shalakany, Hani Sayed, Milton Regan, and Wael Hallaq. This paper has
been presented at Columbia Law School and at various events at Harvard Law School.
The comments by students and participants have greatly enriched the text and made it
possible in its present form. I owe all of these people a great deal of gratitude.
I would like to especially acknowledge the contriution of Parastoo Anita Mesri to
the production of this article. Her brilliant skills at research, editing, and commentary
contributed a great deal to this text. I cannot thank her enough.
1.
See Lama Abu-Odeh, Egyptian Feminism: Trapped in the Identity Debate
21 (Jan. 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also Fauzi M. Najjar,
Egypt's Laws of Personal Status, 10 ARAB STUD. Q. 319, 323-25 (1988) (on file with
author).
2.
See J. N. D. Anderson, Law Reform in Egypt: 1850-1950, in POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN EGYPT 209, 217-24 (P. M. Holt ed., 1968) (describing
changes in the laws of Egypt, as embodied by the adoption of various Codes that were
largely European in origin, that took place in the second half of the nineteenth
century).
3.
See id. at 217-19 (noting that the Shari'a courts, and the sacred law which
they applied in the old traditional way, remained largely unchanged, and "it was only
in the Sharia courts, and the community courts of the non-Muslim communities, that
an uncodified law was still applied in the old, traditional way; but these courts were
strictly confined to matters of family law in its widest connotation (marriage, divorce,
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needed move toward modernization, a process that unfolded over
time but seems to have been completed by the mid-twentieth
century. 4 For most areas of the law, Egyptian elites chose to borrow
(in the manner of legal transplants) European laws that displaced the
rules of the inherited legal system.5 Europeanization inevitably led to
secularization. 6 For those who were (and indeed, for those who still
are) opposed to Europeanization and secularization, the Islamicity of
the rules on the family came to symbolize the last bastion of a
dismantled Islamic legal system, the reform of which threatened to
flood Egypt with the European and the secular. 7 Thus, attachment to
medieval patriarchy came to mean attachment to the Islamic.

paternity, guardianship, and succession) and the law of waqfs and gifts"); infra Part
II.A (providing a definition of waqfs); see also DAWOUD SUDQI EL ALAMI & DOREEN
HINCHCLIFFE, ISLAMIC MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LAWS OF THE ARAB WORLD 3 (1996)
(recognizing that "although by the mid-nineteenth century many areas of traditional
Islamic law had been swept away... , changes in the law of the family came later and
were undertaken with great delicacy"); Margot Badran, Competing Agenda: Feminists,
Islam and the State in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Egypt, in WOMEN, ISLAM
AND THE STATE 201, 201 (Deniz Kandiyoti ed., 1991) (reporting that in nineteenth
century Egypt, "[t]he former broad purview of the religious establishment was eroded
piecemeal in the drive toward secularisation of education and law. The only exception
to this was the sphere of personal status laws").
4.
See Daniel Crecelius, The Course of Secularization in Modern Egypt, in
RELIGION AND POLITICAL MODERNIZATION 67, 73-89 (Donald Eugene Smith ed., 1974).
As the author notes, this process of modernization and secularization of most areas of
Egyptian law and society, save the realm of the family, began with a process in the
nineteenth century marked by the "differentiation of political and religious structures."
Id. at 73. Although modernizing and secularizing elites "did not openly challenge the
traditions and concepts of the ulama [religious scholars] nor totally abandon the basic
concepts of Islamic government," the effect of their project was that "the scope of the
shari'ah [Islamic law] was reduced to personal status law (marriage, divorce,
inheritance, etc ....
)." Id. at 75, 79. Throughout the process of modernization and
secularization, family law and "the liberation of women" were issues that "involved the
ulama in constant political conflict with their modernizing government." Id. at 83-84.
5.
See JOHN H. BARTON ET AL., LAW IN RADICALLY DIFFERENT CULTURES 22
(1983) (asserting that the French influence in Egypt can actually be traced to the short
"visit" made by Napoleon to the country in the late eighteenth century and that
although the French invaders were driven out of Egypt after only three years, "[n]ot
only was Egypt's intellectual system shaken; its new reformers would look to France."
Indeed, "[o]ut of the political and military confusion that followed the Anglo-Turkish
defeat of France there arose the first of Egypt's modernizers, Muhammed Ali."); M.
Cherif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari'ah: Sources, Interpretation, and RuleMaking, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 135, 166 (2002) (noting that around the
middle of the ninth century, Egypt "adopted a number of codes modeled after French
prototypes"); see also JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 47 (2d ed.
2001) (explaining the adoption of European codes in Egypt and other parts of the
Ottoman Empire).
6.
See Crecelius, supra note 4, at 80 (reporting that "the twin goals of the
emerging social and political elites, nationalism and liberal reform, were explicitly
framed on the basis of secular principles derived from the West").
7.
See Najjar, supra note 1 (giving a detailed account of the opposition posed
by religious, conservative elites to various attempts at family law reform in the
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This Article argues that while secularizing the legal system in
Egypt through European transplants allowed for the possibility of
either dismissing or radically reorganizing various elements of the
doctrine on the family inherited from medieval Islamic jurisprudence
to make
it more
progressive,
it was also
the same
secularization/Europeanization process that placed limits on and
defined the ceiling of such progressive reforms. This is so because
historically, in order for all other laws to be secularized, family law
had to represent the limit of, the exception to, or the sacrificial lamb
of secularization. 8 In order for family law to be legislatively reformed,
progressively interpreted by secular judges, or actively protected by
elite constitutional judges, the outer limits have to be convincingly
defined for a difficult-to-please religious audience. 9 It is through
making patriarchal pronouncements on the outer limits that the
"reformer" gains legitimacy for his or her reforms in the eyes of
watchful religious contenders. This Article argues further that it is
this unceasing and obsessive look to the outer limits that preempts a
full-fledged secular critique of patriarchal relations of the family in
Egypt.
Part I of this Article begins by providing an account of the Taqlid
legal system, the pre-modern Islamic legal system that prevailed in
the Muslim world (including Egypt) up to the early part of the
nineteeth century, before modern legal transformations started to
take place. It was during this pre-modern era that the vast majority
of Islamic rules on the family were developed and articulated. 10

twentieth century in Egypt, an opposition portrayed as a defense of Islam in the face of
Western-inspired secularism and feminism, for which there is much evidence in
present day Egypt); see also Mariz Tadros, What Price Freedom?, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY
ONLINE, Mar. 7, 2002, at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/576/fel.htm. Tadros reports
on changes made to the procedural personal status law in Egypt in 2000 that allows
women to seek khul divorce (a divorce granted to the wife without there existing one of
the established grounds for seeking such divorce, usually in exchange for her giving up
certain financial rights). The author observes:
Judging by the level of social hostility and discontent in the People's Assembly
and in the opposition newspapers two years ago when the procedural law was
being discussed, it is not difficult to see why the government is cautious about
touching the personal status law itself, which is the central bastion of the
patriarchal system.
Id.
8.
See John L. Esposito, Introduction, in ISLAM, GENDER, AND SOCIAL CHANGE
ix, xv (Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad & John L. Esposito eds., 1998).
9.
See id. ("[Miodern Muslim family law reforms were initiated then by
governments, implemented from the top down, and often rationalized and legitimated
in the name of Islam by using (or, as some would charge, manipulating) Islamic
principles and legal techniques.").
10.

See JAMAL J. NAsIR, THE ISLAMIc LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS 12-13 (3d ed.

2002) (describing the process by which each of the four major Sunni schools of law
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Those very same rules, intricately modified, constitute the
contemporary doctrine on the family in Egypt as well as the rest of
the Arab world. 1' Part I also includes a structural reading of the
Taqlid doctrine on the family and argues that while Taqlid law does
not have an internally coherent view of the family-with each school
of Taqlid law having its own doctrinal arrangement on the
relationship between husband and wife-the differences between
these schools amount to no more than possible positions within an
overall gender regime that could be described as hierarchical to the
benefit of the husband. This hierarchical regime has nevertheless a
strong underlying element of transactional reciprocity of obligations
between the spouses, in which husbands provide money in the form of
maintenance, and wives provide conjugal society in return.
Part II begins by offering an account of the introduction of
European legal transplants in Egypt, transforming the very nature of
the legal system as a whole. It shows the ways in which, as a result of
both the centralization and the Europeanization of the legal system,
Taqlid law was crowded out of its historic jurisdiction until it was left
12
with only the family to regulate.
Part III proceeds to describe the modern doctrine on the family
in Egypt, including the ways in which it was reformed and amended
once European legal transplantation occurred. In order to understand
the scope and nature of the various statutes adopted in Egypt with
the goal of reforming rules and laws concerning the family, a
comparative approach is used.' 3 Part III places Egyptian reforms in a
comparative relationship with those undertaken in Jordan and
Tunisia. A comparative summary also includes the rules on the
family under the Hanafi doctrine, an Islamic school of law that
developed in the Taqlid era and that historically had the largest
influence on Egyptian law. 14 Part III includes the Hanafi rules to

worked to consolidate their legal doctrines during the early part of this legal era, from
approximately the tenth to the thirteenth centuries).
11.
See id. at 14-15; see also N. J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIc LAW 84-85
(1964).
[B]y the fourteenth century various legal texts had appeared which came to
acquire a particular reputation in the different schools and areas of Islam.
Representing for each school the statement of law ratified by the ijma
[consensus of Islamic legal scholars], they retained their paramount authority
as expressions of Shari'a law until the advent of legal modernism in the present
century.
12.
See infra Part II.A-C.
13.
See infra Part IlI.A-B.
14.
Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 5, at 166 (observing that in general, under
Ottoman rule, the Hanafi school of law was "the official madhhab [legal doctrine] of the
empire"); see Charles C. Adams, Abu Hanifah, Champion of Liberalism and Tolerance
in Islam, in ISLAMIC LAw AND LEGAL THEORY 377, 384 (Ian Edge ed., 1996) (noting that
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show the extent to which the Egyptian reforms departed from their
historic Taqlid origins.
A spectrum of reform possibilities emerges from this
comparative picture. While Tunisian legislative reform appears to
represent the most liberal approach, the Hanafi doctrine sits on the
other end of the spectrum as the most conservative. Jordan and
Egypt are located in the middle and are examples of countries that
enacted what can be characterized as centrist reforms. Indeed,
Tunisia seems to have gone as far as to legislate liberalism in its
15
family code in a manner that has no parallel in the Arab world.
Tunisian lawmakers introduced terms such as "equality" in their
legislation and made a concerted effort to abolish the structure of
gendered reciprocity and complementarity inherited from Taqlid
law. 16 By comparison, the Egyptian legislature preserved gender
reciprocity, while at the same time chiped away at the husband's
surplus of powers in the family. 17 The aim of the Egyptian legislation
seems to be to replace the marital status regime provided for under
Hanafi doctrine, the prevailing Taqlid doctrine in Egypt, with that of
8
contract.'
Part IV argues that the family courts in Egypt have continued
the legislative approach of chipping away at the husband's power in
the family, without, however, destroying the regime of reciprocity.
Part IV looks at lower family court and appellate court adjudication
interpreting some of the new legislative rules. 19 Egyptian courts

the Hanafi school is credited with a liberal, analogy-based approach to legal reasoning);
JOSEPH SCHACHT, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 40 (1964) (stating that the Hanafi

school of law was founded by the jurist Abu Hanifa (d. 767)).
15.
See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 239 ("Tunisian law has been
held to be the most progressive of the laws of the region, in that it includes the most
radical provisions of any of the Arab laws.").
16.
See id. at 239-47 (providing the text of the Tunisian Personal Status Code,
or Majallah).
17.
See id. at 51-52. The authors, referring to legislative and presidential
decrees of the 1970s and 1980s aimed at reforming personal status laws in Egypt,
report:
There had for some time been a movement to amend the personal status laws,
which had remained unaltered despite social changes. Some members of the
Popular Assembly proposed a draft law amending the laws of personal status,
which was examined and confirmed by the Assembly during June and July
1985. The resulting Law No. 100 of 1985 revised and replaced certain
provisions of the laws of personal status, including provisions in the areas of
ta'a (obedience), registration of divorce, mut'a (compensation to a divorced
woman), maintenance for the wife and custody.
Id.
18.
See id. at 52-62 (providing the text of various Egyptian laws of personal
status); infra Part III.C.
See infra Part IV.A-B.
19.
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limited the husband's power in the marital relationship by restricting
the interpretation of the wife's duty of obedience in the family, as
well as expanding rather drastically the grounds available for her to
request a divorce. The aggregate effect of these judicial moves, it is
argued, has been to further undermine the status regime inherited
from the Hanafi doctrine and push it more aggressively toward a
20
contractual one.
Part IV also presents an account of the way the judges of the
Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt (SCC) attempt to defend
legislative reforms in family law from the attacks of religious groups.
Specifically discussed are the Court's rulings after the 1980
amendment to Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, which
establishes that "the principles of Islamic Sharia are the principal
source of legislation."'21 The amendment prompted religious groups to
argue that certain legislative reforms in family law were un-Islamic,
or contrary to the Shari'a. Part IV argues that the SCC has pursued a
strategy of splitting the difference between the demands of the
religious detractors and those of Egyptian feminists on the question
22
of how to interpret those reforms.
This Article concludes by arguing that legislative and
adjudicative reforms and interpretive strategies that move from
defining a marital relationship as one of status to one of contract, as
well as splitting the difference between the demands of religious
advocates and those of feminist reformers, represent the ways in
which the Egyptian secular male elites have introduced reform in the
area of family law. 23 These strategies attempt to strike a centrist
compromise so as to mediate the demands of the feminists and those
of their adversaries-the religious intelligentsia.
The Egyptian path to family law reform represents the rule
rather than the exception in the Islamic world. Many other countries
have adopted a centrist compromise, as Egypt did, (although each
adopted one that is uniquely its own), to navigate the complex
interaction between the need to reform family law while still
preserving a semblance of Islamicity in this law.

20.
See infra Part IV.A-B.
21.
Dr. Hatem Aly Labib Gabr, The Interpretation of Article Two of the
Egyptian Constitution by the Supreme Constitutional Court, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF EGYPT 217 (Kevin

Boyle & Adel Omar Sharif eds., 1996). Before the amendment, Article 2 of the 1971
Constitution dictated that "the principles of Islamic Sharia are a principal source of
legislation." Id. (emphasis added).
See infra Part IV.C.
22.
23.
See infra Parts I.D, V.
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II. FAMILY LAW UNDER THE PRE-MODERN ISLAMIC LEGAL SYSTEM OF
TAQLID

The bulk of legal rules on the family that permeate
contemporary legislation in Egypt were adopted from the pre-modern
Islamic legal system that Muslims refer to as Taqlid. It is therefore
important to offer a description of this legal system as well as the
rules that emerged from it. This section begins by providing an
account of Taqlid as a system, including its distinct institutional
structure and historical legal consciousness, and proceeds to describe
the rules themselves.
The best way to understand how the Taqlid legal system
emerged and how it acquired its internal qualities and dynamics is to
contrast it first with the legal era that preceded it, namely, that of
Usul al-Fiqh (Usul), and second, with that which proceeded it,
namely, the modern legal era of European transplantation.
A. Usul Al-Fiqh
Usul al-Fiqh, meaning the "sources of jurisprudence," is a
reference to the legal theory of the famous jurist Shafi'i, written in
the ninth century. 24 The era of Usul was one in which the schools of
law started to make an appearance through engaging in the legal
activity of innovating rules inspired directly by the sources of the
religion. 25 Shafi'i', in his book al-Risala, argued that all rules of law
applied by qadis (judges) in the various Muslim territories should be
based directly on holy sources.2 6 Shafi'i defined these sources as the
Quran and Hadith.27 His theory, with its stress on the prominence of
24.
See SCHACHT, supra note 14, at 41, 45-48. (explaining that ShafiTs theory
was a powerful intervention in the legal culture of the time, as exemplified by the
statement that "Shafi'i's legal theory is a perfectly coherent system, superior by far to
the theory of the ancient schools, and he became the founder of the usul al-fikh, the
discipline dealing with the theoretical bases of Islamic law").
25.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 2 (noting the once divergent legal techniques
and sources employed by early schools of law and the eventual establishment of four
common sources of Islamic law).
26.
See WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES 28-31 (1997)
(explaining ShafiTs theory as divine in origin).
27.
Id. at 29 ("In establishing the general principles of legal reasoning, Shafi'i
insisted that no legal ruling can be propounded if it is not ultimately anchored in the
Book of God and/or the Sunna of His Prophet."); ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 5
(explaining that Sunna is a reference to the collection of Hadith, or the reported
traditions of the Prophet Mohammad, i.e., everything he had been reported to have
said, done, or approved). Hallaq observed that Shafi'i's theory is understood to have
mediated between the two prevailing legal camps of his time. See HALLAQ, supra note
26, at 18-19. Esposito noted that the first camp was that of Ra'y, or opinion, giving
judges the freedom to use their discretion to innovate rule, while the second was that of
Hadith, insisting that all rules should be based on the two holy texts, the Quran and
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the "text" (Quran and Hadith) as the basis of the rules, and the
relegation of qiyas, or analogy, and "discretion" to a secondary status,
prompted some of the main jurists of the time, who came to slowly
acquire students and followers,2 8to base the rules of law they had
innovated on some textual basis.
The schools of law, attributed retrospectively to these famous
early jurists, came into being and acquired their own distinct identity
through a complicated historical and theoretical process in which
they both acquiesced to Shafi'i's demand for textual foundationalism
but also resisted his proscription. 2 9 In the end, the schools came to be
identified in their jurisprudence along the spectrum of text on the one
side and discretion on the other, some leaning in their doctrinal
activity toward the one end and the others leaning toward the
other. 30 This intense legal activity was taking place as the Islamic
state came into being and was progressively expanding its

the Sunna of the Prophet. See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 2. In addition, Coulson
explained that
[Aish- Shafi'i's scheme embodied a compromise between divine revelation and
human reason in law and thus endeavoured to reconcile the basic conflict of
principle in the early schools between the 'party of Tradition' (ahl al-hadith)
and 'the party of reasoning' (ahl al-ra'y). It was a legal theory which expressed,
with irrefutable logic, the innate aspirations of Muslim jurisprudence.
See COULSON, supra note 11, at 61.
See HALLAQ, supra note 26, at 33 ("What may be seen as a reconciliation
28.
between the traditionalists and the rationalists-a reconciliation that began to
manifest itself only toward the very end of the third/ninth century-may also be seen
as a general acceptance of the rudimentary principles of Shafi'i's thesis.").
29.

See COULSON, supra note 11, at 90.

Hanafi and Maliki law . . . were in existence before Shafi'i formulated his
theory of usul, and although much of their law was already formally expressed
in terms of that theory, in particular as Traditions from the Prophet [Sunna],
there was residuum of local doctrine which was not so expressed; this the
Hanafis and Malikis proceeded to rationalise, in the course of the ninth
century, by modifying and supplementing ash-Shafi'i's theory in a variety of
respects.
30.

See id. at 70-71.

[t]hose who were prepared to accept the precise terms of ash-Shafi'i's doctrine
on the role of Traditions were a minority and thus, despite the consistent
repudiation of this possibility by ash-Shafi'i himself, the Shafi'i school of
law ... represented the middle position between those whose attitude toward
Traditions was more reserved and those whose enthusiastic support of them
was carried to extremes.
See also HALLAQ, supra note 26, at 33-35 (proposing that Shafi'i's al-Risala was
unnoticed for more than a century after his death as the proponents of ra'y and hadith
accommodated Shafi'i slowly).
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to apply
territories. 31 The administrators of this state felt the need
32
law that was "Islamic" to the new subjects and converts.
Whatever the sympathy of a particular school was during the
time of Usul, this era was marked by the busy and elaborate legal
activity of articulating rules of law for the first time in Islamic
history. 33 Much of this legal activity took the form of ijtihad. "As
conceived by classical Muslim jurists, ijtihad is the exertion of mental
energy in the search for a legal opinion to the extent that the
faculties of the jurist become incapable of further effort."' 34 This
activity of innovation is understood to have come to an end with the
35
advent of the Taqlid era.
B. Institutional Structure and Legal Consciousness of the Taqlid
System
Taqlid, meaning imitation, or conformism, is the word used (in a
somewhat derogatory way) to describe the legal system that prevailed
following the era of Usul in the Islamic world for a period of roughly

31.

See generally ANN K.S. LAMBTON, STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN MEDIEVAL

ISLAM xvi-xvii (1981) (describing the evolution of Islamic political ideas during the
expansion of the Muslim conquests).
32.
See id. The author writes:
With the expansion of the Muslim conquests from the year 37/657-8 onwards
Broadly speaking three
there gradually evolved a body of political ideas ....
main formulations can be distinguished; the theory of the jurists, the theory of
All three formulations set forth
the philosophers and the literary theory ....
the divine nature of the ultimate sovereignty and pre-suppose the existence of a
state within which the earthly life of the community runs its course and whose
function is to guarantee the maintenance of Islam, the application of the
shari'a,and the defence of orthodoxy against heresy.... The first formulation,
There can also be
that of the jurists, is the most truly Islamic of the three ....
discerned in it the expression of a religious ideal in opposition to practice.

Id.
33.

See HALLAQ, supra note 26, at 16.

[T]he last quarter of the first century [seventh century A.D.] saw an upsurge of
intellectual legal activity in which Arab Muslims and non-Arab converts took
part. Interest in legal issues no longer was limited to an elite who were
privileged to have been affiliated with the Prophet or with his Companions.
This increasing interest in these issues was reflected in the evolution of various
centers of legal activity throughout the Islamic lands. In the beginning of the
second century, the most prominent centers were the Hijaz, Iraq, and Syria.
Egypt became such a center soon thereafter.").
Wael B. Hallaq, Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?, 16 INT'L. J. MIDDLE E.
34.
STUD. 3, 3 (1984) ("In other words, ijtihad is the maximum effort expanded by the jurist
to master and apply the principles and rules of usul al-fiqh (legal theory) for the
purpose of discovering God's law.").
35.
See COULSON, supra note 11, at 80-81 (explaining the replacement of the
"right of ijtihad' with the "duty of taqlid').
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nine hundred years, from the tenth to the nineteenth century. 36 What
distinguishes it as a unique era in its own right is that during this
time, Muslim jurists and judges appear to have abandoned, for the
most part, the religio/legal project of coming up with new rules of law
directly inspired by the sources of the religion, or ijtihad.3 7 Rather
than pursue the project of legal innovation typical of the preceding
era of Usul, these jurists/judges concentrated their legal activity on
consolidating the legal doctrine of the school of law they were
affiliated with and to which they had deep feelings of loyalty. 38 One
followed (imitated, conformed with) the doctrine of one's school rather
than attempting a fresh reading of the word of God to come up with
new rules. 39 Taqlid, one might say, is the era of the schools of law
during which the doctrines of the various schools were treated as the

law of the land, seriously displacing and overshadowing the Quran
40
and prophetic traditions as the sources of the law.

36.

SHERMAN A. JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE 79-80 (1996); COULSON,

supra note 11, at 80-81; COULSON, supra note 11, at 80-81.
See COULSON, supra note 11, at 80-81; ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 128;
37.
Joseph Schacht, The Schools of Law and Later Developments of Jurisprudence, in
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW 57, 73 (Majid Khadduri & Herbert J.

Liebesny eds., 1955).
By the beginning of the fourth century of Islam (about A.D. 900) the point had
been reached, however, when the scholars of all surviving schools felt that all
essential questions had been thoroughly discussed and finally settled, and a
consensus gradually established itself to the effect that from that time onwards
no one could be deemed to have the necessary qualifications for independent
reasoning in law, and that all future activity would have to be confined to the
explanation, application, and, at the most, interpretation of the doctrine as it
had been laid down once and for all. It followed that from then on every Muslim
had to belong to one of the recognized schools.
But see JACKSON, supra note 36, at 73-83 (recognizing the debate regarding whether
the "closing of the door of ijtihad' had really occurred); Baber Johansen, Legal
Literatureand the Problem of Change: The Case of the Land Rent, in ISLAM AND PUBLIC
LAW (Chibli Mallat ed., 1993) (noting the scholarly debate regarding whether ijtihad
came to an end in the tenth century); Hallaq, supra note 34, at 4 (asserting that the
idea that "the gate of ijtihad was closed" completely with the dominance of the Taqlid
system is false, and that, to the contrary, the gate of ijtihad was never closed either in
theory or in practice).
38.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 128.
39.
See JACKSON, supra note 36, at 95; LAMBTON, supra note 31, at 12
("[I]jtihad,the exercise of independent reasoning, gave way to taqlid, the unreasoning
acceptance of the final state of the doctrine as laid down by each school in its
recognised handbooks.").
See COULSON, supra note 11, at 84. The author notes:
40.
From the tenth century onwards the effect of the doctrine of taqlid was
mirrored in the literature of the law. This consisted mainly of a succession of
increasingly exhaustive commentaries upon the works of the first systematic
exponents of the doctrine such as Malik, ash-Shaybani and ash-Shafi'i. Further
glossaries were appended to these commentaries; different views and lines of
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The main operators in the legal system of Taqlid were the four
principal Sunni schools of law, namely the Hanafi, the Shafi'i, the
Maliki, and the Hanbali, 41 each named after a historic jurist appearing
in the previous era of Usul. 4 2 Each school developed its own distinct
legal doctrine, or madhhab,43 as well as its own gendarme of jurists,
qadis (judges), muftis, 44 and students. The political ruler often

development were collated and amalgamated, and concise abbreviated
compendia were produced. Authors, almost without exception, betrayed a
slavish adherence, not only to the substance but also to the form and
arrangement of the doctrine as recorded in the earliest writings. By the
fourteenth century various legal texts had appeared which came to acquire a
particular reputation in the different schools and areas of Islam. Representing
for each school the statement of the law ratified by the ijma' [consensus of the
community, or of the ulama (religious scholars)], they retained their paramount
authority as expressions of Shari'a law until the advent of legal modernism in
the present century.

Id.
41.
The above-mentioned schools of law are considered the dominant schools
within the Sunni branch of Islam. Shi'ites, by contrast, have their own internally
differentiated schools and their own distinct legal theory. This article only covers the
doctrines that were in operation within the Sunni branch.
42.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 128 (reporting that "[a]fter the eleventh
century, all jurists officially followed one of the established law schools, rather than
attempting to form new ones"); see also LAMBTON, supra note 31, at 4 (noting the four
main schools of Islamic law and their origins).
43.
As one author has noted:
The word madhhab meant a number of different things, depending on how the
word was used and in what particular context. One sense of the word indicated
personal affiliation to the doctrine of an imam [founder of the school], a
meaning which had fully emerged and been solidified by the middle of the
fourth/tenth century. Perhaps a more important sense of the term was its
signification of the positive and theoretical doctrine of the imam in particular
and of his followers in general. In this sense, therefore, the madhhab acquired
the meaning of 'a school's authoritative doctrine'....
WAEL B. HALLAQ, AUTHORITY, CONTINUITY, AND CHANGE IN ISLAMIC LAW 61 (2001).
44.
"Mufti" is a reference to a juristconsult who issued "nonbinding advisory
opinions (fatawa, or fatwas) to an individual questioner (mustafti), whether in
connection with litigation or not ....
In their different venues, both qadis [judges] and
muftis are specialized in handling the everyday traffic in conflicts and questions falling
within the purview of the sharia."Muhammad Khalid Masud et al., Muftis, Fatwas,
and Islamic Legal Interpretation, in ISLAMIC LEGAL INTERPRETATION 3 (Muhammad
Khalid Masud et al. eds., 1996). "They [muftis, or juristconsults] issued fatwas in
response to a wide range of questions emanating from individual Muslims of every
status, including qadis and political authorities such as the caliph or sultan." Id. at 4.
In regards to the difference between muftis and qadis, and the opinions they issued, the
author reports that "Islamic legal doctrine generally encourages qadis to consult with
legal experts before issuing a judicial decision (hukm), especially in difficult, unusual,
or sensitive cases ..
" Id. at 10. However, "[w]hereas a judgment [issued by a qadi]
entails direct action, a fatwa provides access to shari'a knowledge in the form of a
considered opinion. Whereas a judgment carries the presumption of finality, a fatwa
enters a world of competing opinions." Id. at 19. As another author asserts, "the
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allowed these schools to operate for the benefit of their respective
constituencies (disputants and legal opinion seekers). 45 The ruler
either adopted a particular madhhab as the official law of his
territory-allowing other schools to cater to their constituencies and
followers while privileging the official madhhab--or chose to
distribute state resources equally between the various schools
46
without privileging one at the expense of the others.
The legal rules produced by the schools within this system
acquired authoritative power through their attribution to a famous
jurist of the past. 47 Any new rule had to be projected back onto a
historical authoritative figure revered among the members of the
school of law in whose doctrine this rule was making an
appearance. 48 The identity affiliation of the people operating the
system, as well as that of the constituencies they offered their
services to, was not so much with Islam as with the madhhab of the
school of law they belonged to. 49 A constituent was a Hanafi, a
Shafi'i, a Maliki, or a Hanbali. 50 Narration of the old masters' legal

function of the mufti was essentially private; his authority was based on his reputation
as a scholar, his opinion had no official sanction, and a layman might resort to any
scholar he knew and in whom he had confidence." Schacht, supra note 37, at 76.
45.
The role of muftis, as legal specialists, was vital because of the centrality of
legal reasoning in every individual's capacity as both a member of a political
community and a religion governed by these laws. The complexity of the taqlid system
meant that educated guidance was a necessity. As one author expressed,
[t]he members of the public had been in need of specialist guidance from the
very beginning of Islamic law, and this need grew stronger as the law became
more technical and its presentation more scholastic. The practical importance
of the sacred law for the pious Muslim is much greater than that of any secular
legal system for the ordinary law-abiding citizen.
Schacht, supra note 37, at 75.
46.
See JACKSON, supra note 36, at xxv (specifically in the case of thirteeth
century Egypt, "whereas in theory all of the Sunni schools were recognized as equally
authoritative, the fact that they were not all equidistant from the source of power (i.e.,
the state) inevitably conferred an added authenticity upon the views of some,
peripheralizing where not obliterating those of others.").
47.
See id. at 82-83. ('The quest for authority to back and validate legal
interpretations is reflected in a number of phenomena ....
[J]urists often disguise their
own interpretations as having originated with earlier authorities."); see also COULSON,
supra note 11, at 94-95.
48.
See JACKSON, supra note 36, at 82-83; see also BERNARD G. WEISS, THE
SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW 88-97 (1998) (providing a detailed description of the method
used by jurists to bolster their opinions with historical support).
49.
See JACKSON, supra note 36, at 79 (noting that even "legal opinions
themselves came ultimately to be judged not on the basis of their intrinsic quality but
by whether or not they carried the endorsement of the madhhab as a whole"); Schacht,
supra note 37, at 68-70 (listing the different regions and nations that historically
ascribed to each of the four Sunni schools).
50.
Indeed, once a "validly deduced view" was endorsed by one of the four Sunni
schools on a disputed question of law, and was confirmed by consensus (generally of the
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microopinions, or those of the Prophet's Companions, on a given
51
matter was the most common way of reporting legal rules.
Under Taqlid, each school of law produced its own internally
complex structure of jurists, judges, and muftis whose role was to
engage in pedagogy, adjudication, and interpretation of the doctrine
of the school. 52 There was little attempt under the Taqlid system to
rationalize or abstract the doctrine of the school to make it easy to
implement, a desire symptomatic of the rise of the modern nationstate with its centralized legal system. 5 3 In fact, the doctrine of the
school was scattered in a vast literature varying from treatises to
54
commentaries to books on responsa (fatwa).
The legal actors in the system attempted to manage complex
cases and to avoid the application of conflicting rules to the same
situation by relegating cases to the hierarchical organization of the
school. 55 Thus, the simple cases went to the lower jurists and the

legal scholars of the school), it became binding on the entire community, or all the
members of the school. See JACKSON, supra note 36, at 108. In regard to the modern
era, one author reports that, "[e]ven though Islamic law was disestablished in most
Muslim nations in the nineteenth century, most Muslims have continued to be
associated with the particular school that has historically dominated their region."
Clark Benner Lombardi, Islamic Law as a Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt: The
Constitutionalizationof the Sharia in a Modern Arab State, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 81, 94 (1998). In addition, the author notes that "[t]he Hanafi school claims the
nominal allegiance of sixty percent of all Muslims in the world-including most
Egyptians." Id.
51.
See LAMBTON, supra note 31, at 4 (reporting that "[iln due course much of
what had originally been arbitrary decisions by scholars was projected backwards and
ascribed to the prophet or one of the great figures of the past").
52.
See generally GEORGE MAKDISI, THE RISE OF COLLEGES (1981). Each
schools' jurists, muftis, and judges were trained in madrasas. As Makdisi reports, "[iln
classical Islam, the madrasa was the institution of learning par excellence, in that it
was devoted primarily to the study of Islamic law, queen of the Islamic sciences." Id. at
9. The author explains:
These institutions of learning may be further divided into exclusive and
unrestricted institutions: exclusive, in that they were devoted to a particular
madhab, and admission was restricted to members of that madhab;
unrestricted, in the sense that members of all schools could be admitted.
Exclusivity applied only to institutions teaching law.
Id. at 10.
53.
See JACKSON, supra note 36, at 98-99. In the absence of consensus on any
given issue, differences of opinion were allowed to stand, and a multiplicity of plausible
legal opinions existed between madhhabs. See id. In addition, within each school,
internal complexity was created as jurists resorted to the formulation of new, distinct
classifications and exceptions rather than modifying a religiously mandated rule. See
id.
54.
See COULSON, supra note 11, at 84-85; Johansen, supra note 37, at 32-33;
see also supra note 44 (defining "fatwa").
55.
See JACKSON, supra note 36, at 97. The author reports that according to the
"hierarchal internal structure" of the madhhabs, there were three ranks: beginners,
graduate students, and masters or teachers-the muftis, whom he also calls rais. "It
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harder ones went to the more senior ones. 56 And in the end, "God
knows best." 57 The place of a single jurist in the hierarchy was
determined by his knowledge and mastery of the doctrine of the
school and of its legal methodology. 58
New rules to be applied to new situations were derived from the
madhhab of the school. 59 This was done by following the principles
developed by the master authorities of this madhhab, constituting a
kind of "usul of the School. '60 Shafi'i's methodology for deriving new

was the ra'is who represented the madhhab on difficult and extremely controversial
issues. It was also the view of the ra'is, along with that of his closest competitors within
a school, that stood the greatest chance of becoming the view of the madhhab."Id.
56.
See id.
57.

See NORMAN ANDERSON, LAW REFORM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 38 (1976)

(reporting that "[i]t was God himself and his law which were sovereign, not the
Government or people").
58.
See JACKSON, supra note 36, at 96-101.
59.
See id. at 82-83. Jackson writes:
As it became increasingly apparent that the view most likely to receive the
widest application was that which could be shown to enjoy the widest
endorsement within a school at large, jurists found themselves in need of ways
to show that their conclusions had not deviated from the position of the
madhhab, or at least from what they could claim the position of the madhhab
should be ....
[N]o longer was it the case that a view was rendered orthodox
merely by the fact that it issued from an authorized jurist; it was now the
madhhab as a whole that conferred this status upon a view.

Id.
60.
See HALLAQ, supra note 43, at 61. "Whereas the earlier period (which had
ended, so to speak, by the middle of the fourth/tenth century) was one of almost
indistinguishable plurality, the century or two immediately succeeding it witnessed a
significant narrowing of doctrinal possibilities." Id. Thus, as Hallaq explains, taqlid
involved "the act of following the totality of the founder's legal doctrines as a
methodologically systematic structure ....
." Id. at 86. This "usul," connoting a
methodology unique to a given school, is to be distinguished from Shafi'i's methodology,
which he had sought to have all schools comply with. As Jackson reports:
[I]n extrapolating from the madhhab of an Imam [founder of a school] a jurist
also had to be certain not to violate any legal precepts, or so-called qawa'id.
Legal precepts are essentially broad-based rules or tests deduced from the
aggregate of opinions of the early Imams ....
[W]here the need did arise to
consult scripture on an unprecedented matter, legal precepts ensured that the
resulting interpretations did not violate the madhhab of the respective Imam.
See JACKSON, supra note 36, at 92-93. In addition, it was not enough
for a jurist to have mastered the discipline of usul al-fiqh. This is because ...
'there are many precepts of the shariah relied upon by the Imams and the
ancient masters that are nowhere to be found in the books of usul al-fiqh.' In
the final analysis, what this stipulation comes down to is the prima facie
counterintuitive conclusion that, whereas mastery of usul al-fiqh had been
enough to qualify a jurist to practice ijtihad in the early period, now it would
not be enough to qualify him to engage successfully in taqlid!
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rules became overshadowed and displaced by each school's own
usul. 61 These sub-rules were understood to be derived essentially
from the rules of the madhhab rather than a fresh reading of the holy
62
texts following the methodology of Usul al-Fiqh.
During the Taqlid era, change in the legal doctrine of any of the
schools was acknowledged implicitly rather than explicitly given the
63
authoritative hold of the opinions of the masters of the school. It
often took place at the lower level of the system through, for example,
legal opinions given by muftis or cases adjudicated by judges, without
64
such change being reflected in the official treatises of the school.
Official treatises were typically used for pedagogical purposes, and
they allowed the doctrine of the school to have the appearance of an
unchanging code. 65 It is the fact that legal doctrine never changed in
an explicit way that marked this period inaccurately as one of Taqlid,
or imitation.6 6 Recent historians of Islamic law have argued that in

Id. For this reason, the author asserts that "[t]aqlid, in other words ... represents a
more rather than less advanced stage of legal development." Id. at 93.
61.
See HALLAQ, supra note 43, at 57-75 (detailing the historical processes by
which there was a "rise and augmentation of school authority"); JACKSON, supra note
36, at 73 (noting that the madhhabs were "a tightly-knit structure held together by
mutual subscription to a strict body of legal rules").
62.
See HALLAQ, supranote 43, at 57-75.
63.
See Johansen, supra note 37; see also JACKSON, supra note 36, at 97-102.
Jackson refers to the implicit process of change as "legal scaffolding" by the statement:
Rather than abandon existing rules in favor of new interpretations from the
sources, needed adjustments are sought through new divisions, classifications,
distinctions, exceptions and expanding or restricting the scope of existing rules.
To be sure, only ranking jurists acquired enough authority over time to be able
to challenge an incumbent view or introduce a new one; and it was only they
who possessed enough skill to engage successfully in legal scaffolding.
Id. at 97.
64.
See Johansen, supra note 37, at 29-47; see also JACKSON, supra note 36, at
97-102. Hallaq reports:
On the micro-level ... plurality of opinion within a given school was literally
the name of the game. Each school possessed a vast corpus of opinions
attributed to the founder, his immediate followers, and later authorities. In
other words, they represented the total sum of doctrinal accretions beginning
with the founder down to any point of time in the history of the school.
HALLAQ, supra note 43, at 122.
65.
See JACKSON, supra note 36, at 98 ("For even where the rules on the books
appear to have lost a measure of suitability, they remained important repositories of
authority."); see also Johansen, supra note 37, at 31 ("Islamic law, as embodied in these
texts, remained largely unchanged after the tenth and eleventh centuries.").
66.
See JACKSON, supra note 36, at 77-78. The author notes that although there
may be difference of opinion on whether the gate of ijtihad truly closed completely
during the taqlid era, "it seems clear that by the later middle ages the activities of the
individual jurist came to be significantly circumscribed by his membership in a
particular madhhab. The madhhab, moreover, clearly became the context within which
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fact new rules were invented all the time during the Taqlid era in a
complex way, and that to characterize the era as stalemated and one
67
of endless imitation is simply false.
By the tenth century, Taqlid displaced and transcended Usul in
the Islamic world, and the modern legal system identified as
European legal transplants displaced and transcended Taqlid by the
nineteenth century. However, while Taqlid displaced Usul, occasional
medieval jurists during the Taqlid era would call for the reinnovation of Taqlid law through a return to Usul. 68 In addition,
while the modern legal system identified as European transcended
Taqlid, it nevertheless incorporated some of its rules whenever it
desired to mark its doctrine as "Islamic," as has been the case with
family law. 6 9 Similarly, some jurists called for a return to Usul in the
all interpretive activity took place." Id. at 77. "Ijtihad, understood here not merely as
the fresh, unfettered and direct interpretation of scripture but also as the clear and
open advocacy of views as having resulted from such a process, ceased to be dominate
from around the 6th/12th century." Id. at 78. In addition, the author explains the
negative connotations of the word taqlid: "As a technical term, 'taqlid' is commonly
translated as 'blind following,' 'imitation,' 'servile imitation,' 'unquestioning
acceptance,' 'unreasoning acceptance.' Such appellations tend not only to cast taqlid in
a wholly negative light but also to obscure the basic logic underlying the institution
itself." Id. at 80. Wael Hallaq points out that an alternative way to look at some
historical instances of taqlid is not simply as "blind imitation," which has a negative
connotation, but as the positive loyalty which an adherent had to his school. HALLAQ,
supra note 43, at 103-04. Hallaq further points out that:
This loyalty would not have been the same had the jurists found it necessary to
vindicate the school's principles at every state of reproducing doctrine. Loyalty
meant precisely the acceptance of these principles-though not necessarily
unquestioningly-and more importantly, it meant applying them to individual
cases .... [L]oyalty also meant a defense of the principles as well as of the
hermeneutics of the school.
Id.
67.
See HALLAQ, supra note 43, at 119 (insisting that "taqlid is far from the
blind following of an authority, as a number of major Islamicists have claimed");
JACKSON, supra note 36, at 101 ("[L]egal change and innovation both remain realities
even under a r6gime of taqlid."). See generally Johansen, supra note 37.
68.
See Hallaq, supra note 34, at 10-33; see also Schacht, supra note 37, at 74
(noting that the Zahiri school in theory rejected taqlid and that a follower of this school,
the prominent jurist Ibn Taymiyya, and other adherents considered it dangerous to
follow blindly anyone but the Prophet Mohammad).
69.
Indeed, many authors note the fact that elites and legislators were hesitant
to "reform" or replace Islamic laws on the family with secular laws of European origin
because of the strong public conception of the importance of the Islamicity of said rules.
See, e.g., EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 3 (writing that
[flor Muslims, the Shari'ah is the law of God .... The Shari'ah covers all
aspects of life and every field of law-constitutional, international, criminal,
civil and commercial-but at its very heart lies the law of the family. Although
by the mid-nineteenth century many areas of traditional Islamic law had been
swept away . . . changes in the law of the family came later and were
undertaken with great delicacy.
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modern era as a response both to the contemporary European
influence in the legal system and the stalemated Taqlid. 70 Indeed,
Muslim legal modernists of the twentieth century acquired
prominence through continuing the Taqlid tradition of calling for a
71
return to Usul.
C. A Legal Narrativeof Marriageand Divorce in the Taqlid Treatises
The issues covered in the Taqlid treatises in the realm of the
family demonstrate the manner in which the Taqlid jurisprudence
regulated the two general legal acts of marriage and divorce. A legal
narrative is presented here on marriage and divorce by discussing
topics related to these two fundamental legal acts typically dealt with
in the Taqlid treatises. 72 How did marriage take place? What legal

70.
See JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM THE STRAIGHT PATH 139-40 (1998) (explaining
that the South Asian modernist Muhammad Iqbal
regarded the condition of Islam as a 'dogmatic slumber' that had resulted in
five hundred years of immobility due to the blind following of tradition and
believed that the restoration of Islamic vitality required the 'reconstruction' of
the sources of Islamic law .... Iqbal rejected the centuries-long tendency to
regard Islamic law as fixed and sacrosanct. Like other Islamic revivalists and
modernists, he believed that Muslims must once again reassert their right to
ijtihad,to reinterpret and reapply Islam to changing social conditionsD].
ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 129 (noting that the Egyptian modernist Muhammad Abduh
wrote in the early twentieth century of the "disease of taqlid that afflicted many
Muslims" and called on Muslims to engage in ijtihad).
71.
See HALLAQ, supra note 26, at 210.
72.
The Taqlid treatises differ on the level of micro-discussions they delve into.
The topics they cover demonstrate the manner in which the Taqlid jurisprudence
regulated the two general legal acts of marriage and divorce, and include the marriage
contract (aqd al-nikah); the guardian (al-wali); equality ('kafaa); the unlawfuls (almuharramat);the marriage of pleasure (nikah.al-mutaa);(nikah al-shighar);the dowry
(al-sidaq,al mahr); the terms of the marriage contract (shurut al-aqd); (khayarfi alnikah); publicizing the marriage (al-walima); treatment of wives, which includes
equality of treatment, leaving the house without permission, sexual enjoyment,
housework, and disobedience (ghasam bayna al-zawjat); divorce (talaq); maintenance,
which includes the maintenance of the wife, children, parents, relatives, and other
members of the household (nafaqa); and custody (hadana).
Al-muharramat, or unlawfuls, refers to the women a man cannot legal marry. The
topic of "unlawfuls" covers the way the law organizes the prohibitions dictated by the
"incest taboo" among others. Sura 4:23 of the Qur'an declares, "[florbidden to you are
your mothers, your daughters, your sisters, your paternal and maternal aunts, the
daughters of your brothers and sisters .... THE KORAN 63 (N.J. Dawood ed., 1994).
Sura 4:22-4:24 provide in general the sources of al-muharramatfor reasons of affinity
and consanguinity. See id.
The topic of shurut al-aqd covers what may or may not be included as terms in the
marriage contract by either party. Couples are permitted to stipulate conditions in
their marriage contract; however, stipulations must comply with the principles of the
shari'a. "If any condition could be proven void under the Sharia, it should not be
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actions were necessary for one to be married, stay married, get
divorced, get custody of children, and then move on? This section is
for the benefit of the uninitiated reader who is unfamiliar with the
Islamic legal system and the way Muslims have legally conducted
their marriages and divorces. It is important to note that the legal
narrative related to each of these issues still holds true for most
73
Muslims today.
An important point related to the topic of marriage under Taqlid
law and under general Islamic legal doctrine is that Muslim women
retain both their juridical personality as well as whatever property
they own when they enter marriage. 74 In addition, they are under no

stipulated at all, and if made, must be deemed null and void." NASIR, supra note 10, at
58.
In regard to publicizing the marriage, or al-walima, it is reported that the first of
the Caliphs recognized by the Sunnis to legitimately succeed the Prophet Mohammad
as the leader of the Muslim community, Abu Bakr, stated that "[m]arriage in secret is
not allowed until it is publicized and witnessed." Id. at 56. The Prophet Mohammad
himself is reported to have said, "[plublicize marriage even with timbals." Id.
73.
See DR. M. AFZAL WANI, THE ISLAMIC LAW ON MAINTENANCE OF WOMEN,
CHILDREN, PARENTS & OTHER RELATIVES 30 (1995).

Toward the end of the last century the British and French Colonial forces
replaced in their dominians the Islamic administrative, civil and revenue laws
by modern codes of civil and criminal law. However, the Islamic laws relating to
personal status, including matters like marriage, divorce, mahr, maintenance
and succession continue to remain, till date, applicable in all Muslim countries
and also to the Muslims of many other non-Muslim states. In many of these
countries the Muslim Personal Law has been fully or partly codified.
74.

See id. at 8. Dr. Wani reports that

[t]he Quran . . . manifestly recognises the rights of women to earn, hold and
inherit property. Her property is not the property of the husband. She enjoys a
separate legal existence. If the husband predeceases the wife she inherits a
part of his property and if the wife predeceases the husband he also inherits a
part of her property.
See also Dr. Zahia Qaddura, Woman's Rights in Islam, in I ISLAM AND FAMILY
PLANNING 67, 79 (International Planned Parenthood Federation ed., 1974). Dr.
Qaddura notes that "Islam gave woman the right to administer her own financial
affairs and to develop her own capital .... Neither her husband nor her father had the
authority to prevent her from, or restrict her freedom of action in the exercise of any of
the functions she felt inclined to undertake." Id. In addition, Professor Esposito asserts
that "[a]lthough each party in a marriage may inherit from the other, neither acquires
interest in the property of a spouse because of the marriage." ESPOSITO, supra note 5,
at 23. Another author explains that "[t]he duties imposed by the law do not impose any
financial duty on a wife with respect to her marital life . . . and her husband has no
authority over her property. Indeed, she has full freedom to manage her own property
whatsoever. Her property is entirely independent from his." Muhammad Abu Zahra,
Family Law, in ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW 141 (Majid Khadduri &
Herbert J. Liebesny eds., 1955). For a discussion of this rule and its practical
significance in the lives of women in nineteenth century Egypt, see JUDITH E. TUCKER,
WOMEN IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY EGYPT 44-45 (1985).
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obligation to maintain the marital household except under limited
75
circumstances when the husband is in need.
In order for a marriage to take place, there must be an offer and
acceptance. 76 Any party can include terms in the contract as long as
such terms do not violate "the nature of marriage. 7 7v The husband
has to pay the woman her dowry, or mahr, immediately upon the
marriage as an effect of the contract unless the wife agrees to defer
payment of some or the entire amount to a future time.78 The mahr is
79
paid to the bride herself, not to her father or any other party.
Having received the agreed share of her mahr, the woman must then
move to her husband's residence (which, by law, should be
appropriate)8 0 and provide him with her "conjugal society. 81 It is

75.
The maintenance of children is, as is the general maintenance of the
household, the sole responsibility of the husband. However, as one author notes,
[i]f the father is indigent, the mother, if possessing sufficient means, has to
maintain the child. If the mother has no property or an earning she cannot be
forced to maintain the child. Since her obligation to maintain the child is not
absolute [unlike that of the father], she is to be reimbursed by the father
whenever it becomes possible for him.
WANI, supra note 73, at 228.
76.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 16.
Essential to the marriage is the offer (ijab) of one contracting party and the
acceptance (qabul) of the other, occurring at the same meeting before two
witnesses.... A distinguishing feature of Islamic law is the power (jabr)that it
bestows upon the father or grandfather, who can contract a valid marriage for
minors that cannot be annulled at puberty. The right of guardianship is known
as wilayat and the guardian is a wali.
Id. The offer is made by the woman (or her guardian, or agent) to be accepted by the
man (or his guardian if a minor, or agent). See MUHAMMAD JAWAD MAGHNIYYAH, THE
FIVE SCHOOLS OF ISLAMIC LAW 260 (1995). "[Mlarriage is performed by the recital of a
marriage contract which contains an offer made by the bride or her deputy (naib), such
as her guardian or agent (wakil), and a corresponding acceptance by the groom or his
deputy." Id.
77.
See Zahra, supra note 74, at 140-41.
78.
See id. at 141-42; see also ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 24 (noting that "the
practice of dividing the dower into two portions, prompt (muqaddam) and deferred
(muakhkhar), is universal in the Hanafi school"); NASIR, supra note 10, at 86
(explaining if the woman decides to defer the payment of some of her mahr, then it
becomes divided into two parts, the immediate or prompt mahr, paid upon contract,
and the deferred mahr, paid either on some agreed upon date, or, if such date is not set,
upon divorce or death).
79.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 23.
80.
See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 20.
The law requires that the dwelling which a husband provides for his wife must
fulfill certain requirements. It must be safe structurally and situated in a safe
locality so that the wife is not afraid to go outside. Further it must be free from
the presence of other members of the husband's family.
NASIR, supra note 10, at 79-80.
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understood that the husband has earned this right to her society by
paying the wife's mahr.82 The wife then starts to earn her daily
maintenance (nafaqah) as his spouse so long as she commits herself
to him. 83 If she proves to be "disobedient" by leaving the house
without his permission or without good reason, or denies him sexual
84
access, she loses her maintenance money.

It is the duty of the husband to provide, and the right of the wife to have, a
suitable matrimonial home ....
The wife should follow the husband to the
matrimonial home, provided that it complies with the Sharia requirements,
that is, that it should be in accordance with the husband's financial standing;
habitable, private and not occupied by others, even if they are the husband's
kin; and provided that the husband is trustworthy toward her and her assets,
and has paid her dower or the agreed prompt portion thereof.
81.
"Conjugal society" involves providing the husband sexual access as well as
not leaving the house without his permission. Thus, as one author describes it,
maintenance is due the wife after the celebration of a valid marriage contract if she
"places, or offers to place, herself in the husband's power so as to allow him free access
to herself at all lawful times" and if "she obeys all his lawful commands for the
duration of marriage." NASIR, supra note 10, at 98. As another author reports,
"[a]ccording to the Hanafis, when a wife confines herself to her husband's house and
does not leave it except with his permission, she shall be regarded as 'obedient'....
Thus the cause which entitles her to maintenance, according to the Hanafis, is her
confining herself to her husband's home .. " MAGHNIYYAH, supranote 76, at 357-58.
82.
See MAGHNIYYAH, supra note 76, at 316.
83.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 25 (reporting that the husband is obliged to
pay his wife her maintenance (nafaqah) "unless she refuses him conjugal rights or is
otherwise disobedient").
84.
See id; see also WANI, supra note 73, at 49. Wani reports:
A wife is said to be a nashizah when she is refractory, unsubmissive or
disobedient, that is, when she does not abide by the Islamic instructions
regarding her behaviour toward the husband without any reasonable cause. In
actual practice a wife is deemed to be a nashizah when she leaves her
husband's house without any just reasons and when she does not allow him
access to her. A wife who leaves her husband's house, on her own, without any
justifiable cause is not entitled to maintenance....
Id. Another author reports that "[o]bedience is a right which the husband can demand
of his wife. By obedience is meant that she should transfer herself to his domicile, live
with him, and that they should live together in harmony." Zahra, supra note 74, at 145.
Another author asserts that "[s]ince it is the tamkeen [conjugal society], i.e. the
availability of the wife for her husband, and not the marriage contract itself, that
makes maintenance the lawful right of the wife, this right shall be lost if the husband
is denied access to the wife.... NASIR, supra note 10, at 99. In addition, for a
definition of obedience, see MAGHNIYYAH, supra note 76, at 357-59. "If a wife leaves her
husband's home without his permission or refuses to reside in a house which fits her
status, she shall be considered 'disobedient' and shall not be entitled to her
maintenance according to all the schools." Id. at 359. The author adds that "[t]he
schools concur that a disobedient wife is not entitled to maintenance. But they differ
regarding the extent of disobedience which causes the maintenance to subside." Id. at
357.
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If the husband wishes to end the marriage, he divorces his wife
85
by uttering a legally accepted formula under certain conditions,
after which the divorced wife spends her idda (waiting period) in her
husband's residence 86 and receives support from him.8 7 During this
period the husband may return his wife to himself and cancel the
divorce without her consent. 88 The purpose behind idda is to allow
the husband to reconsider his decision and to determine whether the
wife is pregnant, in which case her waiting period extends until she
89
gives birth.
If it is the woman who wishes to divorce her husband and there
are no grounds that are legally acceptable for her to request it, she
can still exit the marriage through a khul divorce. 90 If the husband
agrees to khul, the woman must usually pay him some or all of her
mahr, waive the deferred part of her mahr, or both-although this is
92
not a necessary condition. 91 If the husband agrees to the divorce,
then he is in no position to return her to himself during the waiting
93
period without her consent.
Once the waiting period is over, the divorce becomes final and
the financial obligations between the couple are terminated, unless
they have minor children. In this case, the wife receives custody of

85.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 28-34 (describing the five classifications of
divorce in Islam).
86.
See MAGHNIYYAH, supra note 76, at 415.
87.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 35; see also MAGHNIYYAH, supra note 76, at
356 (noting "[t]he legal schools concur ... that the maintenance of a divorcee is wajib
[obligatory] during the 'iddah.... ).
88.
See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 23 explaining that
[n]o particular formality is attached to revocation of talaq [divorce] and it may
be made expressly by the husband declaring that he has revoked the talaq or
implied by the husband's conduct, such as resuming cohabitation, and even, in
the Hanafi law, by merely kissing or touching his wife . . . he has the right to
revoke the talaq if he wishes, whether his wife wants him to do so or not.
MAGHNIYYAH, supra note 76, at 417 (noting that "[a]l-raj'ah in the terminology of
legists is restoration of the divorcbe and her marital status. It is valid by consensus [of
the four schools] and does not require a guardian, or mahr, or the divorc6e's consent, or
any action on her part .... ").
89.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 20, 34.
90.
See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 27-28 (providing a general
explanation of khul divorce).
91.
See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 27-28.
92.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 104 (explaining that for a judge to be able to
declare a khul divorce, the husband must agree to it).
93.
MAGHNIYYAH, supra note 76, at 417 (explaining that "[t]he schools concur
that it is necessary that the divorc6e being restored be in the iddah of a revocable
divorce. Thus there is no raj'ah for . . . the divorcee of khul' against a consideration,
because the marital bond between the two has been dissolved.").
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the children until they reach a particular age. 94 During this time, the
husband has to maintain the divorced wife and the children under
her custody. 95 The wife's custody, however, only includes nurturing
and nursing the children, while the husband retains the power of

"instruction" and guardianship, including administering the child's
property and money. 96 After the custody period is over, the children
97
live with their father.

94.
See NASIR, supra note 10, at 159 ("All Schools, Sunni and Shia alike, hold
that the mother, whether she is separated or living with her husband, has the first
claim to the custody of her infant, but she cannot be compelled to undertake it due to
"). The schools differ, however, over the age until which the
her inability to do so ..
mother has custody, but it is usually at the end of the childhood years and before they
become of majority age. Id. at 170; see also ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 35 ("Under
Hanafi law, the divorced mother has the right to custody of her male child until he is
seven years old and of her female child until puberty, set at age nine.").
95.
"[M]aintenance is a right of the minors who have no property, on their
... NASIR, supra note 10, at 174. If children have the means to provide
father.
maintenance for poor parents, they must do so. Id. However, the father alone has the
responsibility of financial support of minor children. See THE HEDAYA 146 (Charles
Hamilton trans., 1975) ("The maintenance of infant children rests upon their father;
"). While the mother
and no person can be his associate or partner in furnishing it ..
in general has custodial duties related to her children, many of these duties, such as
suckling, can be delegated, at the expense of the husbandlfatherIf the child be an infant at the breast, there is no obligation upon the mother to
suckle it, because the infant's maintenance rests upon the father, and in the
same manner the hire of a nurse; it is possible, moreover, that the mother may
not be able to suckle it, from want of health or other sufficient excuse, in which
case any constraint upon her for that purpose would be an act of injustice.
Id. However, in the case of adult daughters, or adult sons who are disabled (and thus
cannot work to support themselves), there is disagreement; in some cases, the
maintenance, "rests upon the parents in three equal parts, two-thirds being furnished
by the father, and one-third by the mother, because the inheritance of a father from the
estate of his son or daughter is two-thirds, and that of a mother one-third." Id. at 148.
The same author notes that other schools assign "the whole of the maintenance ...
upon the father ....
Id. As for the maintenance of the wife after divorce, one author
notes that "[y]oung children remain in the custody of their divorced mother, unless she
is otherwise unfit ....
While she nurses the young children and cares for the rest, it is
the father's responsibility to bear the full cost of this care and equitably compensate
the mother therefore." HAMMUHAD 'ABD AL 'ATI, THE FAMILY STRUCTURE IN ISLAM 246
(1977).
96.
See NASIR, supra note 10, at 158-59 (noting the "guardianship of education
(wilayat al-Tarbiyya) [is] believed under the Sharia to be the duty of men rather than
women" while "guardianship of property (al wilayatu alal maal) if the child has any
property, [is] again a task for men rather than for women").
97.
See MAGHNIYYAH, supra note 76, at 351-52. However, as the author
explains, this is not necessarily the case, and rules differ according to the school of law.
For instance, under Shafi'i doctrine, there are no set ages until which the mother has
custody; instead, "the child shall remain with its mother until it is able to choose
between the two parents; and when it has reached the discriminating age it will choose
[I1f the child keeps quiet and does not choose any one of them, the
between the two ....
custody shall lie with the mother." Id. The author also reports that under Hanbali
doctrine, although the mother has custody until the child is seven years of age,
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After divorce, when there are no minor children under the
custody of the woman, she maintains herself by spending her own
money if she has any or by being provided for by one of her male
98
relatives, as long as they are able financially to do so.
The marriage and divorce narrative that I have put together
from a reading of the doctrinal areas covered in the medieval Taqlid
treatises is somewhat simplistic and leaves out some details,
nuances, and qualifications. It is designed to give the reader a quick
sense of the way Taqlid jurisprudence conceived of the distribution of
wealth and power between men and women (husband and wife,
father and child) at the beginning of marriage, during marriage, and
after its termination.
D. The Family in the Doctrine of the Taqlid Schools of Law: A
StructuralistReading
The Taqlid rules on marriage and divorce, outlined above,
established a general framework within which the family was
expected to operate. This framework served to define the marital
relationship and indeed can be read and understood to have set the
boundaries and limits for the rights and obligations of both the wife
and the husband. Therefore, the rules that have historically defined
the status of the woman and man within the family, particularly
within the marriage, are important to understand not only for the
influence they had in defining past notions of patriarchy and for
legally defining particular gender roles, but also because these same
rules are the precursor to the contemporary family law in Egypt as
well as the rest of the Arab world. 99
Providing a structural reading of family law doctrine under the
regime of Taqlid is not an easy. The doctrines of each school of law, as
was explained above, were scattered in multiple treatises, each
having a different status within the doctrine. Over time, these

irrespective of sex, "after that, the child can chose to live with one of the parents." Id. at
352.
98.

ABD AL-Aziz MUSA AMIR, AL-AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIYAH Fi AL-SHARIA AL-

ISLAMIYYA 513 (2d ed. 1976) (on file with author).
Femaleness is the cause of maintenance since a female is incapable of
maintaining herself. Consequently her maintenance is the obligation of her
relatives, whether she was young or old, whether she was in fact capable of
working or not. As for the female who does work, then she has no right to
maintenance and is expected to use her income to support herself.
99.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 47 (noting that although codes modeled on
those found in European countries were introduced in much of the Islamic world by the
nineteenth century, (in the case of Egypt, France), "Islamic law, however, remained
central to family law").
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treatises were reproduced, commented upon, and the commentaries
themselves commented upon. Moreover, each such collection
contained majority and minority views within the school, such views
changing slowly over time through the very act of exposition and
commentary. In addition, as was also mentioned above, doctrine was
embodied in the collection of fatwas, legal opinions given by muftis
(Islamic scholars) in response to questions posed by private
individuals outside the context of litigation; qadis (judges) in the
context of litigation; and even by the ruler himself. However, this
author is by no means the only "modern" presented with what seems
on first blush to be such an unnerving task. Condensation for the
sake of exposition of doctrines developed over centuries inside a
system that accommodated and managed internal divisions of opinion
on any given matter left Muhammad Jawad Maghniyyah, the author
of the book The Five Schools of Islamic Law, equally puzzled. As
Maghniyyah asserts,
[F]iqh [jurisprudence] is an infinite sea, as one matter can be divided
into different ramifications, about any of which the schools' opinions
may be numerous and contradictory, including the opinions of the
fuqaha [jurists] of the same school, or even the opinions of the same
scholar. Any one trying to have full conception of any ethical matter,
will encounter the severest hardship and suffering, let alone the whole
fiqh, with its branches: the rituals (ibadat), and transactions
100
(mu'amalat)according to all schools?!

Daunting as the task is, this section argues for the following
structural features of the doctrines of the schools:
The views of the four Sunni schools of law on any given doctrinal
area relating to marriage and divorce are widely divergent from each
other, so that differences between them sometimes read like the
difference between earth and sky.
No one school has an internally coherent view of the family that
can be distinguished from the views of the next one. It is very difficult
indeed to do a reading of the doctrine of a given school that would
allow one to predict the position of the school on the next doctrinal
issue.
* Example 1: Although the doctrine of the Hanafi school of law,
unlike that of other Sunni schools, gives the woman of
majority age complete freedom to marry without requiring
her guardian's consent, it nevertheless gives the guardian the
right to dissolve her marriage after she has married on the
basis of the doctrine of kafaa (equality). 1 1 Moreover, those

100.
MAGHNIYYAH, supra note 76, at xiv.
101.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 15, 21. As one author put it, "Abu Hanifa
was just as severe regarding the conditions with respect to suitability (kifa'a) as he was
liberal in granting freedom to a woman to choose her husband." Zahra, supra note 74,

20041

MODERNIZING MUSLIM FAMILY LAW

1069

who belong to the Hanafi school interpret this doctrine very
loosely, providing several grounds according to which the
guardian can exercise his right, paradoxically giving him
10 2
enormous power over the fate of the marriage.
9 Example 2: While the doctrine of the Maliki school of law
allows the wife to request divorce on the basis of "harm,"103 it
nevertheless gives the guardian absolute freedom to marry off
his daughter of majority age and treat her consent as
04
absolutely unnecessary.
As divergent as the schools are in their views, they do, however,
agree on the nature of the legal acts that need to be undertaken for a
marriage to take place, for it to continue, and those that are needed
for it to terminate. They also share common ideas about the nature of
the transactional relationship that the contract of marriage
establishes between men and women and the way in which
patriarchal power within the family (that of the husband or father) is
organized. These nodal points of agreement on the general doctrinal
structure of marriage and divorce arise because of a "topical"
consensus among the Taqlid jurists (rather than a consensus of
opinion about a given legal matter). In other words, if one is to
discuss marriage and divorce under the Taqlid jurisprudence, then
10 5
one needs to discuss a particular set of topics.
Internal tensions permeate the doctrines on the family.
e Example: Under the topic of "contract conditions," one notes
the tension between, on the one hand, treating marriage as
purely "contractual" in the sense that it is open for
contractual terms to be included by either husband or wife
and, on the other hand, the idea that marriage is "status"

at 138. According to the doctrine of kafaa, which is contemplated by all four major
schools of Sunni law, the husband has to be of "equal" status to his wife; otherwise, the
marriage is subject to dissolution either upon the request of the wife (if she had been
married by her guardian) or by the guardian if the woman married without his consent.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 15, 21.
102.

See Zahra, supra note 74, at 138; see also IBN ABIDIN, HASHIYAT RADD AL-

MUHTAR, Vol. 3, 84-95 (2d ed. 1979); NASIR, supra note 10, at 61 (reporting that
"[e]quality, which can be defined as parity of status, is considered by the Hanafis in six
matters: lineage, Islam, freedom, property, trade or craft, and piety").
103.

See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAMIC LAW: A COMPENDIUM OF THE VIEWS OF THE

MAJOR SCHOOLS 539-40 (Laleh Bakhtiar ed., 1996) (explaining that the only other
school of law to accept harm as grounds for a divorce initiated by a wife is the Hanbali
school); see also AL-SADEQ ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-GHARYANI, MUDAWWANAT AL-FIQH ALMALIKI WAADILLATUHU 12-15 (1st ed. 2002).
104.
See COULSON, supra note 11, at 94 ("In Maliki law a marriage can be
validly contracted only by the bride's guardian"); see also AL-GHARYANI, supra note 103,
at 560 ("The father has the right to coerce his virgin daughter to marry, whether she
was a minor or of majority age, even if she reached forty.").
105.
For a list of these topics, see supra note 72.
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that precludes including certain terms that are regarded as
"violating the nature of marriage."' 1 6 This tension arises
when the following questions are discussed in the treatises:
Can a woman stipulate in the marriage contract that her
husband cannot take a second wife? 107 Can she stipulate that

106.
See, e.g., MAGHNIYYAH, supra note 76, at 267-69; see also ESPOSITO, supra
note 5, at 22-23. Professor Esposito reports:
The wife's ability to make conditions, provided that they are not contrary to the
object of marriage, can resolve many inequities in areas such as polygamy and
divorce .... Agreements on conditions can be drawn up at the time of the
marriage or afterward, and are valid and enforceable provided they are not
contrary to the policy of the law. Conditions that are contrary to the object of
marriage (for example, clauses saying that the wife need not live with her
husband or that the husband need not maintain his wife) would be void,
although the marriage would still be valid. However, clauses that extend the
natural consequences of marriage, such as a husband's promise to maintain his
wife in a certain lifestyle, are valid.

Id. Another author notes that the Islamic marriage contract "is open for additional, but
legitimate, conditions and its terms are, within legal bounds, capable of being altered."
AL 'ATI, supra note 95, at 59. Other authors assert that, while some stipulations are not
valid, those that "merely reinforce the normal effects of marriage," for instance,
"agreements fixing the amount of dower [mahr], or fixing the amount of maintenance to
be paid to the wife," are "both valid and enforceable." EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra
note 3, at 9. For yet another discussion of the terms that can be included in the
marriage contract and those that cannot, see IBN QUDAMA, AL-MUGHNI, Vol. 10, 42-62
(Abdullah AI-Turki & Abd Al-Fattah Al-Hilu eds., 1986) (on file with author).
107.
See MAGHNYYAH, supra note 76, at 267-68. Maghniyyah reports:
The Hanbali school is of the opinion that if the husband stipulates at the time
of marriage that he will not make her leave her home or city, or will not take
her along on journey, or that he will not take yet another wife, the condition
and the contract are both valid and it is compulsory that they be fulfilled, and
in the event of their being violated, she can dissolve the marriage. The Hanafi,
the Shafi'i and the Maliki schools regard the conditions as void and the contract
as valid....
Id.; see also ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 22 (discussing women's ability to make
conditions in marriage, such as clauses "that eliminate the husband's right to take a
second wife"). Other authors note that "[t]he majority of Muslim jurists hold ... any
measure which attempts to vary or modify a normal incident of marriage as void.
Applying the doctrine of severance, they expunge it from the contract, which then
remains valid." EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 9. Only adherents of the
Hanbali school of law "maintain that any stipulation which is not itself forbidden, or
which is not expressly contrary to or inconsistent with the contract of marriage, will be
valid." Id. The authors add:
Thus a stipulation in the marriage contract that the husband will not take a
second wife is void according to the non-Hanbali Sunni schools.... According to
the majority doctrine a man has a right to take four wives at any one time. This
right is a normal incident of marriage and may not be varied. The Hanbalis,
however, hold that such a stipulation is not itself forbidden, for the law merely
allows a man to have up to four wives; it does not require him to do so. Nor is it
contrary or inconsistent with the contract of marriage. Accordingly, the
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she can divorce him whenever she wishes? 108 Can she
stipulate that she does not owe him the duty of obedience? 10 9
Can she stipulate that she will reside in her hometown and
will not be forced to live elsewhere? 1 0
As divergent as the schools are in their views, these views tend to
pull toward a particular position on the spectrum of possible opinions
on any given legal matter. This tendency to "pull toward" highlights
the general sensibility of these jurists on the question of gender and
the way relations within the family should be organized.
* Example: Whereas the doctrine of the Hanafi school of law
holds that women of majority age should consent to their
marriage and can indeed marry without the presence of a
guardian, the three other Sunni schools insist that in such
cases, a woman's consent is unnecessary and the presence of
the guardian is "foundational." Some limit this requirement
to women who have not been married before (bakr).111
Although the views tend to pull toward a position on a spectrum of
possible opinions on any given legal matter, they also clearly exclude

Hanbalis regard it as valid, and if the husband in contravention of the
stipulation marries a second wife, his first wife will have a right to have her
A stipulation may also take the form of a conditional
marriage dissolved ....
talaq [divorce]. Thus the husband may stipulate that he will not take a second
wife, but if he does so, the marriage will be automatically dissolved.
Id. at 10; see also AL-GHARYANI, supra note 103, at 520-21.
See AL-GHARYANI, supra note 103, at 268; see also ABD AL-RAHMAN BIN
108.
MUHAMMAD AL-JAZIRI, KITAB AL-FIQH ALA AL-MADHAABIB AL-ARBAA, Vol. 4, 89-92
(Maktabat A-Eeman, A1-Mansoura, 1999) (on file with author).
See AL-JAZIRI, supra note 108, at 89-92; ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 22
109.
(noting that some schools allow a stipulation to the marriage contract so as to, "grant
the wife greater freedom of movement").
See MAGHNIYYAH, supra note 76, at 267-68; see also AL-JAZIRI, supra note
110.
108, at 89-92; supra note 106.
111.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAMIC LAW: A COMPENDIUM OF THE VIEWS OF THE
MAJOR SCHOOLS, supra note 103, at 423. The author reports:
The Shafli, Maliki and Hanbali schools are of the opinion that the guardian has
the sole authority with respect to the marriage of his sane and major female
ward if she is a virgin. But if she is a person who has been married previously
(thayyib), his authority is contingent on her consent. Neither can he exercise
his authority without her consent, nor can she contract marriage without his
The Hanafis regard a sane, grown-up female as competent to
permission ....
choose her husband and to contract marriage, irrespective of her being a virgin
or a non-virgin. No one has authority over her, nor any right to object, provided
she chooses one her equal and does not stipulate less than a proper dower
(mahr al-mithl) for the marriage. If she marries someone who is not her equal,
the guardian has the right to object and demand the annulment of the contract.

1072

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 371043

a number of others, so that such views do not seem to exist anywhere.
This exclusion delimits the boundaries beyond which the opinions of
none of the schools venture; in other words, they define the outer
limits of the general sensibility of these jurists.
* Example: All the jurists agree on the position that the
husband has the right to talaq, what in U.S. legal discourse is
called no-fault divorce. 112 When it comes to women, they
unanimously agree on two things. First of all, women do not
have an equivalent right to no-fault divorce,1 13 and second,
women can enter into a consensual agreement with their
husbands to "buy" their divorce against a particular
consideration (the khul divorce). 114 Having thus delineated
the outer limits of women's privileges through implicit
collective agreement, the schools proceed to have divergent
views on women's legal abilities within these boundaries.
Thus one finds them having divergent views on the question
of whether women can request divorce from a judge on
specific grounds, and what those grounds might be. For
instance, Hanafi doctrine denies women any grounds for
divorce without the husband's consent, 115 and the Maliki
school of law takes the radical step of allowing women to
request divorce on the basis of "harm." 116 The rest of the

112.

See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 22.

The most common method by which marriages are dissolved in the Muslim
world is by the husband exercising his right of talaq....
Islamic law grants to
the husband the right unilaterally to terminate the marriage at will without
showing cause and without having recourse to a court of law.
113.

See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 29.

A wife according to all the schools and sects may only terminate her marriage
unilaterally when such a power is delegated to her by her husband. Otherwise a
wife who is unhappy in her marriage and who wishes to obtain a dissolution
must petition the court for divorce by judicial decree, showing cause why such a
decree should be granted.")
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAMIC LAW: A COMPENDIUM OF THE VIEWS OF THE MAJOR SCHOOLS,
supra note 103, at 501 (observing that "[tihere is consensus that the divorcee is the
wife").
114.
For a discussion of khul divorce, see supra note 7 and infra Part III.
115.
See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 29.
The law of the Hanafi school is the most restrictive toward women in the
matter of divorce. The sole ground on which a Hanafi wife may obtain a
dissolution of her marriage is her husband's inability to consummate the
marriage.... It was the unfortunate position of Hanafi wives in the Ottoman
Empire which caused the promulgation of the first reform to the law of personal
status in 1915.
116.

See id. at 31-32. The authors report that
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schools aggregate in the middle, allowing women divorce on
one or more "objectively acceptable grounds" such as
imprisonment or long absence of husband, non-payment of
maintenance, insanity, or infliction with an incurable
7
disease."
A close reading of the aggregate positions of the schools on various
legal issues suggests a particular gender regime within which all
these schools historically worked. The differences between the
schools, it seems, amount to no more than possible positions within
this overall gender regime without any school constituting a
meaningful critique of, or departure from, the views of the next one.
This gender regime could be described as hierarchical to the benefit
of husband/guardian but with a strong underlying element of
transactional reciprocity of obligations. In a nutshell, the reciprocity
amounts to a situation in which husbands provide money, in the form
of maintenance, and women provide conjugal society in return.
The question that the reading above raises is the following: is it
conceivable that a radically different gender regime could be
constructed by picking and choosing from the rules of these schools,
such as was done by the modern Egyptian legislature? 118 In other

Maliki law is unique in that it allows a woman to obtain a divorce on the
grounds of dharar (prejudice), by invoking wrongful acts by the husband or by
claiming that living with her husband is harmful and prejudicial to her or by
claiming that there is discord between her husband and herself.
Id. at 31. Further,
[w]rongful acts of which the wife might complain include beating her without
cause or with undue severity, refusing sexual relations, insulting her or her
family and preventing her from leaving the matrimonial home to visit her
parents. It is sufficient for a divorce to be granted that the husband has
committed a single act contrary to law or custom against the wife.
Id. at 31-32.
See id. at 30. For instance, the authors report that "the Shafi school allows
117.
the court to grant a decree of judicial divorce (faskh) where the husband willfully
refuses to maintain his wife." In addition, the authors report:
Hanbali law recognizes the various physical and mental defects and also
recognises further grounds on which a judicial divorce may be granted. A wife
may obtain a divorce if her husband is absent for a 'prolonged' period of timeusually interpreted as six months, even if the husband continues to provide her
with maintenance during his absence-or if he abstains from having sexual
The failure of the husband to provide
relations with her for a similar period ....
maintenance, whether this is because of willful refusal or inability for whatever
reason, is also a ground on which a petition may be brought.

Id.
See TAHIR MAHMOOD, STATUTES OF PERSONAL LAW IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES 6
118.
(1995) reporting that
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words, can a modern legislator, not feeling the need to be affiliated
with a particular school but proceeding with a uniquely supramadhhab sensibility, 119 come up with a new doctrine on the family by
combining together the most "progressive" rules, whatever their
genealogical origin might be? Could this doctrine conceivably
constitute a critique of and departure from the gender regime
constructed by the Taqlid schools of law?
What is noteworthy is that most contemporary legislatures
proceeding with a pick-and-choose legislative methodology or
approach have thus far, as is demonstrated below, fallen short of
realizing the project that liberal feminist advocates of family law
reform in these countries have pushed for. Such legislation continues
to hint at and aspire to this kind of feminist reform while consistently
failing to achieve it.
The Taqlid legal system, with all its varied interpretations on
family law issues (particularly the marital relationship), lasted into
the nineteenth century in Egypt. Transformations were made in the
legal system in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, that
brought about the demise of the Taqlid system. The ways in which
European legal transplants were introduced into the system altered
the very nature of law and legality in the country.

[u]nification of personal law has been achieved in the Muslim world by
assuming that all or most of the different schools of Islamic jurisprudence are
equally valid and acceptable, and by applying to them the principle of eclectic
choice (takhayur). The choice has been exercised in different countries under
the legislative, executive or judicial powers of the state often through juristic
aid and advice.
See also id. at 56; ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 120 (writing about the reformist
methodology used to formulate the rules embodied in Egyptian Law No. 25 of 1929 and
noting that "[w]hereas takhayyur traditionally was restricted to selection of the
dominant opinion of another law school, the reformers extended it to the adoption of an
individual jurist's opinion").
119.
Supra madhhab refers to supra doctrinal. A supra madhhab jurist is one
who is not affiliated with the doctrine of any specific Taqlid school of jurisprudence but
adopts rules in an eclectic way from either one of them to achieve his reformist project.
See HALLAQ, supra note 26, at 210 (Acknowledging that the doctrine of a single school
no longer served the purposes of the reformers, recourse was made to a device
according to which law could be formulated by an amalgamated selection (takhayyur)
from several traditional doctrines held by a variety of schools .... Moreover, the
reformers resorted to the so-called talfiq according to which part of the doctrine of one
school is combined with a part from another."); Aharon Layish, The Contribution of the
Modernists to the Secularization of Islamic Law, 14 MIDDLE E. STUD. 263, 263 (1978)
(observing that "[t]he modernists tried to synthesize the materia of the Sunni schools of
law by the doctrine of selection (takhayyur)or combination (talfiq, lit. patch-work)....
Muhammad Rashid Rida likewise called upon 'ulama to free themselves from
partisanship for particular schools.").
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TRANSFORMATION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM FROM TAQLID LAW TO ONE
INFLUENCED BY EUROPEAN CODES

A. Centralizationof the Egyptian State Duringthe Reign of
Mohammad Ali
The decline of the Taqlid legal system in Egypt began with the
1 20
reign of Mohammad Ali in the early part of the nineteeth century.
A one-time all-powerful Ottoman Governor of Egypt, Ali embarked
upon what he saw as a modernization project that was to transform
Egypt forever.1 21 Particularly detrimental to the Taqlid legal system
during this era were his efforts to centralize the state. 122
Centralization meant that the carefully calibrated relationship
between the ulama (jurists who were the overseers of the Taqlid legal
system) and the political ruler that was typical of the pre-modern era
23
could no longer be maintained.

120.
See JASPER YEATES BRINTON, THE MIXED COURTS OF EGYPT 5 (1968)
(describing this important figure in Egyptian history as "[tihe creator of modern Egypt,
the Albanian adventurer Mohammad Ali, born in the same year as Napoloen and by
1807 master of Egypt by right of conquest..."); BYRON CANNON, POLITICS OF LAW AND
THE COURTS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY EGYPT 9 (1988) ("Few periods of Ottoman
history have intrigued scholars as much as the 1805-48 governorate of Muhammad 'Ali,
founder of the dynasty that ruled Egypt until the mid-twentieth century. Muhammad
'Ali's draconian methods of reconsolidating political control in Cairo following
withdrawal of Napoleon's expeditionary force in 1802 became a special focus for
historians."); TUCKER, supra note 74, at 25 (writing that "Muhammad 'Ali officially
became wali (viceroy) of Egypt in 1805, and, having managed to annihilate his political
opponents by 1812, he embarked on an ambitious program of increasing state revenue
to the end of gaining strength and independence for Egypt, still de jure under the
suzereignty of the Ottoman Empire").
121.
See Crecelius, supra note 4, at 73-77. The author reports that "[t]he reign of
Muhammad Ali Pasha (1805-49) marks the beginning of the differentiation of political
and religious structures in modern Egypt. His decisions and programs have in fact
largely determined the course that secularization has taken over the last century and a
half in Egypt." Id. at 73.
122.
See ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES 272-73 (1991)
(discussing the histrorical events of this period); see also KHALED FAHMY, ALL THE
PASHA'S MEN 9-10 (1997) (explaining the efforts toward centralization).
123.
See Crecelius, supra note 4, at 73-74.
The first and most abrupt move toward the differentiation of religion and state
came in the attacks Muhammad Ali made against the political influence of the
ulama. . . . Above all, he departed from traditional principles of Islamic
government by refusing to accept the advice and mediation of the ulama in the
councils of state.")
See also Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, The Beginnings of Modernization among the
Rectors of al-Azhar, 1798-1879, in BEGINNINGS OF MODERNIZATION IN THE MIDDLE
EAST 268-69 (William R. Polk & Richard L. Chambers eds., 1968) (describing the
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Mohammad Ali's project involved the centralized appropriation
by the ruler of the economic and regulatory powers of the state. 124
This policy proved to have a detrimental effect on the schools of law
in two respects. First of all, Ali appropriated the schools' financial
resources through his "annexation" of the waqf institutions. 125 For
Ali, the ulama and their institutions were among several social and
economic forces or intermediaries (others being tax farmers,
merchants, and guilds) that had to be either obliterated or controlled
so that the state could have power over their revenues. 126 As a

historical relationship between the ulama and the political ruler in the following
manner:
[u]nder the later Mamluks the "ulama'had achieved a close relationship with
the ruling group and had become the natural leaders of the people, thus serving
as a bridge between their unruly rulers and the population at large. This was
manifest in the increasing dependence of the Mamluks on the "ulama"in
negotiating between opposing Mamluk factions, in consulting with them on
matters of import, and above all by a notable increase in the wealth of the
shaykhly class.
124.
See Crecelius, supra note 4, at 73-74; see also CANNON, supra note 120, at
12-14 (explaining Ali's centralization efforts); FAHMY, supra note 122, at 9-10 (reporting
that between 1805-1820, as governor of Egypt on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan,
Muhammad 'Ali, "managed to tighten Cairo's control over the provinces by fighting
corruption in the local bureaucracy, by conducting a cadastral survey that was crucial
in abolishing the tax farming system (iltizam) and in the cancellation of the immunities
on agricultural land belonging to mosques and pious foundations (awqa), and, most
importantly, by getting rid of ... the power of the military landlords, the Mamluks,
who had been in effective control of the province for centuries in spite of Ottoman legal
suzerainty. Centralization of political and administrative control was also enhanced by
rapid increase in agricultural productivity."); HOURANI, supra note 122, at 273
(describing the changes introduced in Egypt by Muhammad 'Ali).
125.
See Tamir Moustafa, Conflict and Cooperation Between the State and
Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt, 32 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 3, 4 (2000)).
Muhammad 'Ali (1805-48) was the first Egyptian ruler to challenge
systematically the power of Egypt's religious institutions. As part of his
program to build a modern Egyptian state and challenge the Ottoman
government for control of the empire, Muhammad 'Ali reorganized land
ownership and nationalized 600,000 feddans (623,000 acres) of waqf land that
had previously financed mosques and religious schools and formed the economic
foundation of the ulama.
See also Crecelius, supra note 4, at 73-74 (discussing 'Ali's efforts to differentiate
church and state).
126.
See Crecelius, supra note 4, at 73-74; see also CANNON, supra note 120, at
12-13; TUCKER, supra note 74, at 29-30 (explaining 'Ali's struggle to get control over the
social structure). Cannon describes the process by which the power of tax farmers,
merchants and guilds was appropriated by the state in the following passage:
Muhammad 'Ali began with a concerted drive to regain central control over
Egypt's actual revenue-earning power. To do this, he forcibily revived the
Ottoman Islamic theory of state ownership (miri) of all agriculturally
productive land previously under tax farmer intermediaries. Soon after his first

20041

MODERNIZING MUSLIM FAMILY LAW

1077

consequence, the ulama found themselves being demoted from being
institutionalized elites to being alienated and disenfranchised. 127 Ali
not only ravaged the ulama's financial institutions, but he also
started to build an educational system to compete with and take the
128
place of the religious one that the ulama historically controlled.
This alternative educational system, primarily designed to educate
the bureaucratic and military elites that Ali needed to run his
modern state, produced a secular elite that identified with Europe
and came to see the ulama and their institutions as pre-modern and
29
conservative. 1
In addition, the centralized state established as a result of Ali's
unabashed use of his regulatory powers seriously competed with
madhhab as a source of law. Ali, as part of his modernization project,
issued for the first time in Egypt a substantive body of laws that may
be termed as public law, taking little heed of the Taqlid rules on the
questions these regulations tackled. 130 Al saw this public law as

political tasks were accomplished by brutal suppression of local Mamluk
interests in Egypt's military and landholding system, Muhammad 'Ali extended
central controls down to the smallest localized units of economic productivity.
For town dwellers, this brought a decline in fiscal and administrative autonomy
for traditional guilds responsible for the welfare of many artisans and small
shopkeepers. . . . In short, the ultimate authority of the Cairo governor to
regulate nearly every aspect of provincial economic and administrative activity
became an accomplished fact.
CANNON, supra note 120, at 12-13.

127.
See Crecelius, supra note 4, at 74 (observing that "[t]he regime's attacks
upon the political influence of the ulama and its seizure of most of the revenues that
sustained the vast system of schools, mosques, takiyahs, and ceremonies of the
religious community had a terrible effect upon the religious institutions in Egypt.
Deprived of most of their revenues and ignored by the new regime, religious
institutions entered a period of rapid and continuous decline.").
128.
See Moustafa, supra note 125, at 4; see also F. ROBERT HUNTER, EGYPT
UNDER THE KHEDIVES 1805-1879 17 (1984) (discussing the Europeanization of
education); TUCKER, supra note 74, at 122-23 ("Muhammad 'Ali founded a number of
schools modeled on the European system. The Council of Public Instruction,
established in 1836, supervised 54 state-run primary and secondary schools throughout
Egypt during the latter part of Muhammad 'Ali's reign.").
129.
See TUCKER, supra note 74, at 122-23. Tucker writes:
Not surprisingly, given the emphasis on reforms calculated to promote
technological transformation, other new educational institutions focused on
military, professional, and technical training geared to introduce European
practices. . . . This new educational system functioned alongside the older
system of elementary schools attached to mosques (kuttabs), and the advanced
religious and classical education offered by al-Azhar.
Id.; see also Crecelius, supra note 4, at 73-74 (assessing the roles of the educated elite).
130.
See Rudolph Peters, "For His Correction and as a Deterrent Example for
Others," Mehmed "Ali'sFirst Criminal Legislation (1829-1830), 6 ISLAMIC L. & SOC. 164,
164 (1999). Although this article looks specifically at criminal legislation and codes
enacted by Ali, the author's analysis is instructive for other areas of the law as well. In
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necessary for the state to appropriate, distribute, and control the
economic and financial resources to be channeled primarily to the
needs of the strong army that his modernization efforts focused on. 131
One of the components of this public law was an elaborate set of
punitive (penal) legal regulations that allowed All to control
resistance to the newly centralized state. 132 Eventually, the qadi
courts, associated with the Taqlid era, were forced to compete with a

fact, the author notes that "[t]he convening of the consultative council (Meclis-i
Mesveret, Meclis-i Umumi) in September 1829 (3 Rabi'I 1245) marked the beginning of
Mehmed 'Ali's legislative activity in the fields of criminal, constitutional and
commercial law." Id.
See TUCKER, supra note 74, at 29. Tucker notes that laws put in place
131.
under Muhammad Ali affected the diverse aspects of Egyptian life that needed to be
under the control of the modernized, centralized state to achieve Ali's goals. Thus, the
state was empowered to regulate and tax commercial activities in general and
agriculture in particular, and "[sitate intervention in agriculture and trade ... formed
part of the State's attempt to mobilize agricultural resources to the political end of
generating revenues for building a strong military force." Id.; see also CANNON, supra
note 120, at 19 (noting that "almost all of Muhammad 'Ali's important internal reforms
had been organized to support a strong military budget"); FAHMY, supra note 122, at 9
(asserting that "Mehmed Ali started to found a modern army in Egypt, an army which
was based on conscription and which relied on the institutions of the modern state that
he founded mainly to serve that army").
132.
See Peters, supra note 130, at 173. The author, focusing on the area of
criminal law, reports that:
It was Mehmed 'Ali's ambition to impose a centralized and rational order upon
his realm. The effects of this endeavor are evident in various domains of
society, such as agriculture and the military. Criminal law, by its nature, is
crucial to such a policy of disciplining, and the new laws must be regarded as a
means to achieve this centralization and rationalization. The idea of
centralization was very much vested in his person. Mehmed 'Ali wanted to be
the ultimate authority in criminal justice and the new laws expressed the
notion that all punishment derived from his omnipresent authority, even if it
was in fact imposed by his agents. Lawfully inflicted punishment ought to
represent and symbolize the centrality of his power.
Id.; see also Khaled Fahmy, The anatomy of justice: forensic medicine and criminallaw
in nineteenth century Egypt, 6 ISLAMIC L. & SOC. 224, 231-34 (1999). Fahmy notes that
"[al]lthough some aspects of legal reform were indeed influenced by European law,
these developments aimed more at tightening the grip of the government over its
populations than at spreading 'legal knowledge concerning rights, duties, freedoms and
remedies."' Id. at 231. In addition, Fahmy links this desire to control the population
with Ali's goal of independence:
[a]s early as September 1829, when he passed his first penal legislation, and
much before he first expressed his desire for official independence from the
Ottoman Empire in the late 1830s, Mehmed Ali was already using law, and
penal law in particular, to carve out an independent realm for himself in which
his laws and his bureaucracy would reign supreme at the expense of the
Sultan's.
Id. at 233-34.
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number of other judicial bodies. 133 These new judicial bodies included
those that Ali set up to allow those affected by the regulations,
primarily peasants, to present their grievances concerning actions
134
taken by government officials.
As Ali consolidated a centralized, strong state, (one that was
armed with newly created regulatory instruments) the residues of
Taqlid law that remained in effect acquired the character of the law
of the private and the personal. 13 5 Such private legal activities, left
untouched by the state's regulations, were primarily but not
exclusively related to the family. These matters came to be
understood as the privileged domain of Taqlid.

133.
See CANNON, supra note 120, at 23-25. The author describes "a series of
administrative options for different types of litigation introduced by Muhammad 'Ali"
that "encouraged separation between the (primarily personal status) functions of the
qadi and secular judicial prerogatives of government. This was especially true where
penal or basic fiscal considerations were at stake. . . . Muhammad 'Ali himself
consciously tried to found a system of specialized majalis or councils to carry out a
variety of secular judicial functions." Id. at 23. Commerical disputes, for instance, could
be settled before "two separate merchants' councils (Ar. majalis at-tujar) created in
1845.... They could arbitrate disputes between capitulatory and local subjects alike."
Id. at 25. The author asserts that, in general, "sectarian jurisdiction tended to diminish
whenever the power of central political authorities rose enough to offset the traditional
influence of the religious classes in many key areas." Id. at 23.
134.
See FAHMY, supra note 122, at 172 (reporting that "[b]y curbing the highhanded behavior of officials, these codes aimed at protecting Egyptian subjects ...
These legal texts must be read as a pledge on the part of the sovereign to see that
justice was done once he was informed by petition of any injustice suffered by his
subjects"); see also CANNON, supra note 120, at 24.
In his own provincial operations in the 1830s and 1840s, Muhammad 'Ali
delegated a portion of his own high executive prerogatives to a single
specialized body known as the Council of Egyptian Judicial Rulings (Ar. majlis
al-ahkam al-misriyya)....
['The Cairo Council served primarily as a superior
court for the Egyptian governorate. It reviewed, for example, petitions against
Muhammad 'Ali's own officials who, in the absence of a distinct judicial branch
of government, traditionally settled village-level disputes not clearly reserved
for local sectarian jurisdictions.
135.
See NADAV SAFRAN, EGYPT IN SEARCH OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY 32 (1961).
The author suggests that Ali was motivated by political realities to leave some areas of
the legal system intact while changing others:
[Ali] left untouched the system of religious courts, even though he had a very
low opinion of them, in order not to raise complications with the Ottoman
sultan to whose hands the jurisdiction over these courts ultimately reverted;
but he established two courts independent of Muslim Law in Cairo and in
Alexandria to settle commercial disputes and had criminal justice administered
almost exclusively by the executive authorities in a summary fashion.
Id. Thus, this may be one reason why personal status laws escaped Ali's "modernizing"
touch.
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B. The Defeat of Ali and The Europeanizationof Egypt
The second onslaught on Taqlid took place in the second half of
the nineteenth century, following the death of All and the defeat of
his modernization project. The Ottoman elites of Istanbul, who
considered Egypt one of their most important provinces, felt the
secessionist threats of Ali's rising power and collaborated with
contemporary European powers, primarily Britain, to destroy him. 1 36
One of the consequences of Ali's defeat was to subject Egypt to
the terms of the treaties that Istanbul had entered into with a
number of European countries, symbolizing the end of Egypt's
autonomy. 137 This in effect destroyed the state economic monopolies
that Ali masterminded 138 and the corresponding legal regime, as
European countries insisted that tariffs on commodities entering the

136.
See FAHMY, supra note 122, at 22, 291-97. Britain perceived Ali as a threat
to its imperial interests in India, Egypt being an important country en route to this
most precious British colony. As Fahmy describes it, Ali's expansion "seriously
challenged Britain's most ambitious imperialist designs and was regarded in London
and Bombay as a threat to Britian's possessions in Asia, her communications with
India and her influence in Istanbul." Id. at 294-95. Britain was also worried about the
detrimental effect that Ali's rising power could have on an already weakened Ottoman
Empire that had come to be the object of several European countries' colonial interests.
See id. In other words, the British feared that Ali would jeopardize the efforts taken by
the competing European powers to save the dying "sick man of Europe," as the
Ottoman Empire was called at the time, which had until then kept the Empire in one
piece. See id. at 294-97. Fahmy thus reports that the British viewed Ali as "causing a
grave threat . . . by giving the Russians the opportunity and the pretext to encroach
onto Ottoman lands, and possibly to do away with the Ottoman Empire altogether.
[British Foreign Secretary] Palmerston's motto of 'the preservation of the integrity of
the Ottoman Empire' was his most effective bulwark against possible Russian
aggression ..
" Id. at 294-95. See also CANNON, supra note 120, at 15-17 (describing
additional, economic motivations that drove the Europeans to scheme with Istanbul to
intervene in Ali's rule).
137.
See FAHMY, supra note 122, at 291 reporting that
on 1 June 1841, the Sultan issued a firman naming Mehmed Ali as governor of
Egypt for life and granting his male descendants the hereditary rights of the
governorship of Egypt. In addition, though, the firman stipulated that the
Pasha reduce the size of his army to 18,000 troops in peace-time. Moreover, the
Sultan added that 'all the Treaties concluded and to be concluded between my
Sublime Porte and the friendly Powers shall be completely executed in the
Province of Egypt likewise.'
See also CANNON, supra note 120, at 19 (describing the conditions imposed by the
firman of 1841).
138.
See CANNON, supra note 120, at 19 (reporting that the Ottoman Sultan
Abdulmecid, in conjugation with the European countries that helped him defeat Ali,
insisted on the suppression of his "system of government commercial monopolies");
HUNTER, supra note 128, at 31 (noting that, as a result of the European/Ottoman
intervention, in 1840 Ali had to "accept the Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention of
1838 which banned all monopolies in the Ottoman empire").
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Egyptian market be removed. 139 More important for the Taqlid legal
system, however, was the fact that a new legal era commenced in
Egypt that was marked by a process of Europeanization. This was to
become the second severe blow dealt to the Taqlid legal system.
During this period, Europe figured strongly in the life of Egyptian
elites, something that brought with it two contradictory outcomesthe first can be described as a normative liberal legalism and the
second as a political legal imperialism.
As the Khedevis, descendants of Ali and the ruling Turkish elites
of Egypt, embarked on the project of turning Egypt into a "part of
Europe" during the second half of the nineteenth century, radical
legal reforms started to take place. 140 The migratory onslaught of
European communities into Egypt-one element of the Khedevis'
Europeanization policy-established European commercial interests
in the country and helped merge Egypt into the international market
by creating a cash-crop economy based on cotton. 141 This in turn

139.
See CANNON, supra note 120, at 19-20. Cannon writes that "by urging that
reconfirmation of Egypt's obligations within the general capitulatory system should be
followed by a new round of most favored nation treaties based on the 1838 AngloOttoman convention, London laid the basis for capitulatory pohtics that continued to
operate for half a century after 1841." Id. Another author discusses the devastating
results of the loss of tariff protections for local Egyptian industries that Ali's
monopolies had allowed to flourish:
[Mlonopolies were believed to have been the backbone of the Pasha's economic
policy and to have given his industries the protection they needed to compete
with European goods. Having lost that protection, the infant industries and the
The Egyptian factories found it
services connected to them fell to ruins ....
difficult to produce commodities that could compete with foreign, mostly
British, goods. . . . Local industries were closed down after losing their
protective tariff barriers. At the same time, foreign merchants flooded the
Egyptian market with their cheap goods after the collapse of the Pasha's
monopoly system.
FAHMY, supra note 122, at 13; see also Ahmed Abdel-Rahim Mustafa, The Breakdown of
the Monopoly System in Egypt after 1840, in POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
EGYPT 300 (P.M. Holt ed., 1968) (reporting that "[t]he Egyptian government, finding
that there was no escape from the plain and obvious sense of the treaties, consented to
suppress the duties heretofore levied at Bulaq, the port of Cairo").
140.
Crecelius, supranote 4, at 77-78; see also HUNTER, supranote 128, at 44-45.
Hunter notes that new courts were set up all over Egypt: 'The formation of these courts
was the last step in the elaboration of a new judicial administration for Egypt." Id. at
45. Legal reforms were felt not only in Cairo but in other areas of the country as well:
"During the 1860s and 1870s, a new judicial administration emerged in the
countryside, and administrative and agricultural councils were formed to supplement
those provincial units of government created by Muhammad Ali." Id. at 44. In addition,
a Department of Justice was established: "In 1872, perhaps because of the growing
need to control and coordinate the various elements that now made up the legal order,
an executive organ, the Department of Justice, was created." Id. at 45.
141.
See HUNTER, supra note 128, at 38. The author describes:
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prompted several European countries to intensify their request for
legal privileges and concessionary benefits for their nationals living
in Egypt. 142 Such privileges and concessions led to the radical
evolution of the consular legal system and eventually to the
143
establishment of the unified legal system of Capitulations.
Creditors also demanded legal assurances as Egypt amassed a
considerable amount of international debt to finance infrastructure

[Tihe rapid emergence of a European and Levantine fiscal-commercial
bourgeoisie. The two most important components of this class were the
promoters whose companies undertook the construction of public works, and
the merchant-financiers who established banks and had ties with investment
houses in Europe. These men not only represented an institutional base for
Egyptian trade with Europe, but most important, they also provided a new
means of financial support for Egypt's rulers. The viceroys used these
Europeans to facilitate the extension of cash crops, and European merchants
and bankers became a source of easy credit by providing short-term loans and
purchasing government bonds.

Id. See also TUCKER, supra note 74, at 31-35 (providing a complete discussion of the

"cotton boom" to hit Egypt at this time and the results in rural Egypt); Mustafa, supra
note 125, at 306 (asserting that subsequent to Ali, the leaders of Egypt were effectively
"opening the doors of Egypt to the growing Western capitalism and to European
immigration").
142.
See BRINTON, supra note 120, at 5. The author reports "the establishment
of a complete immunity from the jurisdiction of local courts and from the application of
local laws" for foreigners under the consular or Capitulations system and explains that,
"[p]rompted largely by reasons of practical necessity and convenience, little by little the
consuls assumed jurisdiction in all cases, civil or criminal, which involved their
nationals.... It was an expansion of consular jurisdiction ... based purely on usage."
Id. He continues that "[t]he consul's jurisdiction was necessarily confined to the
enforcement of the laws of his own country . . .[;] [tlherefore, foreigners were subject
only to their own laws, as such laws were interpreted by their own consuls." Id.
143.
See id. at 5-6; see also Herbert J. Liebesny, The Development of Western
JudicialPrivileges, in ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW 326 (Majid Khadduri
& Herbert J. Liebesny eds., 1955). Liebesny reports that "[b]y the nineteenth century
the capitulatory rights of the various powers had thus grown into a well-systematized
framework of law and procedure" and provides a very concise description of the system
of Capitulations. Id. However, this is not to suggest that the Capitulations were not in
existence prior to the nineteenth century. See, e.g., CANNON, supra note 120, at 6.
Cannon describes the capitulory system in place in Egypt centuries earlier; in fact, he
asserts:
The series of bilateral treaties that constituted the Ottoman capitulatory
system probably reached their highest degree of efficiency in the seventeenth
century. This was before military defeats made the Ottoman Empire vulnerable
to a variety of forms of external coercion by both friends and enemies. Initially
modeled after much earlier "chapters" (It., capitula) of commercial and judicial
privileges granted by Mamluk sultans to Italian traders in medieval Egypt, the
first capitulatory treaties with Europeans were signed from a position of
strength, not weakness. In fact, until the eighteenth century, whatever benefits
derived from such Ottoman-Christian agreements were technically reciprocal.
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projects and other elements of its modernization scheme. 14 4 Foreign
nationals, creditors, and international contractors demanded to be
exempt from the jurisdiction of Egyptian Taqlid law, which was seen
as either lacking sufficient legal assurances or simply too primitive to
accommodate such complex international economic and financial
145
transactions.
As a means of paying the huge foreign debt being incurred, the
Egyptian government heavily taxed the local peasants. 146 This left
them hostage to the power of moneylenders who were mostly
foreigners residing in Egypt. 1 47 As Egyptian peasants struggled to

144.
See HUNTER, supra note 128, at 38; TUCKER, supra note 74, at 31-32.
145.
See CANNON, supra note 120, at 7, 39-43. As Cannon notes, before the
transplantation of laws based on European codes in Egypt:
[Tihe Ottomans possessed only a very rudimentary body of imperial qanun or
secular administrative law to supplement the sectarian rulings applicable to
Ottoman subjects in their own private affairs. From the sixteenth century
onward, only certain privileged provinces enjoyed the possibility of systematic
reference to special codes of imperial decrees, or qanunnahmes, pertaining to
administrative or land tenure questions in their zones. These were supposed to
give guidelines for a separate jurisdiction free from sectarian interference in
areas of recognized governmental concern, especially in fiscal matters. They
embodied neither uniform rules applying throughout the Empire nor provisions
for commercial transactions or private contract and property relations that
European law would eventually group under the civil umbrella of the
Napoleonic Code.
Id. at 7.
146.
147.

See TUCKER, supra note 74, at 32.
See id. at 31-34.

The cycle of small peasant debt has been amply illustrated: forced to borrow at
high rates of interest in order to get the seed and animals necessary for sowing
and paying monthly installments on their taxes, the peasants then had to repay
these loans, often in kind, at harvest time when crop prices were lowest.
See also Sayyid 'Ashmawi, Perceptions of the Greek Money-lender in Egyptian Collective
Memory at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, in MONEY, LAND AND TRADE 244, 253-54
(Nelly Hanna ed., 2002) (providing a detailed account of foreign moneylenders in Egypt,
particularly Greeks). The author observes:
Although he made very little profit which he used to purchase more stock, the
Greek grocer lived on next to nothing and lent money to the peasants at
exorbitant interest rates. He bought land, traded in cotton and built an
astonishing fortune, despite being barely able to make ends meet when he first
saw Egypt.
Id. at 253. The author adds:
Many Egyptians displayed a certain aversion to money-lending because Islamic
religious values prohibited usury. Money-lenders, therefore, were mainly
Greeks who owned grocery shops in rural areas. They sold consumer goods to
peasants on a retail basis, taking the cotton crop as security, and lending on a
wide scale to rural inhabitants.
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regain ownership of their mortgaged lands from both foreign
moneylenders and local elites, Taqlid law proved even more
inadequate because it failed to regulate such forms of contractual
relationships. 148 The establishment of the Capitulations Court
System in 1875 was seen as a resolution to the legal chaos, inviting
all foreigners to adjudicate claims between each other and between
themselves and Egyptians in the newly established courts. 149 In
addition, Civil and Commercial Codes and Codes on Procedure, with
a very strong French influence, were passed to regulate actions dealt

with by these courts. 150
C. British Colonization and Reactions to the Continued
Europeanizationof the Egyptian Legal System
The third legal era during which Taqlid law was transformed
began with the colonization of Egypt by the British in 1882 and
lasted until 1948, when a national Egyptian Civil Code was
passed.151

Id. at 253-54.
148.

See CANNON, supra note 120, at 39-40.

149.
See Liebesny, supra note 143, at 30-31; see also BRINTON, supra note 120, at
9, 23-25 (referring to the courts as the "Mixed Courts of Egypt" and reporting that
"[t]he fourteen capitulatory powers which gave adherence to the regime of the Mixed
Courts were Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, the United States, France,
Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Sweden, Holland, Portugal, and Russia").
150.
See Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 5, at 166. As the authors report:
In 1875, it [Egypt] adopted a number of codes modeled after French prototypes.
This can be explained by the fact that the codes were intended for application
by the Mixed Courts, which had jurisdiction over cases involving European and
U.S. citizens residing in Egypt. The Mixed Courts were abolished in 1949.
Id.
151.
The importance of this legal development cannot be underestimated, as
codification is a new and recent phenomenon in majority Muslim countries where
Islamic law historically prevailed. It is interesting that, although often also codified or
formulated as man-made legislation, albeit legislation based on Islamic legal rules,
personal status law consistently has a separate existence from other branches of the
now-codified law. See MAHMOOD, supra note 118, at 2.
In most of the Islamic countries major branches of law now stand fully codified
under state authority. There are in these countries, both Arab and non-Arab,
written constitutions and codified laws of contracts, crimes, civil and judicial
procedures, evidence, labour relations, trade and commerce, intellectual and
industrial property, taxation, etc .... [In addition,] [m]any Islamic countries
now have a national civil code. Known in the Middle East as qunun-i-madani,
the first few among these were drafted by the celebrated Arab [Egyptian] jurist
Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri. The Arab civil codes cover laws of contracts,
obligations, partnership, transfer of property, etc., but not personal law (family
relations and succession). In the Arab countries personal law has been either
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1. British Colonization and Subsequent Legal Developments
In 1883, a year after the British colonized Egypt, a national
court system was established for the purpose of adjudicating cases
among Egyptians that was modeled on the Capitulations Court
System both in structure and textual foundations. 152 The Codes
applied in the national courts were very similar to those of the
Capitulatory courts, with the exemption that some Taqlid rules were
included.' 5 3 As a result of the establishment of the national court
system, the qadi Taqlid courts saw themselves overseeing an even
more contracted jurisdiction, namely, that of the family (marriage,
54
divorce, inheritance, and wills) and waqf (charitable institutions).

separately codified, or left uncodified; but nowhere has it been made part of the
civil code.
152.
See Liebesny, supra note 143, at 331 reporting that "[iun 1883 native or
National Courts were organized in Egypt which followed more or less the pattern of the
Mixed Courts and which had jurisdiction in matters involving Egyptians only;" see also
BRINTON, supra note 120, at 157-58.
Whereas the Mixed Courts were established prior to the British occupation of
Egypt in 1882 . . . the Native Courts were not instituted until 1883, their
existence being the result of an effort to put an end to the defects of the existing
system of purely Moslem courts. The new courts were modeled largely on the
Mixed Courts themselves....
153.
See FARHAT J. ZIADEH, LAWYERS, THE RULE OF LAW AND LIBERALISM IN
MODERN EGYPT 35 (1968). The author reports that in the new courts, although it was
decided that to a large extent "the laws applicable in the mixed courts [would] be
followed," there were many areas "which were to be amended for conformity to the
conditions in the country," and as far as codes, "separate codes were prepared." Id. In
addition, "[questions which touched upon Islamic law were referred for comment to
Shaykh Bahrawi, Mufti of the Ministry of Justice." Id.; see also HERBERT J. LIEBESNY,
THE LAW OF THE NEAR & MIDDLE EAST 71 (1975). As Liebesny reports:
The new judicial system . . . necessitated not only a new court structure, but
also new procedural and substantive laws. The new codes were taken largely
from French law and were, in fact, prepared by a French lawyer, M.
Manoury .... Those parts of the Civil Code which dealt with domestic relations
were omitted, but the books regulating property rights and obligations were
largely adopted. Certain rules of traditional Egyptian law, particularly those
concerning certain property rights, were incorporated into the new Egyptian
Code. The Commerical Code, the procedural Codes and the Penal Code also
followed the French prototypes.
Id.
154.

See BRINTON, supra note 120, at 159-63. Brinton writes that:

In the Religious Courts was encountered that broad domain of jurisdiction over
questions of personal status which has always played a large role in the
complicated legal machinery of the former Ottoman Empire ....
The distinction
involved no idea of inferiority or humiliation, but was the natural result of the
great diversity of social and religious organizations existing throughout the
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Under this process of intense European influence, Taqlid law
and its normative character were greatly transformed. First of all, as
the Code came to be seen by the Europe-identified elites of Egypt as
the universal, the modern, and the embodiment of advanced legal
thought, Taqlid came to be seen as the local, the pre-modern, and the
primitive. 155 This was so despite the fact that the introduction of the
Code in Egypt was the culmination of a long process of imperial
pressure by European interests.

country. Such questions had to be left to the only authorities capable of solving
them.

Id. at 159; see also RON SHAHAM, FAMILY AND THE COURTS IN MODERN EGYPT 11-12
(1997). Shaham, reporting on "modernist legislation" imposed by the government in
Egypt to put in place "Western-oriented" reforms, notes that there was a
gradual restriction of the jurisdiction of the shari'a courts. During the Ottoman
period, the jurisdiction of these courts had included personal status and pious
endowment (waql), as well as civil, criminal, and administrative affairs. But in
the early nineteenth century Muhammad 'Ali had already begun to diminish
this jurisdiction by establishing alternative civil courts that applied Westerninspired codes of law. This process was continued by his successors and later
promoted by the British. The 1897 law, pertaining to evidence and procedure in
the shari'acourts, restricted their jurisdiction to personal status and waqf...
The jurisdiction taken from the shari'a courts was transferred to civil courts,
among them Indigenous Courts (mahakim ahliyya), established in 1884 ....
These courts applied European-oriented laws.
Id. Liebensy reports:
The Egyptian law reforms of the late nineteenth century thus established three
separate court systems: the mixed courts, the native courts, and the religious
courts (shari'a courts and the courts of the Jewish and Christian communities).
In addition there were consular courts which retained jurisdiction in some
matters with regard to citizens of their country.
See LIEBESNY, supra note 153, at 76.
155.
See ZIADEH, supra note 153, at 58. As the author describes, lawyers were
divided into members of the so-called Shari'ah Bar and those of the National Bar.
The Shari'ah Bar was never able to gain the same prestige as the National Bar.
In the first place, its members for the most part did not have as high a level of
education. In the second place, the practice of the shari'ah advocates was
limited to matters of personal status, a field of law which was not, except for
waqf cases, as lucrative or as commanding of respect as other fields of law. The
really decisive factor in this lack of prestige was the fact that the shari'ah
advocates were the defenders of a religious order that was constantly giving
way to secular ideas and progressive legislation.
Id.; see also TIMOTHY MITCHELL, COLONISING EGYPT 84-85 (1988). Al-Azhar, "the oldest
continuing centre of scholarship and law anywhere in the world," established in Cairo a
thousand years ago, is a key example of institutions that embodied and preserved local
religious learning and traditions. Id. at 84. Offering training in religious law and other
traditional areas of learning, the author reports that "[t]he techniques of order and
authority exemplified in the learning of al-Azhar could not cope with the political and
economic transformations taking place." Id. at 85.
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In addition, as the Code became the embodiment of universal
legal liberalism applying equally to everybody, Taqlid came to be
seen as expressive of sectarian specificity applying only to matters of
deep interests to religious Muslim communities. 156 In this sense,
Taqlid law was now equal in status to Coptic law, which regulated
the personal status affairs of Copts (the Christian community) in
Egypt. 157 As such, Taqlid law became the exception to the jurisdiction
of the national courts rather than representing the origin and basis of
158
national law.
Perhaps the most significant transformation to Taqlid law
during this legal era was more institutional than normative. The
centralization of the regulatory powers of the state not only allowed it
to create a surplus of laws on top of Taqlid law through the
promulgation of the Code(s), eventually turning Taqlid law itself into
an exception, but it also allowed for the annexation of the domain of
Taqlid as it promulgated laws intervening in Taqlid law and applying
to qadi Taqlid courts.1 59 These statutes were passed beginning in the
last two decades of the nineteenth century and culminated in various
statutes regulating the family that were passed in the twentieth
century. 160 These statutes include those that forced qadi courts to
follow European laws of procedure as they adjudicated cases included

156.
See BRINTON, supra note 120, at 159-60.
157.
See id. at 162-63. Brinton notes that "[the] non-Moslem had the same right
to resort to their own religious courts as had the native Moslem himself' and
[t]hese non-Moslem religious courts comprised the most complicated system of
courts in Eygpt. . . . The jurisdiction of these courts covered all questions
affecting personal status (marriage and divorce, etc.) .... At the head of these
communities, numerically considered, stood the Orthodox Copts, a Christian
sect of great antiquity and one of the most solid and important elements in
Egyptian life.
Id.
158.
See id. at 160.
159.
See id. at 161; see also SHAHAM, supra note 154, at 11-12 (describing the
curtailment of the shari'ah courts); ZIADEH, supra note 153, at 56 (noting that the
shari'a courts
had been the ordinary courts of the country, with a jurisdiction which
theoretically embraced every type of case, both civil and criminal .... Serious
reorganization was not undertaken until May 27, 1897, when a decree was
issued setting up three levels of courts and defining the jurisdiction of each in
questions of personal status only. From then on jurisdiction of these courts no
longer depended upon the shari'ah,but upon statute.
160.
See BRINTON, supra note 120, at 161-62; see also SHAHAM, supra note 154,
at 12-15. The original law of procedure that changed the jurisdiction and functions of
the shari'acourts was the 1897 law (as amended in 1909 and 1910). See id. at 12. Laws
of personal status passed in the twentieth century include Law No. 25 of 1920; Law No.
25 of 1929; Law No. 77 of 1943; and Law No. 71 of 1946. See id. at 14.
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under their shrunken jurisdiction. 161 Furthermore, Taqlid courts
were only to apply the decisive opinion of the Hanafi school of law on
matters of marriage and divorce, thus defining the doctrinal sources
of Taqlid law to be applied. 162 This institutional annexation
reinforced the very European, modern, and historically un-Islamic
idea that the privileged and sole source of the law is the regulatory

161.
See BRINTON, supra note 120, at 161; see also SHAHAM, supra note 154, at
12-14. Shaham reports that the procedural legislation passed in 1897
reformed the shariarules of procedure by introducing, for example, a statute of
limitations of fifteen years on claims denied by the defendant ....
This meant
that the qadis were forbidden to try such claims once this period had passed if
there was no legal excuse ('udhr shar'i) for failure to submit the claim until
then.
Id. at 13. In addition, European rules of evidence were introduced, and shari'acourts
were forced to follow them:
Reform of the Islamic rules of evidence included the acceptance of documents as
valid proof in a court of law. The Sunni schools had regarded documentary
evidence as secondary and subordinate to oral evidence.... Egyptian statutory
legislation equated written with oral acknowledgement, accepted documentary
evidence as if it was not suspect, and set up regulations for determining the
authenticity of documents....
Id. Similary, there were "procedural reforms" concerning oral testimony, giving the
option to "swear in" as well as to cross-examine witnesses. Id. This conflicts with the
shari'a,according to which the only way to credit a witness is by the tazkiya test, which
involves inquiring about his honorable record. Id. at 13-14. The author cites many
other foreign procedural elements introduced into the laws to be applied by the shari'a
courts, and also notes that the new procedural rules included a total reorganization of
the shari'acourts in a way foreign to the traditional system.
The organization of the shari'a courts system that had existed during the
Ottoman period was reformed as well: the concept of institutional hierarchical
appeal, alien to the shari'a, was introduced; and the 1897 Law (which was
further modified in 1909 and 1910) organized the shari'a courts into three
stages: Courts of Summary Justice (mahakimjuz'iyya), Courts of First Instance
(mahakim ibtida'iyya) and a Supreme Court (mahkama 'ulya).
Id. at 12.
162.

See SHAHAM, supra note 154, at 12-13.

Although the majority of the Muslim population in Egypt adheres either to the
Shafi'i school (in Lower Egypt) or to the Maliki school (in Upper Egypt), the
dominant school in the Egyptian shari' courts is the Hanafi, a legacy of
Ottoman rule. From the early nineteenth century, the Hanafi school acquired
exclusive status in the courts, regardless of the personal affiliation of the
litigants. The procedural legislation directed to the shari'acourts (starting from
1880) ordered these courts to judge according to the decisive opinion within the
Hanafi school (arjahal-aqwal fi madhhab Abi Hanifa), except for matters in
which the legislators specifically ordered the courts to apply reform statutory
legislation based on the instructions of alternative schools.
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power of the state and not that of the private ijtihad of the jurists, as
163
was the case under the Taqlid legal system.
2. Reactions to Colonization, Modernists, and Nationalism
In 1948, a national Egyptian Civil Code was passed. 164 The
promulgation of this Code (annulling the earlier Civil Code that
applied to the national courts), which was drafted through the
elaborate reconstructive work of the famous Egyptian jurist Sanhuri,
marked the beginning of an autonomous Egypt with its own
independent laws. 165 The Egyptian Parliament passed the Code on
the very day the regime of Capitulations was abolished, setting the
stage for the Egyptian national courts to become the primary courts
166
of the land and the repository of Egyptian national sovereignty.

163.
See generally ANDERSON, supra note 62. This is of course within the general
framework of the decline of ijtihad during the Taqlid era; as the author's authoritative
work notes, although by "about the end of the third century of the Muslim era, it was
commonly accepted that the 'door of ijtihad' had become closed," and "the development
of the law became progressively more and more moribund,"
[tihere was always, it is true, a certain measure of progress or evolution, since
new situations and problems arose which had to be solved by the fatawi, or
reasoned opinions, of some leading jurist; but, in the main, the continual
sequence of accepted textbooks took the form of commentaries and digests
based, century after century, on the commentaries and digests of the past.
Id. at 7. Because the shari'a "was regarded as a divinely given blue-print to which
society-ruler and subject alike-must always do their utmost to approximate," even
early suggestions to officially (that is, under the authority of the state) codify the law
"was successfully resisted; so it remained an amorphous volume of partly contradictory
doctrine, to which lip-service, at least, was invariably given ....
Id. at 9-10. Eventually
reform, which involved not only codification; the establishment of courts that rivaled
and limited the jurisdiction of the shari'a courts; and the positioning of the state as the
promulgator of laws, even if at times based on Taqlid rules, "came not from below but
from above. . . . [These reforms were imposed on them [ordinary Muslims] by the
Government." Id. at 14-15. The reaction in Egypt and in many other countries,
although not always involving a demand to return to the authority of knowledgeable
jurists as the source of law (who are often seen as having been coerced by recent reform
processes by the state of their traditional power and independence), is often "the
pressure for a greater reliance on the Shari'a as the source of the general law." Id. at
193. Indeed, religious Muslims often use modern, secular forums such as the Supreme
Constitutional Court of Egypt to pursue their demands, rather than seeking fatwas or
opinions of Islamic jurists.
164.
See Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 5, at 167; supra note 150 and
accompanying text (providing an overview of the general historical context).
165.
See Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 5, at 168-69 ("The Egyptian Civil Code of
1948 and its progeny in other Arab countries are mainly the result of the efforts of Abd
al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri (1895-1971 C.E.), the most influential Arab jurist of the 20th
century.").
166.
See id. at 167-69.

1090

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 37.1043

This era witnessed the emergence of two groups of legal elites, each
reacting in its own way to the effects of Europeanization of the Egyptian
legal system. 167 These elites spearheaded two legal modernization
projects that were in effect hostile to each other but at the same time
incorporated in their respective projects the historical claims of the
other. 168 The first group was composed of people like Muhammad
Abduh and Rashid Rida. 169 These elites were confronted with both the
de-Islamicization of the legal system in Egypt and the rising hegemony
of notions of legal liberalism in the world. 170 Their response was to
critique the medieval theory of Usul al-Fiqh which, as is indicated
above, had a deep influence on the Taqlid schools of law. 17 1 They offered
alternative ways of 'legislating" law that was Islamic by shifting the
hierarchical ordering of the sources of law included in the theory of
Usul. 1 72 They proposed that the doctrines of public welfare and public
interest (maslahah, istislah) replace qiyas (analogy) as a privileged
source of law. 173 Thus if a particular social need was not covered by
specific religious texts (the traditional sources of the law), then "a jurist

167.
See SAFRAN, supra note 135, at 61. As the author reports, the result of
Europeanization in general and British colonization in particular was
that two major trends, destined to be of crucial importance in the evolution of
Egypt during the first half of the twentieth century, were formulated during
this period. At first they seemed to have much in common, and the men
responsible for them at times collaborated with each other; but as they
developed and crystallized, they became increasingly alternative and competing
platforms. One approach, formulated by Muhammad 'Abduh and modified by
Rashid Rida, spoke for a reformist Islam; the other, formulated by Mustafa
Kamil and Lutfi al-Sayyid, promoted a nationalist ideal to which was attached
a rationalist liberal philosophy.
Id.
168.
169.

See id.
See HALLAQ, supra note 26, at 212, 214-20 (providing background on

'Abduh and Rida). See generally MALCOM KERR, ISLAMIC REFORM: THE POLITICAL AND
LEGAL THEORIES OF MUHAMMAD 'ABDUH AND RASHID RIDA (1966) (reporting that both

traditionally trained 'ulama, Egyptian Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Syrian
Rashid Rida (1865-1935) sought religious reform based on rational exploration of the
needs of modern society that did not betray the essential doctrines of Islam).
170.
See KERR, supra note 169, at 205 (reporting that "[bly the early 1920's
Rashid Rida was embittered to discover that his most formidable opponents were ...
the Western-educated secularists, who were ready to push his own utilitarian
principles beyond the bounds to which his intellectual background restricted him").
171.
See HALLAQ, supra note 26, at 212-20.
172.
See KERR, supra note 169, at 194.
173.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 145; Layish, supra note 119, at 266-67. As
Hallaq put it, "[w]hat Rida excluded from the domain of traditional qiyas he replaced
by the concept of maslaha." HALLAQ, supra note 26, at 217. As Kerr describes it,
according to Rida, "qiyas, with all that it entailed not only of deductive reasoning but of
semantic study of texts of the Qur'an and hadith, was merely a roundabout way of
arriving at the same conclusions that could be reached by the equally valid (but much
simpler) process of istislah." KERR, supra note 169, at 194.
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should select an interpretation that best accorded with the public
1 74
interest (maslahah).'
These Islamic modernists, as they came to be called, also
articulated and rationalized the doctrine of supra-madhhab. 175
Abduh argued that the state should not be confined to the rules of
one madhhab but should be free when appropriate to seek the rules
for its purposes in the doctrine of any school of law. 176 This legal
strategy was eventually incorporated and standardized in the
statutes regulating the family in Egypt, 177 producing a now very
familiar figure in Egypt as well as in the rest of the Arab world: the
contemporary religious jurist, legal adviser to the Ministry of Justice
on family law whose whole training and legal sensibility is that of
supra-madhhab.7 8 In fact, one could say that the dominance of the
supra-madhhab sensibility among almost all of the contemporary
religious jurists represents the last blow dealt to the Taqlid system,
with the latter's intricate distribution of legal activity among several
179
schools of law.
It is unfortunate that the propagation of the supra-madhhab
legal sensibility may be the only tangible result of the Islamic

174.
ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 145.
175.
Anderson, supra note 2, at 223. Anderson reports the following of Abduh
and his contemporaries:
Why, they argued, should the courts always be required to follow the dominant
opinion in the Hanafi school-particularly in matters such as the judicial
divorce of misused wives, where the dominant Hanafi doctrine is rigid in the
extreme, and some of the other schools much more liberal? Had not the
individual Muslim in his private life always enjoyed considerable latitude as to
which school he would follow, whether in general or in any particular
question ... was there not considerable authority for the proposition that it
was within the competence of the ruler, when public interests so required, to
require his courts to abandon the dominant opinion of the school they normally
follow in favour of the ruling of some other reputable juristic authority of the
past?
Id.; see MAHMOOD, supra note 118.
176.
See Anderson, supra note 2, at 223.
177.
For an example of such a statute, see HALLAQ, supra note 26, at 210.
178.
See MAHMOOD, supra note 118, at 6. The author's assertion that such
efforts involve ijtihad in the classical sense, however, can be disputed. See id. The
author claims that "[tihe jurists of the time, while advising the state, have arrived at
their conclusions through the Islamic processes of ijtihad (search for required legal
solutions of newly arising problems), having recourse where necessary to the Islamic
doctrines of masalih al-mursala (public interest) and siyasa shar'iya (state's legal
policy)." Id.
179.
Supra-madhhab sensibility permeates family court cases in Egypt decided
by otherwise secular judges. For court decisions that are evidence of such judicial
leanings, see PRINCIPLES OF SHARIA ADJUDICATION OVER FIFTY YEARS (MABADI AL-

QADA AL-SHARI) 657-59 (Ahmad Nassr al-Jundi ed., 1974) (on file with author). Thus
contemporary Egyptian judges are as much at ease quoting passages from Hanafi
medieval treatises as they are quoting Maliki works.
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modernizing project of Abduh and his contemporaries. 180 In fact,
some historians of Islamic law argue that contrary to these
modernizers' intentions, rather than providing the basis for a new
modernized Islamic law, their critique of Usul and the alternative
methods for lawmaking that they proposed ultimately provided the
methodological rationalization for the European-influenced

secular

legal system in Egypt. 181 Moreover, the institutional proposals of
these modernizers tended to copy the models of the institutions of the

liberal state but with Islamic names, lending further legitimacy to
18 2
the legal institutional structure already in place in Egypt.
The second group of legal elites to emerge during British colonial

rule was the secular nationalists, descendants of the lawyers trained
83
in the Capitulations as well as the earlier national court system.'
These lawyers were educated either in Europe or in the modern law
schools set up in various Egyptian universities. 184 The curriculum of
these law schools was at this time (and still is today) based primarily
on European civil law. 185 These lawyers constituted an emergent
power around the turn of the century and spearheaded, either as

students or as professionals, the nationalist movement agitating

against British colonialism (as well as against Egyptian royalty.) 8 6
The rhetoric of the secular nationalists included the liberal discourse

180.
See HALLAQ, supra note 26, at 258-62; Layish, supra note 119.
181.
See Layish, supra note 119, at 267-73. The author's critique of the Islamic
modernists' project and its results is summarized as follows:
The liberally-oriented modernist movement in Islam, founded by Muhammad
'Abduh, has failed signally. It has not succeeded in achieving its main objective,
viz. reshaping Islamic doctrine so as to adapt it to the requirements of modern
society.... They sincerely strove to renew Islamic law from within through its
authorized functionaries. Not only did this endeavor miscarry, but the
ideological infrastructure and technical procedural mechanism created by them
for this purpose caused, on the one hand, a disruption of traditional Islamic
legal doctrine and, on the other, prepared the ground for intensive
parliamentary secular legislation.
Id. at 263. Thus, the author reports that, "[t]he modernists unwittingly made an
appreciable contribution to the secularization of Islamic law." Id. at 267.
182.
See id.
183.
See Crecelius, supra note 4, at 77-78. As the author reports, "[tihe second
half of the nineteenth century appears to be the key period of secular gestation ...
when new institutions, concepts, and elites coalesced to form the basis of a modern
state and society." Id. at 77. Thus, there emerged a "modernizing native elite ... and
the spread of Western political concepts" among them. Id. at 78.
184.
See ZIADEH, supra note 153, at 63.
185.
This was (and still is) necessitated, of course, by the fact that most laws in
place in Egypt were (and still are) transplants of European civil law, the only exception
being the law of personal status.
186.
See ZIADEH, supra note 153, at 63.
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of constitutional rights. 187 For the nationalists, the system of
Capitulations came to symbolize not modernity and universalism but
imperialism and violation of Egypt's sovereignty. 188 Sanhuri, the
Egyptian jurist assigned the task of drafting a new Civil Code for an
independent Egypt (promulgated in 1948) was a decided member of
this group of elites, sharing its Europe-identified but also
18 9
paradoxically nationalist liberal consciousness.
Just as the Islamic modernists had to contend with "legal
liberalism" as the emergent norm among the competing secular
elites, so did Sanhuri have to contend with the demands (claims)
made by the Islamic modernizers about the role of Islamic law in the
Egyptian legal system.1 90 His Civil Code drafting project was marked

187.
See id. at 67-68; see also Crecelius, supra note 4, at 82 ("[A] secular political
theory, derived entirely from the West and resting on the concepts of constitutionalism,
consultative or representative government, nationalism, and popular sovereignty,
evolved in the latter part of the nineteenth century and gained rapid acceptance .....
188.
See ZIADEH, supra note 153, at 100.
During the 1800s Egypt had been intent upon emulating Europe and had been
ready to accord legal privileges to its citizens. In the early 1900s, however, the
country was swept by a spirit of nationalism which gave precedence to all
things national and was aimed at consolidating the basic fabric of the
nation.... [I]t was natural that the nationalist movement, which was out to
abolish the capitulations altogether, also directed its attention to the mixed
courts and their gradual elimination.
189.
See Enid Hill, Islamic Law as a Source for the Development of a
Comparative Jurisprudence, the 'Modern Science of Codification' (1): Theory and
Practice in the Life and Work of Abd Al-Razzaq Ahmad Al-Sanhuri, in ISLAMIC LAW:
SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXTS 148-49 (Aziz A1-Azmeh ed., 1988).
190.
See Amr A. Shalakany, The Analytics of the Social in Private Law Theory:
A Comparative Study 223-231 (April 5, 2000) (unpublished SJD dissertation) (on file
with author). J. N. D. Anderson reports:
The responsibility for drafting this new code was entrusted to a committee
under the chairmanship of 'Abd al-Razzaq Ahmad al-Sanhuri Pasha. Their
work was much discussed, both in the press and among experts; their draft was
extensively debated, both in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies; and the
code was eventually promulgated in July 1948, and brought into operation on
15 October 1949. Considerable publicity was given at the time, moreover, to the
fact that the new code had drawn extensively on 'the decisions of Egyptian
courts, comparative legislation and the Shari'a as its sources of amendment
the Explanatory Memorandum states unequivocally that
and enrichment ....
its authors derived from the Shari'a 'many of its general concepts and many of
its detailed provisions'; the Report of the Committee of Civil Law reiterated this
claim and remarked that 'the strengthening of the links between this draft code
and the provisions of the Shari'a represents a retention of a spiritual heritage
which deserves to be preserved and used'; and Sanhuri, when challenged as to
why he had not based it more firmly on the Shari'a, stated categorically: 'I
assure you that we did not leave a single sound provision of the Shari' which
We adopted
we could have included in this legislation without so doing ....
from the Shari'a all that we could adopt, having regard to sound principles of
modern legislation; and we did not fall short in this respect.'
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by a preoccupation with incorporating Taqlid rules representing the
Islamic in a piece of legislation that he also thought should include
the latest and most advanced achievements in codification in the
world. 191 An independent Egypt should be one that is both modern

192
but also loyal to its own historical traditions.
Sanhuri's codification strategy attempted to mediate the tension
between Taqlid law and European law (seen as "modern" law by the
secular elites) by inventing the category of the "social.' 193 Influenced
by the latest insights of the French sociological school of
jurisprudence of the 1920s and 1930s, Sanhuri argued that the most
advanced codes were the ones that most closely approached in their
rule structure the idea of "the social" (as opposed to the
"individualist"). 194 Further, he argued that the "social" was what
medieval Islamic jurisprudence also based its rules upon. 195 The
comparative legal methodology that Sanhuri followed in drafting his
Code led him to read the insights of the German code, considered the
most advanced at the time, into Taqlid law and to incorporate Taqlid
either as discrete rules or by symbiosis through German law. 196 In
the end, the Egyptian Civil Code came to reflect a European social
agenda embodied in a legal instrument that represented, in the
fashion of European codes, the universal, the rational, and the rule of

Anderson, supra note 2, at 227.
191.
See Shalakany, supra note 190, at 209-14, 223-31; see also Anderson, supra
note 2, at 227 (quoting Sanhuri that his code mostly relied on existing Egyptian
decisions but also incorporated some principles from the Shari'a).
192.
See Shalakany, supra note 190, at 223-31; Anderson, supra note 2, at 227.
193.
See Shalakany, supra note 190, at 208-24. Thus, "according to Sanhuri, the
code is at once a 'modern' and 'Islamic' document, and as such represents the ultimate
exercise in resolving the tension between modernity and tradition, while at the same
time 'socializing' modern law." Id. at 224.
194.
See id. at 209-13.
195.
See id. at 229-36. Maurits S. Berger describes the doctrine of "public policy"
found in the Code. See Maurits S. Berger, Conflicts Law and Public Policy in Egyptian
Family Law: Islamic Law Through the Backdoor, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 555, 568 (2002)
("The legal principles which are considered to pertain to public policy are those
principles that aim at realizing the public interest, from a political, social as well as
economic perspective, which [principles] are related to the highest order of society, and
supersede the interests of individuals."). Berger quotes the Explanatory Memorandum
(issued by Sanhuri's drafting committee), which explains that "[tihe judge should be
cautious not to hold his private opinions on social justice to be the general tendency of
public policy and morals. He is obliged to apply the general opinion (madhhab 'amm) to
which society in its entirety adheres, and not a private individual opinion." See id. at
558 n.5, 568 (quoting the Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Law of the Civil Code,
published as part of the parliamentary Collection of Preparatory Works).
196.
See Hill, supra note 189, at 167-68 (describing the objective nature of
Sanhuri's code); see also ZIADEH, supra note 153, at 142 (noting that Sanhuri borrowed
from up to twenty civil codes from around the world).
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law. 197 Contrary to the fashion of European codes, however, Sanhuri
did not draft a section on family law as part of his Code. 198 That was
to remain the privileged legal domain of Taqlid law. 199
It is noteworthy to mention that when Sanhuri set out to draft
the Civil Code, he had the ambition of drafting a section on family
law that would be applicable to both Muslims and Copts in Egypt;
however, he eventually dropped this plan. 200 What is significant
about this is that it provides a hint as to the way the secular
status of family law in the
nationalist legal elites regarded the
2 01
nascent independent state of Egypt.
Sanhuri's desire to include family law in the Civil Code and
apply it to both Muslims and Copts reflects the fact that he and other
nationalist reconstructive lawyers aspired to overcome and transcend
the quality of sectarian specificity that Taqlid law had acquired in
the preceding era. 20 2 The secularist nationalist aspiration considered
that, through inclusion in the Civil Code, family would acquire the
Code's quality of the universal, becoming thereby applicable to all the
citizens (nationals) of Egypt equally. Sectarian law was to them
symbolic of a pre-nationalist era in which different sectarian
communities applied their own discrete laws, which, to the
nationalist secular mind, would be reminiscent of the Capitulations
and Consular legal systems, given the fact that it was the reigning
logic of sectarianism and the "personality of laws" that rationalized
the application of the law of their country of origin to foreign
20 3
nationals living in Egypt.

197.
See Shalakany, supra note 190, at 207; see also Hill, supra note 189, at 172
("Sanhuri himself, writing some twenty years later, says that 'the new Code continues
to be representative of Western civil culture, not islamic legal culture .... "').
198.
See Hill, supra note 189, at 167. Although initially Sanhuri proposed the
inclusion of personal status laws in the revised civil code, he seems to have given up on
the idea of including family law in his codification project. Id. On the exclusion of
personal status law from the civil code, see MAHMOOD, supra note 118, at 2. In
addition, for a discussion on the trend extending throughout the Arab world, see supra
note 151 and accompanying text.
199.
LIEBESNY, supra note 153, at 136 (reporting that the law of marriage and
divorce "is still covered by Islamic legal principles .... ").
See ZIADEH, supra note 153, at 117, 138. "A-Sanhuri proposed the
200.
appointment of a committee to codify the entire field of civil law, including personal
status. Personal-status law was to be based on the shari'ahbut to be so designed as to
be suitable for non-Muslims as well." Id. at 138.
201.
See id. at 121-23 (noting how reformers intended to radically change the
family).
202.
See id. at 117.
See NATHAN J. BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD 63 (1997).
203.
The author reports that "[c]riticisms of separate courts of personal status emerged as
early as the 1890s and grew steadily from the 1930s on." Id. at 62. He explains:
Behind most of these criticisms lay the belief ...that the existence of separate
and autonomous personal status courts, with their own laws, procedures,
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Ultimately, the closest that the secular nationalist elites came to
overcoming the sectarian specificity of Taqlid family law was not by
including it in the Civil Code, but by simply incorporating the Taqlid
qadi courts into the national court system under Nasser in 1955.204
Although these courts are now part of a unified secular court
structure, the family law that they apply still has the quality of
religious Taqlid law. 20 5 The judges who oversee these cases vary in
their educational background, with some having graduated from AlAzhar University, a renowned religious institution (though
drastically secularized under Nasser), 20 6 and others having studied in
20 7
the law schools of secular Egyptian universities.

training, and personnel was inconsistent with a unified, centralized, national
judiciary. Thus, the dominant attitude toward these courts differed only in
degree from nationalist denunciations of the Mixed Courts. Both were seen to
limit governmental authority and national sovereignty.
Id. at 63.
204.
Id. at 63, 67-68. As Brown reports, "[iun justifying abolition in 1955, the
government claimed to be removing 'all traces of exceptional judicial systems with their
consequential limitations of governmental authority which tended to undermine the
national sovereignty of the country."' Id. at 63.; see also LIEBESNY, supra note 153, at
101 (providing the text of the actual law that abolished the Shari'a courts and those of
religious minorities, Law No. 462 of 24 September 1955). Gamal Abdel Nasser ruled
Egypt from 1952 to 1971. See JOHN L. ESPOSITO & JOHN 0. VOLL, ISLAM AND
DEMOCRACY 173-74 (1996).

205.

BROWN, supra note 203, at 67-68.

Yet if there was no compromise over the structure of the courts and the
unification of the judiciary, the potential opposition (especially the Shari'a
Courts themselves) was mollified by two concessions rendering the reforms
more conservative. First, the content of the law applied by the courts was not
changed. Earlier proposals that centered on reform and even unification of
Egypt's personal status law were ignored. Thus objections to the measure on
religious grounds were robbed of much of their potency, and had to center not
on the law itself but on the judges applying it. With special personal status
sections being established within the National Courts, it would now fall to
secular judges to apply religious law. Yet even this feature of the unification
was made less objectionable to the personnel of the Shari'a Courts by the
second concession: Shari'ajudges were transferred to the new personal status
sections, and the Shari'a bar was allowed to continue to practice in personal
status cases.
206.

See Crecelius, supra note 4, at 86-87.

207.

ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD: A GLOBAL RESOURCE BOOK

169 (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im ed., 2002) (noting that although there "are judges trained
in Shari'apresiding over family law cases within the National Courts .. .appeals are
heard by regular judges in the Court of Appeals and then the Court of Cassation").
Although there are judges trained in religious law and familiar with the Taqlid rules
residing at the lower levels of the court system, courts of appeal tend to be dominated
by judges with a purely secular, non-Shari'a training. Id.
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D. A Compromise on the Question of Women and the Family
This section argues that dropping family law from Sanhuri's civil
code symbolizes a historic abandonment by the male secular legal
elites of the question of women. 208 This abandonment allowed them
to avoid the agonizing problem of how to reconstruct family law in a
manner parallel to that of reconstructing other areas of law, such as
contract law. The historical question that remains unanswered is how
Sanhuri would have confronted this problem and how he would have
used his comparative legal methodology, with its mediation
strategies, to construct a family law that is both modern and Islamic.
One wonders whether the European liberal feminism of his time
would have helped him in the same way the "social" helped him in
mediating the reconstruction of contract law. The main legal
influences at work in Sanhuri's project were not those of mainstream
French legal thought but those of oppositional, generally leftist
responses to the mainstream in France represented by the
sociological school of Geny and Lambert. 20 9 It is not clear, however,
how sympathetic to feminism Sanhuri and the other Egyptian secular
2 10
nationalists were.

Author Margot Badran notes that despite the modernization of state and
208.
society led by the secular male legal and political elites in Egypt in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.
The personal status laws, or family laws, became a last bastion of control over
women. The patriarchal family would not relinquish this control, nor would the
state exact it. Having removed all other areas of law from the jurisdiction of
Islam, the state had left Muslim religious authorities in control of Islamic
personal status laws.
MARGOT BADRAN, FEMINISTS, ISLAM, AND NATION 124 (1995).
209.
See Shalakany, supra note 190.
See Badran, supra note 3, at 204. It may be easier to draw links between
210.
Egyptian feminism and the Islamic modernists in the late nineteenth and first half of
the twentieth century than between feminism and the secular nationalists. See id. For
instance, one author reporting on the emergence of feminism during this time period in
Egypt asserts:
This emergent feminism was grounded, and legitimised, in the framework of
Islamic modernism expounded toward the end of the century by Shaikh
Muhammad 'Abduh. . . . 'Abduh turned a revolutionary corner when he
proposed that believers, by which he meant the learned, could go straight to the
sources of religion, principally the Quran and the Hadith, for guidance in the
conduct of everyday life. Through ijtihad, or independent inquiry into the
sources of religion, 'Abduh demonstrated that one could be both Muslim and
modern and that indeed not all traditional practice was in keeping with Islam.
In dealing with gender issues, 'Abduh confronted the problem of patriarchal
excesses committed in the name of Islam. He especially decried male abuses of
the institutions of divorce and polygamy. The opening out encouraged by ijtihad
had a number of consequences. While Muslim women's earliest feminist writing
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Dropping family law from the Civil Code also meant that it was
abandoned to Taqlid law as transformed throughout the past two
centuries:
first, through
the forces
of centralization
and

Europeanization and, second, through the entrenchment of the supramadhhab legal sensibility among jurists, as described above. In
addition, religious elites came to embrace family law as the last
domain of their influence and treated every attempt at statutory
reform as another assault on the Islamic by the secular elites running
the state. 21 ' Although the secular male elites exempted family law

may not have been immediately inspired by Islamic modernism, it was not long
before it developed within this framework.

Id.
211.
See Najjar, supra note 1 (noting that statutes aimed to "reform" family law
were passed in 1920, 1923, 1929, 1943, 1979, and 1985); see also ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW
IN A CHANGING WORLD: A GLOBAL RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 207, at 169-70. The
analysis of these statutes by various authors is illustrative of this dilemma,
demonstrating that reforms were justified and explained using Islamic principles
espoused by 'Abduh and other modernists in an attempt to avoid or answer the attacks
of the conservative religious elites. One author reports:
A watershed in Egyptian family law reform occurred when Law No. 25 of 1920
was passed. The enactment of this law, and the second phase of the reform in
1929, resulted in an expansion of divorce rights for women ....
These reforms
were significant, not only for the substantive changes in the law that they
effected, but also for the process through which they were achieved. The
Egyptian reforms were cloaked under the veil of the 'acceptable' reform
mechanism of takhayyur. By drawing from the liberal tenets of the Maliki
school's divorce law, the Egyptian reforms counteracted the more rigid tenets of
the Hanafi school's divorce law that predominated in Egypt. . . . Relatively
recent developments in family law reform are testament to the recyclability of
the various legitimating mechanisms for adapting Islamic law to changing
circumstances. In 1979, Anwar Sadat issued Law No. 44 by presidential decree
during parliamentary recess, as provided for in the Egyptian Constitution, so
that the legislature could not block passage of the law. Known as 'Jihan's Law,'
...the provisions of Law No. 44 gave women further protection in the event of
a husband's subsequent polygamous marriage by affording a woman the right
to a divorce, as provided for in the Maliki and Hanbali traditions, should a
husband fail to inform his original wife of a subsequent marriage or should
such a marriage harm her in any way. Once again, by invoking Maliki and
Hanbali teachings, reforms were attempted under the protection of Islamic
sanction ....
As a result of opposition to the reforms, a decree of the Supreme
[Constitutional] Court of Egypt struck down Law No. 44 in 1985 ....
[A] new
law, resembling the old Law No. 44, was passed. This new law, Law No. 100 [of
1985], is currently the main legislation that determines the rights of women in
the family law context.
Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States and the United Nations Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women: Are the Shari'a and the
Convention Compatible?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1949, 1986-89 (1995). For a discussion of
Law No. 25 of 1920, see Anderson, supra note 2, at 224-25 (reporting that "Law No. 25
of 1920 had introduced some very welcome reforms in the sphere of marriage and
divorce by the simple expedient of adopting a 'weaker' Hanafi view, or the dominant
view of one of the other Sunni schools, in place of the dominant Hanafi doctrine").
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from the project of legal reconstruction of the Civil Code, they
nevertheless chose to support piecemeal reform legislation on the
issue. 212 Each piece of legislation, in turn, opened up a confrontation
with a religious elite that was already anxious about its limited
jurisdiction, translating every attack on the patriarchal as an attack
2 13
on the Islamic.
It is interesting that the main ideological driving force behind
these statutory reforms was Egyptian secular feminism, which rose
and came into prominence during the first half of the twentieth
century. 2 14 While the male secular elites allied themselves politically

Anderson also discusses the statute passed in 1923, concerning minimum age for
marriage. See id. at 225 ("[I]n 1923, the registrars of marriages had been forbidden to
register any union in which the bride and bridegroom had not reached the age of 16
and 18 respectively"; and the Shari'a Courts "were also precluded from hearing any
matrimonial cause whatever where the parties had not reached these ages at the time
of litigation."). Regarding the 1929 law, the author adds:
As for a husband's unilateral repudiation of his wife, the expedient of an
eclectic choice between the doctrines of the different schools and jurists was
stretched, in the provisions of Law No. 25 of 1929, to include certain dicta
attributed to early jurists before the schools had crystallized, together with
opinions put forward by certain radical thinkers of a rather later period, with
the result that most forms of repudiation which the husband did not really
intend to be effective were henceforth deemed not to end the marriage
relationship.
Id. For a discussion of the overturning of Law No. 44 of 1979 (Jihan's Law) in 1985 and
the subsequent passage of Law 100 a few months later, see Badran, supra note 3, at
225. See also Adrien Katherine Wing, Custom, Religion, and Rights: The Future Legal
Status of Palestinian Women, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 149, 171 (1994). Wing, after
describing in detail the changes made to personal status law by the provisions of Law
No. 44, notes that "[u]nder great pressure from traditionalists, the [Supreme]
Constitutional Court overturned these amendments on procedural grounds in 1985.
The Parliament subsequently passed a nearly identical law.... Id.
212.
See J. N. D. Anderson, Law as a Social Force in Islamic Culture and
History, 20 BULL. OF THE SCH.OF ORIENTAL & AFR. STUD. 13, 27 (1957) (reporting that
"piece-meal reforms in the law of marriage and divorce were introduced in Egypt in
1920, 1923, and 1929, to be followed in 1943 .. .").
This trend is not limited to Egypt.
Wing, supra note 211, at 165 (reporting that "[als early as the nineteenth century,
Muslim feminists, liberals, and leftists called for shariareform, particularly in the area
of personal status"). Today, all Muslim states, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, have
enacted some type of reform, albeit in piecemeal fashion. Id.
213.
See Najjar, supra note 1; see also Susan E. Marshall & Randall G. Stokes,
Tradition and the Veil: Female Status in Tunisia and Algeria, 19 J. MOD. AFR. STUD.
625, 628 (1981) (noting that certain groups of elite, particularly in "late-developing" or
"new" States, frequently engage in the "selective affirmation of tradition, wherein
certain features of the traditional value system are plucked out, and symbolically
heightened so as to serve as an ideological centre-piece"). This tendency would be
heightened in the case of the religious elite because their very livelihood and role or
position in society is conceived to be under attack when family law reform is proposed.
214.
Badran, supra note 3, at 208. The author reports that "[flrom 1923,
feminism crystallised around a set of demands, a broad agenda of claims for political,
social, economic, and legal rights. However, initial priority was given to women's
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with the agitating Egyptian secular feminists (along with some
enlightened ulama), they nevertheless always ended up following the
strategy of splitting the difference between the demands of the
conservative religious elites and those of the feminists-a strategy
followed by judges as well as legislators. 215 This strategy has meant
that the march toward a legal liberal feminist understanding of the
family, which was the political agenda underlying Egyptian
feminism, was continuously disrupted. 2 16 One of the most striking
features of the debate on family law in Egypt is the relative stability
217
of its terms throughout the twentieth century.
In the debate concerning family law in Egypt, both during the
process of modernization that took hold during the independence era
as well as in current times, feminists pushed for legal reform of
Taqlid rules that established inequality in the family. 218 Their
demands included a prohibition of polygamy, equal access to divorce
for women and men, an increase in the financial rights of women,
elimination of child marriage, and the end to the legal institution of
obedience within marriage. 2 19 On the other hand, there were (and
indeed still are) religious elites, allied over time with different
religious groups, declaring every one of these demands to be an
assault on a God-given right. 220 In the middle were the secular male

education followed by new work opportunities and the reform of the personal status
law." Id. Badran notes that some of the demands put forth by the feminists were
"granted relatively easily, such as equal secondary school education for girls and
raising the minimum marriage age for both sexes (achieved in 1923 and 1924
respectively)." Id. For a more complete account of Egyptian feminism by the author, see
BADRAN, supra note 208.
215.
See generally BADRAN, supra note 208; Badran, supra note 3.
See Badran, supra note 3, at 202 ("Whatever their competing interests, the
216.
state and religious forces have retained patriarchal forms of control over women.").
217.
See Abu-Odeh, supra note 1; Najjar, supra note 1.
For an account of early feminists, such as those who formed the Egyptian
218.
Feminist Union (EFU), and their struggle for family law reform in the first half of the
twentieth century, see BADRAN, supra note 208, at 124-35. For a discussion of the
continuation of their struggle in the second half of the twentieth century, including the
promulgation by President Sadat of Jihan's Law and its subsequent repeal, see Najjar,
supra note 1. For an overview of liberal feminist approaches to family law reform, see
Abu-Odeh, supra note 1.
See BADRAN, supra note 208, at 124-35; ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 48-49,
219.
58-59.
See, e.g., Najjar, supra note 1. Analyzing debates arising from attempts to
220.
reform family law in Egypt in the twentieth century, Najjar gives various accounts of
religious elite arguing against what they considered attacks on men's God-given rights.
For instance, during the debate concerning Law 44 of 1979, or Jihan's Law, the author
reports that Muhammad Khamis, an attorney and head of the "fundamentalist
organization" Muhammad's Youth (Shabab Sayyidna Muhammad)
charged that to decree that a wife has the right to seek divorce if her husband
exercises his Shari'a prerogative to marry another 'is to repudiate polygamy,
and Islam, which legalizes it. . ..' Khamis charged that the law 'closes the door
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elites who were busily splitting the difference between the demands
of the two as legislators and judges by restricting but not outlawing
polygamy; adding more grounds for wives to be granted divorce, yet
not equalizing access to it; and reinterpreting and restricting the
terms of the wife's obedience but not abolishing it.22 1 Unfortunately
for Egyptian feminists, the light of liberal feminism remains
teasingly quivering at the end of the tunnel, as it has been for
decades.

III.

LEGISLATING THE FAMILY

During the processes of legal change that took place in Egypt in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Taqlid law was transformed,
not only as a legal system per se, but also doctrinally, as it was
incorporated into modern legislation. To understand this process, it is
useful to compare and highlight changes in Taqlid in Egypt with
what took place in Jordan and Tunisia. In addition, it is also useful to
understand the doctrine of the Hanafi school of law related to the
family, as codified by the Egyptian Qadri Pasha in the late
nineteenth century, when codification of laws as legislative style
became dominant in Egyptian legal culture. 222 His codification of
Hanafi doctrine never became official law in Egypt, 223 but it is
interesting to consider because codification resulted in a concise and
accessible account of the doctrine, which otherwise sits in multiple
medieval treatises and commentaries and is hard to access without
elaborate effort. 2 24 Hanafi doctrine constitutes the background body
of rules that the modern Egyptian statutes are seen as departing
from and intervening in. Likewise, Hanafi doctrine greatly influenced
the Jordanian legislature when it set out to comprehensively codify

completely in the face of those who would like to marry another wife according
to God's Book and the Traditions of His Prophet....
Id. at 325.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 58-61.
221.
222.
See NASIR, supra note 10, at 35-36. As the author reports, in Egypt, "the
eminent jurist Muhammad Qadri Pasha compiled in 1893 The Sharia Provisions on
PersonalStatus, a book of 646 Articles on marriage, divorce, gift, interdiction, wills and
inheritance, all based on the Hanafi doctrine." Id.
223
EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 51.
224.
Codification as style may have greatly distorted the complexity of the
Hanafi doctrine produced under the Taqlid legal system. The code's style of enlisting
abstract general rules may very well be detrimental to a doctrine expressed in response
to specific questions or hypothesis and able to tolerate a great degree of conflict and
contradiction.
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family law. 225 Hanafi doctrine can also be used comparatively to show
how far modern Arab legislatures have departed from the legislative
model on the family contemplated by the Taqlid legal system.
Tunisia provides an interesting instance of legislating liberalism
226
in family law that has no parallel anywhere in the Arab world.
However, the doctrine that historically prevailed in North Africa and
that influenced Tunisian legislation on the family was that of the
227
Maliki school and not that of the Hanafi.
The data from this comparative analysis has been summarized
in the table below. The table is followed by a discussion of the
information.
A. Comparative Data
Issue

1. Father's
Consent to
Daughter's
Marriage

2 29

Qadri Pasha's
Shari'aProvisions
on Personal Status
(Compiling Hanafi
22 8
Doctrine)

Egypt

Under Article 51 of
Pasha's rules, the
father's consent is

- Unregulated by
statute. The rule
under Hanafi
by
doctrine2 3governs
3
default.

not required if the
daughter is of
1

Jordan

- Under the
dictates of
Jordanian
Personal Status
Law No. 61
1 (1976), the

Tunisia

- Under Article 3 of
the Tunisian
Majallah (Code) of
Personal Status,
(Decree 13, 1956),
the father's consent

225.
See Azizah al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women's
Rights, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 7 (1997); see also Wing, supra note 211, at 160
(reporting that the 1976 Jordanian Law of Personal Status "is based upon the Hanafi
school of jurisprudence").
226.
See Mounira Charrad, Repudiation versus Divorce: Responses to State
Policy in Tunisia, in WOMEN, THE FAMILY, AND POLICY 51 (Esther Ngan-ling Chow &
Catherine White Berheide eds., 1994).
Reform of family law in Tunisia constitutes an interesting case of intended and
dramatic innovation in the legal norms governing gender relations and family
life. It is an example of a government enacting a law as an instrument of social
change in an Islamic country where family matters had been regulated by
traditional Islamic legal doctrine. Gaining significance outside of Tunisia, the
reforms became a model for advocates of women's rights elsewhere in the
Islamic world.
227.
See MOUNIRA M. CHARRAD, STATES AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 31 (2001) (noting
the "overwhelming presence of Malikism" in the Maghribi region, which includes
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco).
228.
QADRI PASHA, AL-AHKAM AL-SHARIYYAT Fi AL-AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIYYAT ALA
MADHHAD AL-IMAM ABI HANIFA AL-NUMAN (1997) (on file with author).
229.
I use the term "father" to refer to "guardian," the latter being the legal term
referring to one who plays this role. In the absence of the father, another male relative
replaces him as the substitute-father.
230.
See PASHA, supra note 228, at 114.
231.
See id. at 110.
232.
See id. at 112.
233.
EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 51.
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majority age.

230

- Under Articles
34231 and 44,232
however, the father
can contract the
marriage of a minor
daughter even by
force,

2. Kafaa' Doctrine

- Under Article 52 of
Pasha's rules, if the
daughter marries one
who is not her equal
against her father's
wishes, the contract
2 38
is void.

- Unregulated by
statute. Rule under
Hanafi doctrine
governs by default,

guardian's
consent is
required
in all
2 34
cases;
however, under
Article 13, an
exception is
made if the
woman is of
majority age and
married
has been
235
before.

is not required if
the daughter is of
23 6
majority age.

- Under Article
22 of the
Jordanian Code,
if a woman
denies having a
guardian and
marries, and
then her
guardian
appears, he can
dissolve her
marriage on the
basis of

Non-existent.

- However, under
Article 6, the
consent of both the
father and the
mother is required
of
for the marriage
23 7
a minor child.

239

"inequality."

Prior to codification, Egyptian personal status law had been based primarily on
the Hanafi school. The first laws to be introduced had drawn from all the
schools of law, but it was provided in Law No. 78 of 1931 that in the event of no
textual provision existing, reference was to be made to the most appropriate
opinion of Abu Hanifa.
234.
See id. at 81. Articles 9-12 set the rules for "Guardianship in Marriage."
Article 9 declares that "[t]he marriage guardian shall be a male agnate in the order set
down in the most appropriate opinion of the Madhhab of Abu Hanifa." See id. Under
Hanafi rules, the father has first priority for guardianship; in his absence, the paternal
grandfather has priority. See id. In addition, Article 6 discusses the procedure by which
a judge may at times conduct a marriage despite the opposition of the guardian. See id.
at 80.
235.
See id. at 82.
236.
See id. at 239.
237.
See id. at 240. The text of Article 6 given by the authors does not reflect the
change made in the law in 1993 to require the consent of the mother as well as that of
the guardian in such cases; reference to the 1993 change can be found in ISLAMIC
FAMILY LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD: A GLOBAL RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 207, at
182-83.
238.
See PASHA, supra note 228, at 114. According to Article 63 of Pasha's rules,
equality includes consideration of lineage (which includes "Arabness" and Islam),
wealth, "goodness," and profession. See id. at 117.
239.
See EL ALAMi & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 85. Article 20 of the Code
defines equality in terms of wealth, meaning he is capable of paying the dowry and
maintaining the wife. See id. at 84. The husband's equality is measured only at the
time of the marriage contract. See id. Article 20 reads as follows:
It shall be required for the marriage to be binding that the man be of equal
status to the woman in financial terms, that is the husband should be able to
provide the immediate portion of the dower and maintenance for the wife.
Equality shall be observed at the time of the contract but if it ceases thereafter
this shall have no effect on the marriage.
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3. Maintenance of
Wife

- Under Article 160 of
Pasha's rules,
maintenance, which
is the obligation of
the husband, is
earned by the wife
from the date of the
contract. 240

- Under Article 1 of
Law No. 100 (1985),
maintenance, which
is the obligation of
the husband, is
earned by the wife
from the date of
contract. 244

- Under Articles 171
and 169, the wife
loses her
maintenance if she
leaves the house or
works without her
husband's
24 1
permission.

-Article 1 provides
that the wife loses
her maintenance if
she leaves the
house without her
husband's

- According to Article
150, the specific
elements of
maintenance are
food, clothing, and
residence.242
Medical expenses are
not specified as being
a necessary part of
maintenance.243

24 5

permission
or if she works and
it is judged that her
work involves
"abuse of the right"
or that it is
contrary to the
interests of the
family, provided
that in both cases
her husband
requests she stops
24 6
working.

- Under Article
35 of the
Jordanian Code,
maintenance,
which is the
obligation of the
husband, is
earned by the
wife from the
date of
contract.247
- Under Article
69 of the
Jordanian Code,
the wife loses
maintenance if
she leaves the
house without
any legal
2 48
excuse,
or
when she
prevents her
husband from
entering a home
that she

[VOL. 371043
- Under Article 23
of the Tunisian
Majallah, the
husband is the
"head of the
family," and he is
responsible for the
maintenance of his
wife and
25 1

children.
- Also under Article
23, the wife has to
contribute to the
maintenance of the
family if she has
25 2
money.

2 49

owns.

- Under Article
68 of the Code,
she also loses

Id.
240.
See PASHA, supra note 228, at 145.
241.
See id. at 147.
242.
See id. at 143.
243.
See id.
See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 52. Under Article 1 of Law
244.
No. 100 (1985), the wife earns her maintenance once she "submits" herself to her
husband, even if by law and not actually. See id. In all references to Law 100 of 1985,
the author is referring to the laws of personal status as they read today because of the
amendments made by Law 100; thus, they are technically the articles of Law 25 of
1929, as amended by Law 100 of 1985.
245.
See id. Under Article 1, an exception is made for those times when she
leaves the house for reasons allowed by virtue of law or custom, or due to necessity. See
id.
It shall not be deemed grounds for forfeit of maintenance if the wife leaves the
matrimonial home without the permission of her husband in circumstances in
which this is permitted by a rule of the Shari'a for which there is some text or
prevailing custom or where this is required by necessity.

Id.
See id. at 52-53. Article 1 also dictates that she loses her maintenance if she
246.
commits apostasy or refuses to "submit" herself to her husband without any legal
reason, or is obliged to do so for reasons outside her husband's control. See id. at 52.
247.
See id. at 88.
248.
See NASIR, supra note 10, at 100. The Code does not define what this legal
excuse might be.
249.
See id.
250.
See id.
251.
252.

See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 243.
See id.
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maintenance if
she works
outside the house
without her
husband's
permission.

4. Discipline of
Wife by Husband

- Under Article 209,
the husband has the
right to discipline his
wife for "trespasses"
not punishable by

- Unregulated by
statute. Hanafi rule
governs by default.

25 3

but the
hadd,
same article
establishes that he
her
beat
cannot
severely
under any
sevreyunany4
254
circumstance.

2 50

- Unregulated by
the Jordanian
Code, except for
the declaration
in Article 69 that
the wife has the
right to be
"disobedient"
without losing
her maintenance
by leaving the
house if her
husband beats or

- Under Article 23
of the Tunisian
Majallah,
both spouses are
obligated to treat
each other well and
avoid inflicting any
harm 2on
5 6each
other.

mistreats
her.255

5. Polygamy

- Under Article 19 of
Pasha's collection, a
man may have up to

-Under Article 11
of Law No. 100
(1985), a man may

- Under Article
28 of the
Jordanian Code,

four wives.257

marry up to four
wives, but he has to
inform both his
current and future
wives of the other
25 8
marriage(s).

a man may have
up to four
wives.261

- Under Article 6 of
Law No. 100 (1985),
the wife can
request a divorce if
she can prove
harm, material or
emotional,
resulting from the
new marriage.259
- In addition, under
11, the new
Article
wife can request a
divorce if she
learned after the
marriage that her

- However, under
Article 19(1), the
wife can
stipulate in the
marriage
contract that he
cannot take
another wife; if
he does so
regardless, the
marriage
contract with the
stipulation is
dissolved and the
wife retains all
her financial
262
rights.

- Under Article 18
of the Tunisian
Majallah,
polygamy is
prohibited and is
punishable by oneyear imprisonment
and/ or a fine of2 6 3
240,000 francs.

253.
See PASHA, supra note 228, at 157. "Hadd" is an Islamic punishment
decreed by the Quran for a specific set of crimes such as homicide, highway robbery,
drinking wine, and adultery. See SCHACHT, supranote 14, at 175.
See PASHA, supra note 228, at 157.
254.
255.
See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 95.
256.

See id. at 243.; see also ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD: A

GLOBAL RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 207, at 183 (noting that the Tunisian Majallah
requires "spouses to treat each other well" during marriage).
See PASHA, supra note 228, at 107.
257.
See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supranote 3, at 58.
258.
See id. at 56.
259.
See id. at 58.
260.
See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 86; NASIR, supra note 10, at
261.
67.
See EL ALAMi & HINCHCLIFFE, supranote 3, at 83-84.
262.
See id. at 242; NASIR, supra note 10, at 67.
263.
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1husband had other
__
____ __ __ __

6. Divorce by Wife

__

__

__

__

__

- Under Article 260 of
Pasha's collection, a
husband can delegate
to his wife the right
26 4
to divorce.

_

__

__

__

__

__

- Under Article 4 of
Egyptian Law No.
100 (1985),

- Article 273 also
provides for khul,
whereby a wife can
buy her freedom from
the marriage by
giving up some or all
of her financial

a judge can grant a
wife a divorce for
continual failure by
her husband to
provide mainten26 7
ance,
and under
Article 9, if her
husband suffers
from a serious

rights.

disease.

- In addition, under
Article 298, a wife
can request a divorce
if her husband is only
capable of anal

- Under Articles 12
and 13 of Egyptian
Law No. 100 (1985),

2 65

26 6

intercourse.

268

the wife can get a
divorce in case of
long absence of
husband, and under
Article 14, in case
of his
2 69

imprisonment.

_

__

__

__

__

__I

- Under Article
19(i) of the
Jordanian Code,
a husband can
delegate to his
wife the right to
seek divorce
without his
27 2

consent.
- Consensual
divorce (khul) is
provided for in
Articles 103109.273

__

__

__

__2_

- Under Article 31
of the Tunisian
Majallah, divorce is
available for both
spouses either
through mutual
consent, if either
can prove the other
harm inflicted by
other, or upon the
husband's desire or
wife's request.280

- Under Article
115, a woman
has the right to
request a divorce
if her husband
has an incurable
27 4

disease.
Other grounds
include, under
Article 120,
2 75

- Under Article 6, in
case of harm
inflicted
by the husband, the
wife can also get a
divorce.270
-Hanafi grounds
for divorce are also
available to the
wife.
- Because of
changes made in
Egyptian
procedural personal
status law in 2000,
women can now
apply for khul

insanity;
under Article
130, his
imprisonment;
276 and under
Article 123, his
2 77

absence.
In
addition, under
Article 127, a
wife can request
a divorce if her
husband does not
pay
2 78

maintenance,
and under Article
132, if he inflicts
2 79
harm on her.

27 1

divorce.

264.
See PASHA, supra note 228, at 170-71.
265.
See id. at 174. When seeking a 'khul divorce, a woman in general agrees to
give up some or all of her financial rights in exchange for an exit from the marriage.
The woman does not have to base her request on one of the grounds for divorce
established by the law. As one author put it, "[a]part from the divorce effected by the
husband, marriage may be dissolved by mutual consent by the wife giving the husband
something for her freedom ....
NASIR, supra note 10, at 115.
266.
See PASHA, supra note 228, at 179.
267.
See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 53.
268.
See id. at 54.
269.
See id. at 59.
270.
See id. at 56.
271.
See Reem Leila, Before you sign on the dotted line.
AL-AHRAM WEEKLY,
June 22-28, 2000, at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/487/li2.htm; Mariz Tadros, The
beginning or
the
end?, AL-AHRAM
WEEKLY,
Mar.
9-15,
2000,
at

2004]
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after Divorce
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- Under Article 311 of
Pasha's collection, a
woman has a right to
maintenance during
her waiting period of
three menstrual
28 1
cycles (idda).
Under Article 316, if
she is pregnant, she
is entitled to

- The wife has all of
the financial rights
given to her under
Hanafi doctrine,
- In addition, under
Article 18 of Law
100 (1985), she has
the right to
maintenance for at

- The wife has all
of the financial
rights given her
under Hanafi
doctrine,
- In addition,
under Article 134
of the Jordanian
Code, if she

- Under Article 35
of the Tunisian
Majallah, the wife
has the right to
maintenance
during her waiting
period of three
months (idda)
unless she's
pregnant, in which

http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/472/fr2.htm; Mariz Tadros, Freedom-at a price, ALAHRAM WEEKLY, May 25-31, 2000, at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/483/lilfhtm;
Tadros, supra note 7; see also Susan Sachs, Egypt's Women Win Equal Rights to
Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2000, at Al.
With the new law, a woman will be able to divorce her husband, with or
without his assent ....
Even with Egypt's new law, a wife who wants a divorce
over the objections of her husband will have to return to him any money or
property that he paid her upon the marriage.
272.
See LYNN WELCHMAN, BEYOND THE CODE: MUSLIM FAMILY LAW AND THE
SHAR'IA JUDICIARY IN THE PALESTINIAN WEST BANK 260 (2002). Article 19 reads as
follows: "If a condition is stipulated in the contract that is of benefit to one of the
parties, is not inconsistent with the intentions of marriage, does not impose something
unlawful and is registered in the contract document, it shall be observed ..
" Id. As
another author describes it, "ihe law also allows the wife to make certain stipulations
in the marriage contract that may create rights. She may specify in the marriage
contract that she can obtain a divorce without resorting to judicial proceedings....
Although legally permitted, such stipulations are rarely made, due to either a
reluctance to defy local custom or a lack of knowledge about this option." Wing, supra
note 211, at 162-63.
273.
For a discussion of these Articles, see WELCHMAN, supra note 272, at 27276. Under Jordanian law, as under the Taqlid rules, for a wife to get a khul divorce, the
consent of the husband is required. Thus, the husband cannot be obliged to agree to the
divorce. As the author put it, under Jordanian law, "[i]t is not therefore a case of the
wife having a guaranteed 'right' to obtain a talaq [divorce] from her husband by giving
up her financial rights ....
See id. at 273. In addition, under Article 102 (b) of the
Jordanian Code, "if the woman is under the age of legal majority (rushd), then the khul'
is not valid unless her legal guardian (wali al-'amr) gives his consent to her
renunciation of her rights." Id. at 275. Recently, a "temporary law" was passed by the
Jordanian government, with the public support of the King and Prime Minister, while
the parliament was in recess, to allow women to file for a khul divorce without their
husband's consent. When the Parliament convened at the end of the summer, however,
it was rejected. For a discussion of this law, see Divorce Blow for Jordan Women, BBC
NEWS WORLD ED., Aug. 4, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ middleeast/
3123661.stm. See also Jordan Woman 'Wins Right to Divorce, BBC NEWS, May 13,
2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/middleeast/1985271.stm.
274.
See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 103.
275.
See id. at 105.
276.
See id. at 107.
277.
See id. at 105.
278.
See id. at 106.
279.
See id. 108-09. For a lengthy discussion of this Article, see WELCHMAN,
supra note 272, at 285-87. For a discussion of all the grounds for divorce available to
the wife, see Wing, supra note 211, at 162.
280.
See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 245.
281.
See PASHA, supra note 228, at 183.
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maintenance for the
entire term of her
pregnancy.

28 2

- Under Article 106,
the wife also has a
right to her deferred

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

least two years if
she was divorced
2
against her will. 88
- Also, under Article
10 of Law 100
(1985), when a wife

claims she was
harmed because
she was divorced
against her will,
she has the right
to up to one year
of

[VOL. 37.1043
case the
maintenance
covers the term2 of
92
her pregnancy.
-She also has the
right to her

See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 184.
id. at 129.
id. at 133.
id. at 174-79.
id. at 174.
id. at 175.
See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 60.
See id. at 57.
See id. at 109. The Article reads as follows:

If the husband divorces his wife arbitrarily (ta'assufan), such as if he divorces
her for no good reason (sabab ma'qul), and she applies to the qadi, he shall
award her against the man who divorced her such compensation (ta'wid) as he
considers appropriate, provided that it shall not exceed the amount of her
maintenance for one year .... This shall not affect the rest of the matrimonial
rights of the divorced woman, including maintenance for the 'idda period.
WELCHMAN, supra note 272, at 339.
291.

See EL ALAMI

& HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 108.

292.
See id. at 246.
293.
See Majallat Al-Ahwal Al-shakhsiyya [Tunisian Family Code], art. 13, at 30
(Muhammad Al-Habeeb Al-Shareef ed., 1997) (Tunis.) (on file with author).
294.
See WANI, supra note 73, at 204. The relevant provision reads as follows:
As regards the women to be indemnified for material injury in terms of money,
the same shall be paid to her after the expiry of iddat and may be in the form of
retention of the matrimonial house. This indemnity will be subject to revision,
increase or decrease in accordance with the changes in the circumstances of the
divorced wife until she is alive or until she changes her marital status by
marrying again. If the former husband dies this indemnity will be a charge on
his estate....
Id.; see also NASIR, supra note 10, at 121. As Nasir describes:
The new Article 31 as amended under Act No. 7/1981 rules that the injured
spouse shall be granted damages for any material or moral injury inflicted as a
result of divorce at the request of either party. The woman shall receive
damages for any material injury in the form of a monthly allowance, to run
after the expiry of the iddat, to secure for her the same standards of living she
was accustomed to during her marriage. Such an allowance shall be liable to
revision upwards or downwards as circumstances change, and shall continue
for the lifetime of the divorcee or until she remarries and her social status
changes, or on acquiring such property as to enable her to do without such an
allowance.
Id. In addition, Mounira Charrad described the amendment to the Tunisian Code, the
1981 law on divorce, as significant because it "introduces the possibility of 'life-long
alimony' for a divorced woman. (Prior to 1981, compensation was paid in a lump sum.)
A divorced woman can now select to receive a regular monthly or yearly payment until
death or until she remarries." Charrad, supra note 226, at 56.
295.
See NASIR, supra note 10, at 121; WANI, supra note 73, at 204.
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283

2 90

seeks a divorce
based on harm, if
the court
determines that she
suffered harm at
the hands of her
husband, the wife
keeps all her
28 9
financial rights.

dowry.
-In addition, Article
118 guarantees the
wife's right to keep
the household items
and furniture she
contributed to the
28 4

marriage.

1109
2 93

deferred dowry;
and, under the
provisions of
Article 31, if the
court determines
that the husband
caused her harm,
she is awarded a
monthly alimony
as well as a decent

maintenance.
- Also, under
Article 132, if the
court determines
that she suffered
harm at the
hands of her
husband,the
wife keeps all her
financial

-Khul divorce is
regulated by Articles

294

residence.
Article 31 provides
that both of these
provisions apply
until she remarries
or earns money and
can make do
without

29 1

rights.

273-297.285 In the
case of khul divorce,
according to Article
274, a wife's financial
rights depend on the
agreement made
with the
2 86
husband.
Articles
276-277 dictate that
she may give up all
or part of these
287
financial rights.
4-

8. Rules on
Custody

29 5

alimony.

4-

- Under Article 365 of
296
Pasha's rules,
the
mother has priority
in custody of the
children, for which
she earns a fee from
the father.297
Article 391 dictates
that her custody over
the children lasts
until a boy is seven
years old and a girl is
nine.

29 8

- Under Article, upon
remarriage, the
mother loses custody,
unless she marries a
2 99

mahram,
and
under Article 393 she
cannot travel with
the child for long
30 0
distances
without
the father's

4-

- Hanafi rules apply
with the following
modifications:
Under Article 20 of
Law 100 (1985),

- The mother has
priority of
custody, for
which she earns
3 07
a fee.

custody ends when
the boy is ten years
old and the girl is
30 3
twelve;
under
the same article,
the judge can order
that the children
stay with their
mother until the
boy is fifteen years
old and the girl gets
3 04
married.
However, again
under the
provisions of Article
20, she does not
earn the custody fee
during the extended

- Under Article
161 ofthe
Jordanian Code,
custody lasts
until the boy is
nine years old
and the girl is
eleven, although
Article 162
provides that the
period can be
extended for the
entire time of
their

period.

420, the father
retains full
guardianship rights
over the children,
even while they are

affairs.

.5.

mahram.
Also under
Jordanian law,
she can't travel
with the child

3 12

-Article 58
provides that the
mother loses
custody if she
3 13

marries,
unless
thejudge
determines

30 9

the mother and his
d

-Also under Article
67 of the Tunisian
Majallah, the
mother as
custodian makes
decisions on her
child's travel,
studies and
financial

- Under Article
156 of the
Jordanian Code,
if the mother
remarries, she
loses custody,
unless she
marries a

3 05

- Under Article
18b(3) of Law 100
(1985), after divorce
the husband has to
provide an
independent
residence for

-Under Article

311

judge.

minority.308

30 1

permission.

- Under Article 67
of the Tunisian
Majallah, the
mother has no
priority of custody.
Instead, custody
can be awarded to
either parent
according to the
"best interests of
the child," which is
determined by a

3 14

otherwise.
&

- Article 56

296.
For rules on custody, see PASHA, supra note 228, at 199-207, arts. 366-94.
297.
See id. at 199.
298.
See id. at 206.
299.
See id. A mahram is one who is prohibited to marry the child for reasons of
consanguinity.
300.
The exception is if she is returning to her own home.
301.
See PASHA, supra note 228, at 206-07.
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custody.302
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children during the
term
of custody and
if he doesn't,

outside of the
country
without
the father's

provides that a fee
for
custody
is taken
from
the child's

depending on the
circumstances, they
may have the right
to live in the
marital apartment
(without him)
unless he provides
them with a
30 6
separate home.

consent.310

money if s/he has
any, and if not, the
father pays their
3 15
expenses.
- If the mothercustodian doesn't
have a place to live,
the father has to
provide her a

302.
See id. at 214.
303.
See Dawoud S. El Alami, Law No. 100 of 1985 Amending CertainProvisions
of Egypt's PersonalStatus Laws, 1 ISLAMIC L. & SOc'Y 116, 127 (1994).; see also ISLAMIC
FAMILY LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD: A GLOBAL RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 207, at 172
("The divorced mother is entitled to custody of boys until the age of ten and girls until
the age of twelve.").
304.
See El-Alami, supra note 303, at 127; Najjar, supra note 1, at 335.
305.
See El-Alami, supra note 303, at 127; Najjar, supra note 1, at 335.
306.
See WELCHMAN, supra note 272, at 334; El-Alami, supra note 303, at 122.
307.
See WELCHMAN, supra note 272, at 332-34.
308.
NASIR, supra note 10, at 172. Article 162 reads as follows: "Custody by the
mother who devotes herself entirely to the care and education of her children shall run
until they reach puberty." Id.; see Lynn Welchman, The Development of Islamic Family
Law in the Legal System of Jordan, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 868, 877 (1988).
309.
See NASIR, supra note 10, at 163-64. As the author expresses this
traditional rule of the Hanafi and Maliki schools of law:
The Hanafis and Malikis deprive the woman of the right to custody should she
marry a stranger (a person outside the child's paternal or maternal family) or a
relation of the child who would not, in other circumstances, be prohibited from
marriage to the child, such as a cousin. However, should she marry a relation of
the child who would be prohibited from marriage to it in any circumstances,
such as the child's uncle, then the custodian would not lose her right to custody,
and loving care for the infant would then be assumed, even if the wife's
attention to the child may compromise part of her services to her husband.
Id. at 163.
310.
See Dr. Moussa Abou Ramadan, The Transition From Tradition to Reform:
The Shari'a Appeals Court Rulings on Child Custody (1992-2001), 26 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 595, 609 (2003). The author reports that "[s]ection 166 of Law No.61 of Personal
Status in Jordan provides that a person with whom the child is staying cannot leave
the Kingdom with the child, unless the guardian agrees, subject to the prior assurance
of his welfare." Id.
311.
See NASIR, supra note 10, at 162; Charrad, supra note 226, at 56.
312.
See Majallat Al-Ahwal Al-shakhsiyya [Tunisian Family Code], at 169
(Muhammad Al-Habeeb Al-Shareef ed., 1997) (Tunis.) (on file with author). However,
under Article 61 of the Majallah, she will "lose her right to custody if she moves to or
settles in a different town where it would be difficult for the father or guardian to look
after the interests of the child." NASIR, supra note 10, at 167.
313.
Again, an exception is made if the person she marries is a mahram. See
NASIR, supra note 10, at 164.
314.
See id.
315.
See Majallat Al-Ahwal Al-shakhsiyya [Tunisian Family Code], at 143
(Muhammad A1-Habeeb Al-Shareef ed., 1997) (Tunis.) (on file with author).
316.
See id.
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3 16

residence.
- Under Article 396,
the father maintains
the children if they
do not have money of
their own, until the
boy can earn a living,
and the girl gets
31
married. 8

9Maintenance
and Guardianship
3 17
of Children

- Under Article 420,
the father has
guardianship rights
over the person and
the money of his
minor cnlidren or
those still
maintained by
him.

31 9

For example, under
Article 420, the
father has the power
to force his minor
children to

- Under Article
18b(2) of Egyptian
Law No. 100 (1985),
the father
maintains the
children if they do
not have money of
their own until the
girl marries or
earns a living and
until the boy is
fifteen years old, if
he is capable at
that time of earning
a living.""
- The father has
guardianship rights
over his children
until the age of
3 23

twenty-one.

- Under Article
168 of the
Jordanian Code,
the father
maintains the
children if they
do not have
money of their
own; until the
boy can earn a
living, unless he
is a student; and
until the girl
3 24
marries.
- Under Article
169, the father is
obliged to cover
the expenses of
the children's
education until
they get their
first university
5
degree.32

3 20

and under
marry,
Article 422, he can
hire his children out
32 1

I

for emoloyment.

- Under Article
165, the male
guardian of

- Under Article 46
of the Tunisian
Majallah, the
father maintains
the children until
they are of
majority age or
until they finish 3 2 8
their education.
Also under Article
46, the father
maintains his
daughter until she
works or
32 9
marries.
- Under Article 47,
if the father cannot
maintain them,
then it is the
mother who is
responsible for
their
maintenance.

3 30

- Under Article
154, the father is
the guardian of

There is a distinction between custody and guardianship. Under Article 395
317.
of Pasha's rules, a father (as guardian) has the obligation to discipline, educate, and
instruct his children, as well as maintaining them if they have no money, until a boy
can earn money and a girl gets married. See PASHA, supra note 228, at 199. The mother
(as custodian) is required to take care of the children and nurse them as long as they
need it. See id. In addition, guardianship is important under the doctrine of all four
schools of law in relation to the marriage contract-as Maghniyyah describes it,
"[w]ilayah [guardianship] in marriage implies the legal authority granted to a
competent guardian to be exercised over one under a legal disability for his or her
advantage." MAGHNIYYAH, supra note 76, at 292. Under the doctrine of the Shaf'i,
Maliki, and Hanbali schools, this "legal disability" means that a woman, even if she is
"sane" and "major" and a "maiden", or a sane, grown-up virgin, cannot contract her own
marriage. See id. Thus, as the author puts it, "[c]ustody has no connection with
guardianship (wilayah) over the ward with respect to marriage; it is limited to the care
of a child for its upbringing and protection for a period of time during which it requires
the care of women." Id. at 349. This distinction is found in the rules of all Taqlid
schools of law. However, because under the doctrine of the Hanafi school a "sane,
grown-up female" is "competent to choose her husband and to contract marriage,
irrespective of her being a maiden or a thayyib," the distinction between guardianship
and custody does not imply the same role in marriage under Hanafi rules as it does
under the rules of the other schools. Id. at 292. The distinction is important, however,
as it relates to other issues, as evidenced by the dictates of Article 395 of Pasha's rules.
318.
See PASHA, supra note 228, at 207.
See id. at 214.
319.
See id.
320.
321.
See id. at 215. Under Article 422, however, a daughter can only be "hired"
out to a woman to teach her a craft and in some other specified jobs. See id.
322.
See El-Alami, supra note 303, at 121-22. Also according to Article 18b(2), if
a son is fifteen years old but is pursuing a level of education "appropriate for a person
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either the
unmarried
woman who is
under forty or
the woman
divorcee who
"cannot be left on
her own" can
request that the
woman joins him
in his
32 6
If
household.
she refuses, she
loses her

[VOL. 37-1043
minor children
unless he is
deceased, in which
case the mother is
3 31
the guardian.

maintenance.327

B. A ComparativeReading of the Legislative Regulation of the Family
The comparative data provided in the table above allows one to
make several observations. First, as mentioned earlier, if one were to
put these examples on a spectrum of legislative possibilities, the
Hanafi doctrine and Tunisian law would sit on the two opposite ends
of the spectrum while Jordan and Egypt would represent two
intermediary positions. The Hanafi doctrine would stand for the
Taqlid conception of gendered relations in the family-hierarchical to
the benefit of the husband and the male guardian-with a strong

of his status and ability," his father continues to be liable for his maintenance. Id. at
122.
323.
Egyptian Law on Rules of Guardianship Over Money, Law No. 119 of 1952,
art. 1 (Egypt) (on file with author).
324.
See Qanun A1-Ahwal A1-Shakhsiyya [Jordanian Family Code], at 89 (Ratib
Atallah A1-Dthaher ed., 1983) (Jordan) (on file with author).
325.
See MAHMOOD, supra note 118, at 135. The text of Article 169 reads as
follows: "As regards children whose maintenance is obligatory for their father, their
maintenance will include expenses of education at all levels-primary, secondary and
higher-provided that the child is capable to study, in accordance with the resources of
the father." Id.
326.
See Qanun AI-Ahwal Al-Shakhsiyya [Jordanian Family Code], at 89 (Ratib
Atallah Al-Dthaher ed., 1983) (Jordan) (on file with author).
327.
J.N.D. Anderson, The Syrian Law of Personal Status, 17 BULL. OF THE SCH.
OF ORIENTAL & AFR. STUD. 34, 43 (1955). The author reports that, according to "the
usual Hanafi rule," previously married women and "spinsters who are no longer young"
do not have to live with their male guardian from whom they receive their
maintenance, "unless there are special reasons to cause apprehension about their
moral safety," in which case they have to live with him if he asks them to do so, facing a
loss of maintenance if they refuse. Id.
328.
See MAHMOOD, supra note 118, at 175. The text of Article 46 reads as
follows: "Maintenance of minor descendants, how low soever, is binding on the
ascendants. A girl is entitled to such maintenance till the responsibility is taken over
by her husband, and a boy till the age of sixteen years or till he becomes capable to
earn." Id.
329.
See id.
330.
See id. at 176.
331.
See id. at 178.
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underlying element of transactional reciprocity of obligations
between the spouses. Tunisia, on the other hand, would represent the
approach closest to the U.S. model of equality between the spouses.
The Egyptian and Jordanian legislative approaches, situated in the
middle, represent the attempt to curtail, often half-heartedly, the
conspicuously brutal aspects of husband and father power typical of
the Hanafi doctrine that they have inherited without dismantling the
hierarchy between the spouses or between father and daughter.
1. The Tunisian Model
Although the Tunisian model33 2 contains elements that are close
to the U.S. notion of gender equality, 3 33 what is significantly absent
from the Tunisian approach is the doctrine of privacy; a doctrine
which has historically played a critical role in regulating the family
in the United States. A cursory and formalist reading of the rules in
the Tunisian Majallah (Code) suggests that the law does not shy
away from regulating matters over which the curtain of privacy is
typically pulled in the United States. 334 Such matters include

The significance of the reforms put in place in Tunisia, unique among
332.
majority Muslim countries, cannot be overstated. See CHARRAD, supra note 227, at 218
("On 13 August 1956, less than five months after the proclamation of independence, a
new Tunisian Code of Personal Status (CPS) was promulgated. The code profoundly
changed family law and the legal status of women."). For another author's summary of
the changes in family law brought about by the Tunisian Majallah, see Kristin J.
Miller, Human Rights of Women in Iran: The Universalist Approach and the Relativist
Response, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 779, 827 (1996). In addition, the Tunisian Majallah is
applied to Tunisians of all religions, "ending the application of rabbinical law to Jewish
" ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD: A GLOBAL
personal status matters ..
RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 207, at 182; see also EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note
3, at 239 (quoting the Majallah).
See CHARRAD, supra note 227, at 215-31.
333.
Elene G. Mountis, Cultural Relativity and Universalism: Reevaluating
334.
Gender Rights in a Multicultural Context, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 113, 135 (1996). In the
United States, "[t]raditionally, by respecting the sanctity of family privacy, states have
been reluctant to intrude in family affairs." Id. One unfortunate consequence is that
"[plolice often will not intrude on violent domestic quarrels." Id.; see also Reva B.
Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J.
2117, 2157 (1996). According to Siegel, courts in the United States traditionally
espoused the "evils of interfering with family government." Id. In addition, the author
reports that, historically,
while authorities denied that a husband had the right to beat his wife, they
intervened only intermittently in cases of marital violence: Men who assaulted
their wives were often granted formal and informal immunities from
prosecution, in order to protect the privacy of the family and to promote
'domestic harmony.' In the late 1970s, the feminist movement began to
challenge the concept of family privacy that shielded wife abuse ....
Id. at 2118. Indeed, in its landmark decision, Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme
Court relied on earlier cases that established a doctrine of privacy in regard to family
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maintenance obligations within the family and a detailed regulatory
account of how the relationship between husband and wife should
335
ideally be organized.
For instance, Article 23 of the Majallah provides for the
obligation of maintenance by both husband and wife, good reciprocal
treatment by both spouses, and the division of labor within the family
between both husband and wife. 336 One of the principal ways in
which the Tunisian legislature sought to change the hierarchical
relationship it inherited from the Maliki Taqlid legal system 337 was

or marital affairs, also known as privacy of the marital relation and the marital home,
extending it to declare a woman's right to have an abortion. See Susan Clement et al.,
The Evolution of the Right to Privacy after Roe v. Wade, 13 AM. J. L. & MED. 368, 373
(1987). As Joel Feinberg notes:
[United States courts] decisions take a zig-zag path, but they do exhibit a
pattern. The zone of privacy is extended from the essential intimacies of the
marital relation, to heterosexual intimacies generally, to decisions about whom
to marry, to decisions about 'family planning,' child-rearing, modes of family
living, and finally to decisions about the termination of pregnancy.
Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideas in the Constitution?,
58 NOTRE DAME L. R. 445, 487 (1983). Yet another author reports that in the United
States, "courts and commentators still conceive of family privacy in terms of negative
liberty-keeping the government out of family affairs- .. " Anne C. Dailey, Federalism
and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1831 (1995). In addition, another author sums
up the connection or link made in the United States between this idea of privacy and
other even greater ideals, such as democracy and freedom, when reporting that the
Supreme Court "consistently has been hesitant to intervene in family affairs,
recognizing that familial autonomy and privacy are at the very heart of the existence of
a democratic society." Wendy Meredith Watts, The Parent-Child Privileges: Hardly a
New or Revolutionary Concept, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 583, 600-01 (1987). These ideas
are quite foreign in the Islamic and, for our purposes, the Tunisian context.
335.
See Charrad, supra note 226, at 51-52. As the author puts it, "[r]eform of
family law in Tunisia constitutes an interesting case of intended and dramatic
innovation in the legal norms governing gender relations and family life." Id. at 51.
Charrad adds that the "thrust" of the Code was to "redefine the rights and obligations
of men and women within the family." Id. at 52.
336.

IsLAMIc FAMILY LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD: A GLOBAL RESOURCE BOOK,

supra note 207, at 183. As Professor Abdullahi A. An-Na'im describes, "[d]uring
marriage, spouses are to treat each other well, to fulfill their marital duties 'as
required by custom and usage' and to cooperate in running family affairs, including the
upbringing of children." Id.
337.
Mounira Charrad, State and Gender in the Maghrib, 163 MIDDLE E. REP.
19, 20 (Mar.-Apr. 1990). The Maliki school of law, that which has historically
predominated in the Maghrib (Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria), "gives male members of
the kin group extensive control over key decisions affecting women's lives." Id. Charrad
notes that "[w]omen need not give consent to marriage during the marriage ceremony,
and instead it is the consent of her guardian that makes the marriage valid; and there
is no legal minimum age for marriage." Id. Other features of Maliki law are the same
as other schools, namely that the husband has the privilege of breaking the marital
bond at will, while the circumstances under which a woman may be granted a divorce
are restricted; if a man chooses to repudiate his wife (talaq), she has no legal recourse;
a man has the legal right to marry as many as four wives; and women receive half of
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to undermine as much as possible the division of responsibilities and
powers within the family. As discussed previously, gendered
reciprocity was based on the idea that the husband's duty to maintain
the wife and the children allowed the exercise of a set of powers in
the family. Thus the wife owed the husband obedience, as did the
children over whom he exercised guardianship powers. Tunisian
legislators assumed that if the wife wanted to exercise powers similar
to those of the husband, she should be willing to take on parallel
33 8
responsibilities.
One of the most original legislative interventions to occur in
Tunisia was the move to impose upon the wife the responsibility of
participating in the maintenance of the family, if she has money of
her own. 339 In return, the wife acquired several powers, including the
power to consent to the marriage of a minor child,3 40 equal power to
divorce her husband, 341 the power to make custodial decisions

what a man would in inheritance. See id. The Tunisian law of 1956 fixed the minimum
marriage age at eighteen years for males and fifteen years for females; these were later
raised to twenty and seventeen "for considerations including the dignity of marriage,
lessening parental interference, reducing the chance of divorce, and also reducing
population growth rates." Fazlur Rahman, A Survey of Modernization of Muslim
Family Law, 11 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 451, 455 (1980). In addition, "a medical
certificate of physical fitness is required to establish the capacity for marriage," and the
registration of marriages is required, imposing a fine and imprisonment for not doing
so. Id. at 456. What makes the Tunisian code most unique, however, is that polygamy
was abolished. See id. at 457. As Rahman notes, Tunisia is the only country to use an
"Islamic basis" to ban polygamy in its personal status laws. See id. 'The Tunisian
prohibition on polygamy was based on the standard Modernist reasoning that since the
Qur'an requires that justice be done among wives and also warns at the same time that
it is impossible to do justice among co-wives, this amounts to a prohibition." Id.
338.
CHARRAD, supra note 227, at 224-25.
339.
See id.
A new element introduced in the Majalla concerned the financial responsibility
of the woman to her husband and children. Whereas in Islamic law a woman's
property remained her own without becoming part of the household assets, the
Majalla required the wife to contribute to the expenses of the household, if she
had the means to do so. By making the wife provide for the household when
appropriate, the Majalla placed the division of responsibilities between the
spouses on a new plane.
340.
See ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD: A GLOBAL RESOURCE
BOOK, supra note 207, at 182-83 ("Marriage below the age of legal majority requires the
consent of the guardian and (since 1993) of the mother; recourse may be had to the
judge in the event of their refusal.").
341.
See MAHMOOD, supra note 118, at 174. Article 31 of the Majallah reads as
follows: "(1) A decree of divorce shall be given: (i) with the mutual consent of the
parties; or (ii) at the instance of either party on the ground of injury; or (iii) if the
husband insists on divorce or the wife demands it." Id.; see also CHARRAD, supra note
227, at 225 ("The CPS [Code of Personal Status] changed regulations in fundamental
ways.... The wife and husband were equally entitled to file for divorce, and they could
do so by mutual consent. One of them could also file alone ....").
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relating to children, 342 and the power to exercise the guardianship
role in the absence of the husband. 343 More important, the wife no
longer owes her husband the duty of obedience, one of the most
344
important institutions of the Taqlid legal system.
There are, however, peculiarities in the Tunisian equality
strategy. For instance, the theme of husband/father maintenance of
the wife and family still runs deep in the modern Tunisian doctrine
on the family. It is the husband/father who is still considered the
primary provider in the family ("the head of the family"), whereas the
wife/mother contributes only secondarily and only if she has
money. 345 In return for this secondary position as provider, the wife
gets guardianship powers over children only secondarily and
34 6
contingently if the father is absent or dead.
The secondary position of provider contemplated by the Tunisian
Majallah places the wife in certain respects, not as her husband's
equal, but rather as the interceptor of the male line of responsibilities
and powers in the family. Financial responsibilities and powers
under the Taqlid system often followed a male line. 347 If the husband

342.
See ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD: A GLOBAL RESOURCE
BOOK, supra note 207, at 183. As the author reports, in the case of divorce, "[i]f the
mother is awarded custody, she is authorized to exercise the prerogatives of the
guardian in matters related to the ward's travel, education and financial affairs ......
Id.
343.
See MAHMOOD, supra note 118, at 178. Article 154 of the Tunisian Majallah
reads as follows: 'The guardian of a legally disabled person shall be the father and, if
he is dead or disqualified, the mother .... " Id.
344.
See al-Hibri, supra note 225, at 11-12 ("The present Tunisian Code no
longer requires obedience, although it continues to describe the husband as the 'head of
the family."'); see also Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, Treat Your Women Well: Comparisons and
Lessons From an Imperfect Example Across the Waters, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 403, 411
(2002) ("Only Tunisia has completely abolished wife obedience from its personal status
codes.").
345.
See ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD: A GLOBAL RESOURCE
BOOK, supra note 207, at 183.
346.
See Charrad, supra note 226, at 56. As Charrad explains:
While increasing women's custody rights, the CPS [Code of Personal Status]
nevertheless maintains male power in making a distinction between custody
and guardianship ....
When the father is alive, the CPS systematically makes
him the child's guardian after divorce, even when the mother has custody and
thus takes daily care of the child ....
It automatically makes the mother the
guardian in case of the father's death, and in that case only.
Id. Charrad adds that it was only after a law was passed in 1981 modifying the
Majallah that the mother is automatically made the guardian in case of the father's
death; the original Code only considered her as one among many possible guardians,
and it was up to the judge to decide based on the "child's best interest" whom to select.

Id.
347.
It is instructive to look at three classes of financial responsibilities and
powers: marriage guardianship and guardianship of property, maintenance of children,
and custody of children after the mother's period of custody (hadanah)is finished.
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One author defines guardianship responsibilities connected to marriage as follows:
[Miarriage guardianship is the legal authority invested in a person who is fully
qualified and competent to safeguard the interests and rights of another who is
incapable of doing so independently. It is the authority of a father or nearest
male relative over minors, insane, or inexperienced persons who need
protection and guardianship.
AL 'ATI, supra note 95, at 70. Thus, "[tihe schools concur that it is necessary for a wali
[guardian] to be an adult Muslim male." MAGHN1tYAH, supra note 76, at 296. In the
case of the marriage of a minor, under the doctrine of the Shafi'i school of law, in the
absence of the father, it is the paternal grandfather who is competent to contract the
marriage; under Maliki and Hanbali doctrine, only the father can do so; and under
Hanafi doctrine, in the absence of the father and the grandfather, guardianship in
marriage passes to "other relatives, even if it be a brother, or an uncle." Id. at 294.
Guardianship never passes to the mother or another female relative. As Hamilton A.R.
Gibb puts it, although under Islamic law parties to a contract must always give their
consent, "that of the bride, particularly the virgin bride, is normally expressed through
her father, guardian, or other male relative, but never the mother." Hamilton A. R.
Gibb, The Heritage of Islam in the Modern World (III), 2 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 129,
132 (1971). As for guardianship of property, the fact that this responsibility and power
follows a male line is also clear.
Under Hanafi law, the guardian of the property of minor children is their
father; after the father's death, his executor; after the father's executor, the
paternal grandfather; after him, his executor. After the last, the Court may
take charge of the property. . . . Neither the minor's mother nor uncle, nor
brother, nor sister is entitled to act as the guardian of the minor's property,
except on being appointed by the father, or paternal grandfather of the minor or
by the Court; none of them has the power to sell or mortgage or otherwise deal
with the minor's immoveable property....
FAiZ BADRUDDIN TYABJI, MUHAMMADAN LAW 228-31 (1940).
As one author describes it, maintenance of minor children "includes the
expenditure for nourishment, health, education and training." WANI, supra note 73, at
227. He makes clear that "[u]nder Islamic law it is the father who is primarily
responsible to provide maintenance to his children, male and female, whether in his
own custody or in the custody of someone else." Id. Should the father not be able to do
so, "[n]ext to the father the burden shifts to the grand-parents." Id. at 228. Some
authors report that in some situations, if the father cannot maintain the children, the
mother should do so, if she is able to; such maintenance is usually characterized as
voluntary (not obligatory, like in the case of the father) and is to be paid back to the
mother by the father when he has the means to do so. See supra note 75. Even in the
opinion of those commentators that call for the mother to maintain the children when
the father cannot, after the mother, the responsibility shifts to the paternal
grandparents, particularly the paternal grandfather: "If the father is poor, the mother
is bound to maintain the children. And, failing her, it is the duty of the paternal
grandfather ..."ASAF A. A. FYZEE, OUTLINES OF MUHAMMADAN LAW 184 (1955).
Under the Taqlid rules of all four major Sunni schools of law, after the period of
custody when the children are young (hadanah), custody of the children passes to the
father (and his family). As Professor Esposito notes:
The awarding of custody to the father is a consistent social reflection of the
workings of a traditional, patriarchal, patrilocal family. The family emphasizes
the paternal line of ancestry and makes the central residence the home of the
paternal grandfather, where many women (aunts, grandmother) are available
within the family to care for children.
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was not available to assume responsibility and power for reasons of
absence or death, his father was required to maintain the family or
exercise guardianship powers.3 48 Allowing the wife to take on this
role after the husband/father means that, in several doctrinal
matters, rather than being the husband's equal, the wife has simply
become the next in line to exercise powers and responsibilities. 349 In
other words, she is now the husband's "father."
There are dangers associated with the wife's new position of
equality as conceived by the Tunisian legislature. She loses certain
privileges that the Taqlid legal system had awarded to her by virtue
of its conception of the gendered organization of the family. First, the
wife can no longer assume that her own wealth and property are
350
completely outside her husband's reach, as was the case before.
Whereas under the Taqlid regime she was, in general, immune from
the requirement that she participate in maintaining the family, this
is no longer the case. 35 1 Second, the Tunisian wife can no longer
benefit from the Taqlid legal presumption that she has priority of
custody over young children after divorce. Tunisian legislators have
replaced this with the standard used by judges in the United States
to award custody-namely, the best interests of the child. 35 2 In the
United States this seemingly egalitarian standard has proved to be

ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 35-36.
Besides Taqlid rules of law, of course, there are rules of custom and usage that
apply as well; said customs vary according to countries, regions, and ethnic groups,
although they also generally dictate a male line of financial responsibilities and
powers. Thus, one author describes "[t]he pressure of old Arab custom" as "itself the
reason for emphasis on the male family representative" when discussing marriage
guardianship. Gibb, supra, at 132.
348.
See supra note 347. Further evidence of this rule is the present text of
Article 47 of the Tunisian Majallah, which makes clear that it is breaking from
traditional norms when specifying that the mother now precedes the grandfather in
maintaining the child upon the father's death. See supra note 346.
349.
See MAHMOOD, supra note 118, at 176. The text of Article 47 of the
Majallah reads as follows: "The mother shall, in the event of the father's poverty,
precede the grandfather in providing maintenance to her child." Id. As one author
notes:
The Majalla made the father and mother both responsible for the care of a
child, as long as they lived together. If the father was no longer able to provide
for the child, either in case of death or for any other reason, the next person
called upon to assume responsibility was the mother, who now came before any
other relatives in the order of responsibility.
Charrad, supra note 226, at 227.
350.
See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 243 (quoting the Majallah);
see also ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 96 (reporting that Tunisia requires "both the
husband and the wife to participate financially in maintaining the household.").
351.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 96.
352.
See NASIR, supra note 10, at 162; Charrad, supra note 226, at 56.
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disastrous for women.35 3 Several authors have pointed out that some
judges in the United States use this doctrine to privilege men over
3 54
women.

353.
To understand why this is the case, one has to first understand the history
behind child custody standards in the United States. In the United States, like in
Tunisia, before the 'best interests of the child" doctrine was widely adopted in the
1970s and 1980s, there was a legal preference for women in the custody of small
children; this priority for mothers was expressed in terms of the "tender years"
doctrine. See Sylvia A. Law & Patricia Hennessey, Is the Law Male?: The Case of
Family Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 345, 347-48 (1993). With the abandonment of the
maternal preference or priority in custody and the advent of the 'best interests of the
child" doctrine, a supposedly gender neutral standard is used. See id. at 348. However,
as the authors note:
[T]he 'best interest' standard favors the party with the greatest resources to
mount an expert-based claim. In most cases that is the man. Further, the 'best
interest' standard is extremely vague and unpredictable. Vagueness and
uncertainty in custody standards work to the advantage of the party who is less
committed to maintaining custody, typically the man. Mothers give up solid
legal claims to marital property or child support to resist the man's 'Brer
Rabbit' claim to custody. A law that systemically forces women to give up
honest economic claims to care for their children is biased against women.
Id. at 350. In the 1970s, feminists had argued against a preference for mothers because
of the terms that were used to frame such preference: "[A]lthough feminists later came
to distrust the best interests standard, they initially supported the innovation because
the tender years presumption seemed to reinforce stereotyped gender norms."
Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CALIF. L.
REV. 615, 620 (1992). One reason for the current distrust of the "best interests of the
child" doctrine is that custody is not awarded based on past performance per se but on a
variety of factors judged to determine the parents' future ability to raise the child.
Without taking into account their pre-divorce role in the upbringing of the child, factors
such as income may produce an advantage for fathers that is hard for mothers to
compete with, especially since they often gave up or limited their income-earning
capacity to raise their children. In addition, the potential for custody to go to the father
scares mothers into giving up legitimate rights in exchange for custody at the face of
fathers' claims. The author's comments regarding these issues sums up the problem:
Feminists increasingly express dismay that contemporary custody law dilutes
the importance attached to the primary caretaking role of mothers. Although
the risk that mothers face of losing a custody dispute is greater under the best
interests standard than under the tender years presumption, in practice, courts
applying the best interests standard continue to favor mothers for custody. The
formally gender-neutral rule generates uncertainty, however, by sending
misleading signals to both men and women about fathers' prospects for custody.
This uncertainty can lead women, who care more about having custody than do
men, to insure custody by trading away claims for support and property.
Id. at 626. Thus, the author argues that, instead of the current, supposedly gender
neutral approach, because "[m]ost feminists agree that women have been
disadvantaged by traditional marital roles . . . custody law can best serve women's
interests by strongly supporting mothers' custody claims." Id. at 618. These issues are
summarized well by another author, who asserts that:
Even if the father does not want custody, his lawyer often will advise him to
claim it in order to have a bargaining chip with which to bargain down his
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wife's financial claims. Second, the abolition of the maternal preference has
created situations where a father who wants custody often wins even if he was
not the primary caretaker prior to the divorce -- on the grounds that he can
offer the children a better life because he is richer than his former wife. In
these circumstances, the ironic result of a mother's sacrifice of ideal worker
status for the sake of her children is that she ultimately loses the children.
Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 838 (1989). Another
author, arguing that the '"est interest of the child" principle is "unjust," explains that
"according to the best interest principle, the child's welfare is the dominant
consideration. The law does not take any account of the needs and rights of the
parents ..... Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 16 (1987). The author asserts that "if one parent, usually the
mother, has devoted crucial years to child care and perhaps given up her career to do
so, it seems prima facie right that she should get custody." Id. at 17. However, for an
analysis of problems related to making custody decisions based solely or primarily on
the role as primary caretaker before the divorce, see Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond
Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Settingin the Wake of
Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with the Primary CaretakerPreference, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 427 (1990). The author does conclude, however, that
for opponents of the [caretaker] preference, integrity demands a recognition of
the rationale for the standard. They must face criticism of the broad best
interests standard, which risks unwise results, stimulates litigation, permits
manipulation and abuse, and allows a level of judicial discretion that is difficult
to reconcile with an historic commitment to the rule of law. The costs of this
system, especially for children, mothers and those with the least resources to
resist threats of litigation, are readily apparent.
Id. at 499-500. Thus, many contemporary authors in the United States, given the
continuing reality of gender roles in the family and marital relations, and in the
interest of justice, are actually advocating a return to maternal priority in custody or,
in the minimum, a priority based on a (past) primary caretaker standard. See, e.g.,
Elster, supra, at 16-18, 30-31, 37-39. The issue of joint custody is beyond the scope of
this discussion, but it is also an important and current one. For instance, see Brian J.
Melton, Solomon's Wisdom or Soloman's Wisdom Lost: Child Custody in North
Dakota-A Presumption That Joint Custody is in the Best Interests of the Child in
Custody Disputes, 73 N.D. L. REV. 263, 274-80 (1997).
354. See Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions
from Welfare "Reform," Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 697 (1998)
("Single working mothers are particularly at risk when they are in custody disputes
with fathers who have remarried 'stay-at-home' wives. Courts have shown a preference
for these conforming stepmothers."). In the United States, considerations of wealth, for
instance, disadvantage mothers who, in general, earn less than fathers; paradoxically,
if a woman works and thus has to send her child to day care, she can also be at a
disadvantage, especially if the father has a new wife who is willing to stay at home
with the child. As another author reports:
In Burchard v. Garay, a trial court awarded custody to the father on two
grounds: he earned more money and his new wife could care for the child at
home. The mother needed to use day care while she worked. Justice Bird,
concurring in the California Supreme Court's reversal, emphasized the
injustice of this decision. It places women in a catch-22 situation: If she did not
work, she could not possibly hope to compete with the father in providing
material advantages for the child. She would risk losing custody to a father who
could provide a larger home, a better neighborhood, and other material goods
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It is important to note that not only did the new Tunisian
standard de-privilege women in custody decisions, it also deprivileged the female line of custody that the Taqlid legal system
provided for. Thus, under the new regime, if a woman loses custody
for reasons of, say, remarriage, the custody does not go to her mother,
as was the case under Taqlid law, 355 but to her husband. 356 In other

and benefits. If she did work, she would face the prejudicial view that a working
mother is by definition inadequate ....
Scott Altman, Should Child Custody Rules be Fair?,35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 325,
329 (1996-97). The author also reports that:
[I]nequalities provoked feminist objections to Ireland v. Smith, the Michigan
decision transferring custody to the father because the mother needed to use
day care while she attended class. The trial court explained that a single parent
cannot attend a prestigious university and raise a child effectively. After public
criticism, the appellate court reversed. Cases considering day care and wealth
illustrate the mixed state of custody law.
Id. at 330. The author adds that, "[s]ome feminists claim judges deprive women of
custody for the smallest deviation from expected gender roles. They note fathers win
" Id. at 338. In addition, "[t]he
primary custody in more than 50% of litigated cases ..
vagueness and uncertainty of the 'best interest' standard vests tremendous discretion
in trial court judges." Law & Hennessey, supra note 353, at 350. For a detailed
description of gender bias in custody cases decided under the "best interests of the
child" standard, see Susan Beth Jacobs, The Hidden Gender Bias Behind "The Best
Interests of the Child" Standardin Custody Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 845, 858-74
(1997). Jacobs argues that all of the following factors contribute to such gender bias:
fathers in general have greater economic resources; courts scrutinize a mother's
employment more closely than that of the father; judges prefer what they consider
"traditional lifestyles"; and judges scrutinize more closely a mother's non-marital
sexual relations than those of a father. See id. at 858-74. As to the issue of the
employment of the mother and judges using this as an excuse to give custody to the
father, another author has noted that "[i]n the area of child custody, courts typically
have not rewarded working women." Amy D. Ronner, Women Who Dance on the
Professional Track: Custody and the Red Shoes, 23 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 173, 174
(2000). This same author adds that "the best interests of the child standard, with its
flexibility, can turn against women who work outside of the home." Id. at 215.
355.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 36.
In the absence of or disqualification of the mother, female relatives in the
following order receive custody: (1) mother's mother h.h.s [however high so
ever]; (2) father's mother h.h.s.; and (3) full sister or other female relatives,
including aunts. In the default of female relations, the following male relatives
obtain the right of custody: (1) father; (2) nearest paternal grandfather; (3) full
brother; (4) consanguine brother; and (5) full brother's son and other paternal
relations (in the order of the nearest male relative determined in the same
order as that of inheritance.
See also WANI, supra note 73, at 226.
A mother who is leading an immoral life loses her privilege of custody of the
child. A divorced or widowed mother who has married another man does not
remain entitled to the custody of minor child if the man to whom she has
married does not fall within prohibited degrees of marriage to the child. The
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words, in custody cases the husband intercepts the female line so that
he is now the wife's "mother."
The reciprocal interception by the husband of the female line in
cases of custody and by the wife of the male line in cases of
guardianship suggests that the Tunisian legislative intent is actually
to replace the extended family model as a form of social organization
with that of the nuclear family. 357 The spouses now stand, in a
reciprocal exchange of roles, as the center of the family to the
exclusion of other relations, namely their fathers and mothers. This
is reinforced by the fact that fathers no longer have the power, under
Tunisian law, to "marry" off minor daughters by force, nor is their
consent required for marriage of daughters of majority age.3 58

right revives on the termination of such marriage. . . . Where the mother is
dead or disqualified to have the custody of the child, certain female relations of
the child subject to the preferential position of maternal over paternal
relations, are entitled to the custody of the child. Some of such relatives in
order of preference will be: i) mother; ii) mother's mother; iii) mother's mother's
mother; father's mother ....
356.
In addition, in the case of the mother's death, custody also goes to her
husband. See MAHMOOD, supra note 118, at 176-77 (quoting Article 67). The relevant
provision of Article 67 reads as follows: "Where the parent entitled to custody dies
while the marriage of the parents is dissolved the right shall pass on to the surviving
parent." Id.
357.
See CHARRAD, supra note 227, at 215, 219-21. As Charrad notes:
In the same way as other reforms weakened what was left of tribal solidarities,
so did family law reform. This stands in sharp contrast to the codification of
family law in the Mudawwana of 1957-58 in Morocco and the 1984 Family Code
of Algeria, where the model of the extended patrilineage was explicitly
institutionalized and recognized in the new state. Tunisia in comparison
equipped itself with a family law that sanctioned essentially a nuclear model of
the family and expanded women's rights.
Id. at 215. The author also reports that "[t]he code dropped the vision of the family as
an extended kinship group built on strong ties crisscrossing a community of male
relations. It replaced it with the vision of a conjugal unit in which ties between spouses
and between parents and children occupy a prominent place." Id. at 219. The author
suggests that the motivation behind the political move to reform the law of personal
status and broaden women's rights was the desire to bring about
a transformation of kinship, which they [the political elite] saw as a necessary
condition for broader social, political, and economic changes. The initiators saw
the reform as a step toward altering kinship organization and fostering new
behavior

patterns . .

. .

Their primary objective was to encourage

the

development of a modern nation-state.
Id. at 220. Thus, "[t]he lawmakers in effect intended to design a law that would alter
kinship relations by also emancipating men from kin control, not only women." Id.
358.
Article 5 of the Tunisian Majallah sets the minimum marriage age at
seventeen for women and twenty for men, and provides that "[t]he making of a contract
of marriage for a person below the specified age shall depend upon special permission
from the courts and this permission shall only be given for pressing reasons and for the
obvious benefit of both spouses." EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 240
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When one also considers the outright legislative prohibition of
polygamy in the Tunisian Code 3 59 as well as the abolition of the
institution of obedience, with both being unique in modern Arab
legislation, it becomes clear that the new family is not only nuclear
but one based on companionship and love. The assumption by the
modern Tunisian legislature is that the relationship between spouses
is now more personalized than it was the under the Taqlid regime,
bringing reciprocal expectations of attachment and intimacy. It is not
clear, however, to what extent the legal advocacy of the companionate
family undermines the social power of extended family formations
360
and female subordination in modern Tunisia.

(quoting the Majallah). Article 3 of the Majallah reads as follows: "Marriage shall only
be contracted with the consent of both spouses and it is essential for the validity of the
marriage that it be witnessed by two trustworthy witnesses and that a dower be
specified for the wife." Id. at 239. In addition, Article 9 provides that "[b]oth husband
and wife shall have the right to make the contract themselves or to appoint as proxy
whomsoever they wish." Id. at 240. See also ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 99 (reporting
that Tunisia's law, among the most "liberal," allows both men and women to freely
contract their own marriages).
359.
EL ALAmi & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 242 (quoting the Majallah).
Article 18 of the Tunisian Majallah reads as follows:
Polygamy is prohibited. Any man who marries while he is already married
before the bond of his previous marriage is dissolved shall be punished by one
year in jail and by a fine in the amount of two hundred and forty thousand
francs or by one of the two penalties.
Id.
CHARLES A. MICAUD, TUNISIA: THE POLITICS OF MODERNIZATION 148 (1964)
360.
("The results of the new legislation may not be spectacular."). For instance, "[a]
puritanical Code has increased penalties for loose morals. Not only illicit lovers but the
best-intentioned ones are severely dealt with; elopement is punishable by two years in
jail." Id. at 149. As another author notes, the reality of sex relations and the issue of
female "emancipation" cannot be changed by legislation alone. See Lorna Hawker
Durrani, Employment of Women and Social Change, in CHANGE IN TUNISIA 63-66
(Russell A. Stone & John Simmons eds., 1976). For instance, regarding the supposed
emancipation of women through work, as espoused by many elite in post independence
Tunisia, including ex-President Bourguiba, she reports that "[t]his ideal is largely
unrealized, as most girls hand over their wages directly to family or husband, who then
allocate what money the women may need for personal expenses." Id. at 66. In
addition, "a strict segregation of the sexes operates in many factories," and "[s]tudents
in the University of Tunis restaurant eat with their own sex, and those girls who broke
this informal rule were thought loose." Id. at 67.
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2. Hanafi Doctrine
Hanafi doctrine, as codified by Qadri Pasha, is on the other end
of the spectrum, and it advocates a particularly patriarchal structure
for the family. This is so because, even in comparison with the other
schools of law, under the Taqlid legal system, the Hanafi doctrine
gave women fewer financial rights in marriage3 61 as well as fewer
means to exit the martial relationship. 362 At the same time, Hanafi
rules reward the husband more for his financial obligations by adding
to his powers in marriage.
For instance, under Hanafi doctrine, the wife's maintenance does
not necessarily include her medical expenses if she falls ill. 3 63 In

361.
Authors have noted distinctions between the doctrine of the Hanafi school
and other schools in relation to maintenance, for example. As one author has noted:
The difference between the Hanafis and the other Sunni schools regarding the
question is that the other schools regard maintenance as awad al-ihtibas
(consideration of the husband's control over his wife) with no gratuitous
element at all, while the Hanafis regard it as jaza' al-ihtibas (reward for the
husband's control over his wife), but also including an element which they term
sila (which may be translated as 'relation, connection, link, tie, bond, present,
gift, grant').... The other schools of Sunni law, however, as we have seen, do
not regard maintenance as a gift from the husband to the wife, but as a debt
and they recognise the right of the wife to sue for arrears.
EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 21-22. Thus under Hanafi doctrine, unlike
that of the other three major Sunni schools, a wife cannot sue for arrears; "[tihe reason
for this doctrine is that the Hanafis regard maintenance as (in part) a gift and in
Hanafi law a gift is completed only when delivery has taken place." Id. at 21.
362.
See WANI, supra note 73, at 78-81; see also EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra
note 3, at 29 (reporting that
[t]he law of the Hanafi school is the most restrictive toward women in the
matter of divorce. The sole ground on which a Hanafi wife may obtain a
dissolution of her marriage is her husband's inability to consummate the
marriage. Hanafi law will allow a wife a dissolution only if she can show that
she was unaware of her husband's impotence at the time of the marriage. If a
wife seeks a dissolution on the grounds of her husband's impotence the court
will delay giving a decree for a period of one year. If the husband succeeds in
consummating the marriage during this period, no decree will be granted....
The burden of proof is on the wife to establish the alleged impotence; in the
case of non-virgin wives, this burden is difficult to discharge.
Anderson, supra note 212, at 27 (reporting that "according to the dominant Hanafi
doctrine a Muslim wife could obtain no dissolution of her marriage even if her husband
departed to a distant land and left her permanently without support, or proved,
unknown to her, to be afflicted, even at the time of the marriage, with some dangerous
disease").
363.
See MAGHNIYYAH, supra note 76, at 365-66. For instance, the author notes
that "it has been narrated from the Hanafi's that medicines and fruits are not wajib
[obligatory] on the husband during the period of dispute between the couple." Id. He
adds:
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addition, the woman is not allowed a divorce even in the case of
harm. 364 If the husband beats his wife, her only resort is to go to a
judge and request that he be reprimanded, which will happen only in
the case that the judge determines his exercise of his disciplinary
powers was in excess, meaning he beats her too severely. 365 The wife,
under Hanafi doctrine, is not even allowed to leave the house in this
case, lest she be declared disobedient for leaving without her
husband's permission, which would result in her loss of
maintenance. 366 Thus, under Hanafi doctrine, a wife can very well
find herself stuck in an abusive situation, especially if she is too poor
to afford leaving the house to escape abuse or to bargain her way out
the marriage through khul.
This particular arrangement of doctrinal elements, unique to
Hanafi law, produces a marital regime that is closer to one of "status"
rather than one of "contract." In this regime, women get much less
and men much more than a transactional contractual arrangement
would warrant. This is far from being a marital contract in which
obedience is exchanged for maintenance. The status-like powers of
the husband in the Hanafi doctrine is moreover reinforced by the fact
that the Hanafis are quite strict about the kind of terms women are
able to stipulate in their marriage contract to protect themselves
from the punitive aspects of Hanafi law. 36 7 For instance, a wife

[I]t is certain that the Shari'ah has not explicitly defined the limits of
maintenance, but has only made it wajib on the husband, leaving it to be
And there is no doubt that 'urf
determined in accordance with 'urf (usage) ....
disapproves the conduct of a husband who while possessing the means neglects
his wife who needs medical attention....

Id. at 366.
364.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 51 ("In the Hanafi school . . . there are
virtually no grounds upon which a wife can free herself from an undesirable marriage
except for her husband's impotence."). "In contrast to the other schools, especially the
Maliki school, which was the most liberal in this regard, under Hanafi law, wives had
to endure desertion and maltreatment with no recourse through divorce." Id. For
instance, unlike other schools of law, "[iun classical Hanafi law ... neither inability nor
refusal to maintain is considered sufficient grounds for the dissolution of a marriage."
Id. at 26. In addition:
The Hanafi school shows more preference for the male in that it does not allow
the wife the right to past maintenance unless a distinct agreement was
previously made. The wife who, after a period of time, sues for maintenance,
has no means to obtain payment of her husband's past-due debt. In contrast,
the Shafii and Hanbali schools consider maintenance arrears to be the
husband's ongoing debt that can be claimed regardless of the amount of time
that has elapsed.
Id.; see also WANI, supranote 73, at 78-81.
365.
See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
366.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
367.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 22.
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cannot stipulate that her husband cannot take another wife, and that
in the event he did so, she would not have the power to dissolve the
marriage.3 68 A stipulation otherwise would be treated as void for
violating the nature of marriage. 369 The marriage contract itself,
however, would still be considered valid. 370 In many respects, a poor
wife under Hanafi doctrine resembles a wife living in the United
States during the nineteeth century, when Blackstone's legal regime
371
of the wife's subjugation to her husband prevailed.
C. The Specific Case of Family Law Reform in Egypt
The strategy of both the Egyptian and Jordanian legislatures,
representing the intermediate positions on the spectrum, is to
disassemble the doctrinal elements of the status regime of the Hanafi
doctrine and to transform them into one that is more contractual.
Both have an initial commitment to the traditional rules, and they
treat their respective pieces of legislation as simply an intervention
in, and modification of, the Hanafi doctrine.37 2 Under the laws of both
countries, if the legislation fails to regulate a particular matter,

368.

See id.

One important right granted by the Hanbali (but not Hanafi) law school that
gives women a certain amount of independence and status in marriage is her
right to insert conditions that are favorable to her directly into the marriage
contract.... For example, clauses may be added that eliminate the husband's
right to take a second wife or that grant the wife greater freedom of movement.
Al-Hibri reports that "Hanafis consider the condition prohibiting the husband from
taking another wife null and void because it is viewed as encroaching upon a legitimate
right of the husband." Al-Hibri, supra note 225, at 22-23. She adds that:
[T]he Hanafi attitude toward such conditions appears as highly patriarchal.
The Hanafi view is also contrary to the Prophet's position which ranked
promises (conditions) in the marriage contract highest among all types of
promises, and urged their fulfillment. Only the Hanbali school follows carefully
the Prophet's pronouncement on this matter.
Id. at 23.
369.
See MAGHNIYYAH, supra note 76, at 262; see also ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at
22 ("Conditions that are contrary to the object of marriage ... would be void.").
370.
See MAGHN1YYAH, supra note 76, at 262; ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 22.
371.
See BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 441-42, 446 (St. George Tucker ed.,
1965).
372.
There is an important difference, however, between the approach of the
Jordanian and Egyptian legislatures. MAHMOOD, supra note 118, at 21-24. Whereas the
former set out to codify family law, the latter only passed discrete brief pieces of
legislation on the subject. Id. In other words, Jordanian elites made an elaborate effort
to achieve a comprehensive treatment of issues included under "personal status," while
Egyptian legislators did not. Id. For a discussion of the Jordanian Code of Personal
Status of 1976, see id.
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resort is made to the decisive opinion of the Hanafi school. 3 73 In
contrast, Tunisian lawmakers do not see themselves as intervening
in the Maliki doctrine, the ruling doctrine in North Africa under the
Taqlid legal system. Indeed, the Tunisian legislature, rather than
being constrained or bound by traditional legal rules, has codified a
374
new legal regime.
It is possible to assess the differences between the Tunisian
legislative strategy and that of Egyptian (and Jordanian) lawmakers.
Whereas Tunisian lawmakers attempted to grant women equality by
taking an elaborate step toward abolishing the relationship based on
reciprocity assumed by the Taqlid legal system (obedience for
maintenance), 375 those in Egypt made no attempt in this direction.
Under Egyptian law, maintenance is still the primary responsibility
of the man, and it is from this responsibility that he derives all sorts
of powers (women's obedience, unilateral no-fault divorce, and
guardianship rights). In addition, the primary responsibility of the
woman is still to obey her husband in return for maintenance, while
at the same time being deprived of the same powers as a man. 376 No

373.
For reference to Article 183 of the Jordanian Law of Personal Status,
"requiring recourse to the majority opinion of the Hanafi school in any matter not
explicitly covered by the code," see WELCHMAN, supra note 272, at 3. See also
MAHMOOD, supra note 118, at 22. For reference to procedural legislation under which
courts in Egypt must apply Hanafi law in the absence of a rule or law found in "reform
statutory legislation based on the instructions of alternative schools," see SHAHAM,
supra note 154, at 13. It is the case in many majority Muslim countries that in absence
of a legislated rule, the doctrine of the prevailing school of law is applied. See
MAHMOOD, supra note 118, at 5 (reporting that "[o]utside the scope of the codified laws
the locally dominant school of Islamic law has been, generally, retained by the statutes
as the residual law in most Muslim countries [e.g., Maliki law in Algeria, Kuwait,
Libya and Morocco; and Hanafi law in Afghanistan, Jordan, Sudan and Syria]")
(brackets in original).
374.
The Tunisian Majallah, however, does not constitute a complete
abandonment of Taqlid law. The legal acts involved in entering marriage and exiting it
under Taqlid law are still incorporated in the Majallah. Such acts include contracting
marriage, payment of mahr, the idda, etc. However, these acts are organized within a
regime of "spousal equality in companionate marriage," a radical departure from the
vision of the family under Taqlid.
375.
Thus, Tunisian women came to acquire some of the powers and
responsibilities of the Tunisian man (guardianship and maintenance), and the Tunisian
man lost some of the powers he originally had, taking up responsibilities historically
associated with women (no obedience and paternal custody).
376.
The new legislation on khul divorce passed in Egypt allows the wife to buy
her freedom from the marriage without getting her husband's consent. ESPOSITO, supra
note 5, at 60. As Professor Esposito reports, "[u]nder a new law that came into effect in
March 2000, a woman can divorce her husband, with or without his agreement, in
exchange for returning to him any money or property he paid to her upon their
marriage. This is a variation on khul divorce." Id. The reason why this is a variation of
khul is that in the case of khul divorce the consent of the husband is needed. See id. at
32. For this reason, Professor Esposito refers to it as a "mutual divorce" or a "common
consent" divorce. Id. In addition, traditionally khul does not require financial
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attempt has been made to destroy this legally enforced division of
labor to achieve a semblance of equality between the spouses. Of
course, the maintenance/obedience transaction leaves women's
personal wealth and property untouched, safe from the demands and
needs of the family.
Egyptian lawmakers followed a strategy of reform based on a set
of discrete steps and actions. First, they increased women's
maintenance rights by including medical expenses in the list of items
that constitute her maintenance "package"; this was a departure from
the Hanafi doctrine. 377 In addition, the law requires that the
divorcing husband provide his custodian wife and her children with a
residence to use as part of her custodial fees. 378 Second, Egyptian
lawmakers reduced the requirements of women's duty of obedience.
For instance, the Hanafi presumption that a working wife is
disobedient when she leaves the house without her husband's
permission is reversed. 379 Under new laws, the presumption is that
she is not disobedient unless it is judged that her work constituted an
"abuse of right or is contrary to the interests of the family" and her
38 0
husband asked her to stop working.
In addition to increasing women's maintenance rights and
limiting her duty to obey her husband, Egyptian reforms have
chipped away at the supra powers that Hanafi doctrine allows the
husband because such powers were considered to be in excess of the
transactional deal of maintenance for obedience. 38 1 In this respect,
the powers of the husband were seriously curtailed when the
disciplinary institution of the "house of obedience" was abolished in
1967.382 Egyptian feminists agitated in the sixties to put an end to

compensation on the part of the wife to the husband (by returning the mahr he has
paid her, or waiving her deferred mahr, for instance), but it is allowed as a way for her
to convince him to consent to the divorce. See id. ("[A]warding the dower is not
absolutely necessary. A khul repudiation can also take place without payment of
compensation by the wife.").
377.
MAHMOOD, supra note 118, at 106. Article 1(3) of Law 100 of 1985 reads as
follows: "Maintenance shall include food, clothing, lodging, medical and other expenses
recognised by law." Id.
Id. at 113. Under the dictates of Article 18-C of Law 100 of 1985, "[t]he
378.
divorcing husband shall provide for his minor children from the divorced wife and their
custodian a proper and independent house." Id.
379.
Id.
380.
Id. at 107. Article 3(4) provides that the right of maintenance shall not be
affected "if the wife goes out for a lawful employment-except when this right has been
abused by her or where it is prejudicial to the interest of the family and the husband
prevents her from so doing." Id. at 113.
381.
For a general discussion of such changes brought about by twentieth
century "reforms" to Egyptian family law, which faced vehement opposition from
conservative religious elites, see Najjar, supra note 1.
See Najjar, supra note 1, at 331. As Professor Esposito explains:
382.
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what they saw as a deeply humiliating practice inflicted on women
who chose to leave the marital home. 38 3 Although they succeeded in
abolishing the practice of using the police to enforce obedience
judgments, obedience itself remains a legal duty that wives owe their
38 4
husbands in exchange for their maintenance.
Another blow dealt to the Hanafi husband's supra powers was
brought about by legislation that grants women the power to request
divorce for harm (Law 25 of 1929) and requires judges to grant
women divorce if they fail to prove harm but still insist on
terminating the marriage (Law 100 of 1985).385 The latter effectively

Egyptian family law included a provision, known as bayt al-taah (house of
obedience), that permitted a husband to restrict his wife to their home. Under
traditional Egyptian law, a wife who 'refused to obey' and left her husband
might be forcibly returned by the police and confined until she became more
obedient. Law No. 100 of 1985 instead requires the husband to send his wife a
summons to return home via an official. The wife then has thirty days to object
in court and present her lawful grounds for refusing to obey the summons. If it
becomes apparent to the court that reconciliation is not possible and the wife
petitions for divorce, the court is to follow arbitration procedures.
ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 60. For the text of the relevant article of Law 100 (1985), see
MAHMOOD, supra note 118, at 111. Another author describes the "house of obedience,"
an expression derived from Egyptian popular culture, as follows:
According to the 1897 and later the 1931 Law (Articles 345-46), a husband,
armed with an obedience decree issued by the court, could seek the help of the
police in forcing his rebellious wife to return to his house (this recourse was
called 'the house of obedience,' bayt al-taa). . . . From the beginning of the
twentieth century, Egyptian women's movements attacked the compulsory
character of the house of obedience and demanded its abolition. They were
supported by some modernist jurists. . . . As a result of such opposition, the
government abolished this institution on 13 February 1967.
SHAHAM, supra note 154, at 73. As the author notes, "[t]his kind of enforced obedience
is not mentioned in either the Qur'an or the Hadith; but as a customary practice in
Egypt, the Sudan, and other parts of Africa, it became part of state law." Id.
383.
For a discussion of the legal process by which the institution was abolished,
see Najjar, supra note 1, at 331-32. Even earlier, pioneering feminists, such as those
who comprised the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU), also advocated the abolition of the
institution, but without success. See BADRAN, supranote 208, at 131-32.
384.
Thus, Article 11-B (translated by other authors as Article 11 bis 2) declares
that:
If a wife refuses to live with her husband without having a right to do so, her
maintenance may be stopped from the date of refusal. Refusal without right
shall be taken into consideration if she does not return to the matrimonial
home on her husband's demand....
MAHMOOD, supra note 118, at 111.
385.
See MAHMOOD, supra note 118, at 109. Article 6 of Law 25 of 1929 (as
amended by Law 100 of 1985) reads as follows:
If a wife alleges that the husband has been cruel to her in a way which makes
the continuance of the marital relationship impossible for women of her class,
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means that Egyptian wives have come close to acquiring access to nofault divorce. Divorce is conditional, however, upon the woman's
willingness to go through an elaborate process of attempted
reconciliation with the husband, which is mediated by the court as
process is not required when
required by the law. 386 This conciliation
38 7
the husband divorces the wife.

she can apply to the qadi [judge] for divorce. The qadi shall grant her
dissolution of marriage . . . if the allegation is proved and no mutual
reconciliation between the spouses seems possible.
Id. The article then provides that "[w]here the qadi rejects the wife's plea and she later
"
repeats her allegation but is unable to prove it, he shall appoint two arbitrators ..
Id. Article 10 stipulates that if the arbitrators cannot "effect a reconciliation," then they
will declare who has fault and grant a divorce. Id. at 110. The assignment of fault is
important because it impacts the financial rights the woman will have upon divorce.
See id.
386.
The Hanafi husband's disciplinary power has been seriously undermined
because the statutory reforms offer a woman a way out of marriage. Rather than being
caught in the "poor abused wife zone," what customarily happens now in Egypt if the
wife desires to leave an abusive marital relationship is the following: first, the wife
leaves the house and the husband cuts off her maintenance on the grounds that she left
the house without his permission; second, the wife sues in court for her maintenance;
third, the husband argues that she had been disobedient and obtains an "obedience"
judgment requiring her to come back home; fourth, the wife responds by requesting
divorce based on harm and argues that she had left the house for harm inflicted on her
by husband; fifth, the wife tries to prove harm in court.
If the judge fails to reconcile her with her husband and she succeeds in proving
harm, the wife is granted a divorce. If, however, she fails to prove harm and
insists upon divorce, then the court appoints arbitrators from each spouse's
family who are instructed to look into the reasons for disagreement and
attempt to reconcile the spouses. If they fail, then apportionment of harm and
reimbursement takes place. If the arbitrators decided that harm came really
from the wife herself, the wife stands to lose her deferred dowry and
maintenance during her idda. If, on the other hand, it turns out that the
husband was the source of the harm, she maintains all her financial rights. If
the arbitrators decide that harm was caused by both spouses, then each pays
the other proportionally for the harm inflicted on the other. If the arbitrators
differ among themselves, then the court takes over again and attempts
reconciliation yet another time. If it fails, with the wife insisting on terminating
the marriage, then the court grants her divorce. Apportionment of harm and
reimbursement is attempted again, this time according to the court's discretion.
This process is outlined in Articles 6-11 of Egpytian Law 25 of 1929, as
amended by Law 100 of 1985. For the text of these Articles, see MAHMOOD,
supra note 118, at 109-10.
387.
See MAHMOOD, supra note 118, at 109. Article 5-A of Law 25 of 1929, as
amended by Law 100 of 1985, reads as follows:
A husband who divorces his wife shall get the divorce registered within thirty
days from the date of pronouncement. If the divorced wife is present at the time
of registration, her knowledge of divorce shall be recognized. But if she is not
present, the registrar shall notify the talaq [divorce] to her through a court
official and get delivered to her or her nominee a copy of the certificate of
divorce. Every divorce shall be effective from the date of the pronouncement-
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That the transactional quality of the Taqlid marriage contract
has been legislatively rehabilitated is indicated by two facts: (1) that
husbands in Egypt are no longer able to use the police to force their
"disobedient" wives to return to the marital home, and (2) that
Egyptian women are no longer trapped in an abusive marriage but
can exit through either divorce for harm or khul regardless of the
husband's consent. Marriage is now simply obedience for
maintenance; if one is not offered, the other is denied. Husbands no
longer have extra powers (such as discipline and the "house of
obedience") to force women to commit to this transaction or anything
else in addition. The Egyptian legislature achieved these reforms not
by abolishing the husband's disciplinary powers, recognized
independently by the Hanafi doctrine as part of the list of powers
provided to husbands. 38 8 Rather, the changes were made through
small legislative moves taken on other fronts, the aggregate effect of
which was to strip these disciplinary powers of their otherwise brutal
38 9
impact.
The Egyptian legislative policy of adding to the wife's
maintenance rights, reducing the requirements of the wife's duty of
obedience, and chipping away at the husband's supra powers stands
in contradistinction with the Tunisian legislative policy of
introducing a complex, liberal notion of equality between the spouses.

IV. ADJUDICATING

THE FAMILY IN EGYPT

To truly understand steps taken to reform family law in Egypt,
one must look at the way in which the judiciary has decided cases
related to the issues of obedience and a wife's request for divorce
based on harm. Abolishing the "house of obedience," allowing wives to
request divorce for harm, and more recently, granting women the
right to a 'khul divorce without having to obtain the husband's
consent were all significant steps taken by means of legislation to

except when the husband has concealed it from the wife, in which case for the
purposes of succession and other financial rights it will become effective on the
date when it comes to her knowledge.
Id. One limit to the husband's right to divorce his wife when he wishes is that she must
be informed; under classical Taqlid rules, a wife could be divorced and not even know
it; that is, it was not required that she be informed. See ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 30
(reporting that the wife "does not have to be present nor must she be informed" of the
fact that her husband has repudiated, or divorced, her).
388.
See sources cited supra note 255.
389.
The Jordanian legislature made the even more radical legislative move of
not considering the woman who leaves the house as a result of mistreatment by her
husband as disobedient. See supra note 255 and accompanying text. The Jordanian
Code still allows such a wife her maintenance.
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chip away at the status regime of the Hanafi doctrine. In addition,
Egyptian courts have continued the legislative path of disassembling
the elements of the Hanafi doctrine that in effect traditionally
produced the status regime.
Two moves taken by the judiciary released women from the
disciplinary rule of the husband. First of all, Egyptian courts decided
ambivalently and gradually that women beaten by their husbands do
not owe their spouses a duty of obedience. Second, the courts have
treated obedience cases as separate from and irrelevant to the
outcome of cases concerning requests for divorce based on harm. It is
important to note, however, that the decisions of the Egyptian courts
are contradictory and conflict enough to open to question the exact
effectiveness of these judicial moves.

A. Adjudicating Obedience
Several women have appeared before Egyptian courts because
they were charged with disobedience for leaving the marital home
without their husband's permission. These women responded by
stating that they had left because their husbands beat them. The
question before the court was whether to accept this argument,
particularly given the fact that these women were not requesting a
divorce because of harm. What these women wanted instead was
simply to leave the house to escape the harm inflicted on them by
their husbands, without losing the maintenance they desperately
needed. Under the law, if judged disobedient, these women stood to
lose their maintenance. Below various cases and the decisions made
by the court are discussed.
1. Obedience is Still Owed the Husband Even if He Beat His Wife
Case 1:
Obedience is the wife's legal duty as soon as she is awarded
her prompt mahr and a legal residence is provided for her to
390
inhabit.
Case 2:
The husband has the right to his wife's obedience and to "her
enjoyment," and he cannot beat or discipline her. If he did, she
should resort to court, which must then reprimand him and
prevent him from hurting his wife. The wife, however, does not
3 91
have the right to disobey him on the ground that he beat her.

Case 3:

390.
391.

Case No. 4056/30 (30/10/41) 10/56 (on file with author).
Case No. 474/39 (30/6/40) 8/136 (on file with author).
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20041

The husband has the right to his wife's obedience and to "her
enjoyment" by virtue of the marriage contract, and she does not
have the right to withhold herself from him for reasons of harm
and battery. She also has no right to leave the house for that
reason, as long as she lives among good neighbors. If her
husband beat her, she should complain to the judge, who would
392
punish and discipline him.
2. Court May Discipline A Husband Who Beats
Depriving Him of the Wife's Obedience

His Wife by

Case 4:
If a husband beats his wife without justification, he ought to
be disciplined even if the beating was not severe. There is no
particular and prescribed way on how to discipline such a
husband; it is up to the judge to decide on this question. The
judge may therefore decide to deprive the husband of his wife's
393
duty of obedience.
3. A Husband Who Beats His Wife Loses His Right to Her Obedience
Case 5:
A husband who beats his wife is not to be entrusted with her.
3 94
He therefore loses his right to his wife's obedience.
4. Applying the Same Standard of Harm for Both Divorce and
Obedience
Case 6:
The law has allowed the wife to request divorce for harm if
living with the husband has become impossible. This being the
case, harm that is severe enough to allow the wife to get a divorce
is enough to allow wife less than that: disobedience. What other
courts have decided-namely, that such a conclusion would lead
395
to "obstructing" marriage contracts-is baseless.
Most cases dealing with the question of obedience attempt to
define the outer limits of this legal duty in various contexts. They
deal with questions such as whether the wife is disobedient when she
refuses to move to a new residence upon her husband's request; if she
had stipulated in the marriage contract that she would only live in a

392.
393.
394.
395.

Case
Case
Case
Case

No.
No.
No.
No.

1/35 (1/12/35) 7/200 (on file with author).
45/29 (13/4/30) 1/912 (on file with author).
2254/40 (23/11/31) 3/633 (on file with author).
723/35 (2/5/26) 7/870 (on file with author).
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specific residence; 39 6 if she leaves the marital home because her
husband was appropriating her money; 397 and if she leaves the
marital home because her husband engaged in homosexual
398
practices.
B. Adjudicating Divorce Based on Harm
A series of decisions by the Egyptian Court of Cassation, the
highest court of appeal in Egypt, have affirmed that the issue of
disobedience is to be treated as different from, and its outcome
regarded as irrelevant to, the issue of the same wife's request for
divorce based on harm. The Court has decided that these issues
should be seen as independent from each other, based on the fact that
the cause of action for one is different from that of the other. In
addition, the facts that trial courts are to take into consideration
when assigning fault are different for the two issues. Separating
disobedience from divorce based on harm has the effect of breaking
yet another part of the chain of imprisonment husbands had imposed
on their wives under Hanafi doctrine.
Although the courts might feel strongly that wives should earn
their maintenance by offering obedience, this being the nature of the
marriage transaction, objections do not arise when the wife is
requesting an end to this marital transaction through divorce for
harm. Maintenance is no longer due in this case, and the court simply
has to apportion the blame between the spouses and determine if the
husband owes the wife anything, or vice versa. To prove that
disobedience was justified requires a strict standard of harm,
whereas in the case of divorce for harm, the standard is a looser one.
To transfer the standard of the one case to the other would be unfair.
Case 1:
The case on obedience differs from the case on divorce for
harm. The first is based on abandonment and departure from
the marital home, while the second is based on the wife's claim
that her husband harms her. The outcome of the obedience case
does not preclude the court from looking into the wife's request
399
for divorce based on harm.

396.
See Case No. 396/43 (6/2/44) 5/53 (on file with author) (ruling that wife was
disobedient).
397.
See Case No. 1218/931 (24/8/32) 5/912 (on file with author) (ruling that wife
was not disobedient). But see Case No. 38/33 (21/1/34) 5/647 (on file with author) (ruling
that wife was disobedient).
398.
See Case No. 1458/48 (22/11/48) 21/90 (on file with author) (ruling that wife
was disobedient).
399.
Cassation 29/3/1967, No. 19, 35 (on file with author); see also Cassation
17/11/1971, No. 26, 38 (on file with author).
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Case 2:
Declaring a wife disobedient in a case on obedience does not
preclude the court from adjudicating her request for divorce
based on harm. When the lower court refused to consider the
outcome of the obedience case, it was making the correct
400
decision.
Case 3:
It is not correct to argue, as the lower court did, that the
wife's submission to her husband after she was adjudged
disobedient indicates the absence of harm justifying her request
for divorce. The two cases are different from each other and
should be treated as such. 401 On the other hand, the Court of
Cassation also decided the the next case.
Case 4:
The lower court investigating the question of harm in a
divorce case can look into the facts that have transpired in the
case on obedience, and it is up to the court to decide whether
these facts amount to harm inflicted by the husband, thus
justifying granting the wife a divorce. The court, however, has to
40 2
be clear in its reasoning.
The bulk of the cases concerning the granting of divorce based on
harm done to the wife address the question of what kind of acts the
court should take into account when assesing the harm done. The
question is of importance not so much because a woman might be
denied a divorce-a woman can get a divorce even if she fails to prove
harm. What makes the issue important is the fact that there will be
an allocation of responsibility after the divorce is granted, and this
40 3
allocation has financial consequences.
The Court of Cassation as well as the lower courts have
produced a wealth of cases defining the kind of acts that are to be
considered harmful. The definition of harm tends to be elitist, and

400.
Cassation 24/11/1976, No. 4, 45 (on file with author).
401.
Cassation 14/3/1979, No. 5, 47 (on file with author).
402.
Cassation 5/11/1975, No. 10, 43 (on file with author).
403.
MAHMOOD, supra note 118, at 110. Article 10 of Egyptian Law 25 of 1929,
as amended by Law 100 of 1985, provides that:
Where the arbitrators are unable to effect a reconciliation-(i) if the fault lies
on the part of the husband, the arbitrators can decree a single irrevocable
divorce, assuring that the wife will not lose any of her rights which would
normally arise from the marriage and on divorce; (ii) if the fault lies on the part
of the wife,they can decree a divorce subject to payment of compensation by the
wife; (iii) if the fault lies with both parties, they can decree a divorce either
without compensation or on payment of compensation commensurate with the
blame on either side; and (iv) if the causes of discord are unknown and the fault
cannot be located, they can decree a divorce without compensation.
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what is harm for a rich woman is not harm for a poor one. The Court
of Cassation thus defined harm as "inflicting verbal or physical injury
on the woman in a way that does not befit people of her social
status."404 The Court of Appeals likewise reasoned that "what a
woman of a certain social class finds tolerable another of a different
social class does not. ' 40 5 In another case, the court decided that,
"harm does not have to be repeated. A single hurtful act is sufficient
to allow wife to request divorce, particularly considering that the
woman concerned is a working and educated woman. ' 406 In yet
another instance, the Court of Cassation declared that, "the charge
being made by the husband that his wife was in contact with her exhusband is a charge which is not tolerated in any social milieu and
leads to poisoning the relationship between the spouses. 40 7
The financial consequences for poor women of the definition of
harm that Egyptian courts have adopted can be great. Unfortunately,
however, the published texts of these cases do not provide any details
about the way the courts allocated financial responsibilities between
spouses upon granting the wife a divorce.
C. Constitutionalizingthe Family
Responding to pressure from an increasingly vocal Islamic
movement, and in the midst of a controversy in the country as to the
Islamicity of Egyptian legislation, the Egyptian political elite passed
an amendment to Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution of 1971.408
The Amendment changed the wording of the Article from the
seemingly benign "the principles of Islamic Sharia are a principal
source of legislation" to the more overreaching "the principles of

404.
Cassation 18/4/1962, No. 28, 29 (on file with author) (emphasis added). As
one author reports:
It is said that it is natural for a working class woman to get beaten and for men
of her social class to be polygamous. If a working class wife would come to court
and argue that she had been harmed by her husband who beats her or that he
had taken another wife, she is told this does not constitute harm 'the likes of
her cannot tolerate' and she is denied divorce.
The Status of Egyptian Women in PersonalStatus Law, in THE LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS
OF THE EGYPTIAN WOMAN (AL-wAI AL-QANUNI LIL-MARA'AH AL-MIRIYYAH) 105 (Ahmad
Abdullah ed., 1995) (on file with author).
405.
Appeal 11/12/1965, No. 89, 82 (on file with author).
406.
Case No. 33, Year 50, Personal Status 31/3/1981 (on file with author)
(emphasis added).
407.
Cassation 17/4/1984, No. 37, 53 (on file with author) (emphasis added).
408.
See Gabr, supra note 21, at 217. The amendment was passed in 1980. See
Lombardi, supra note 50, at 81.
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Islamic Sharia are the principal source of legislation." 409 The
implication of such an amendment for an otherwise predominantly
secular legal system took some time to unfold. For years, the
Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt (SCC) 4 10 avoided confronting
this matter head-on, despite the fact that its docket filled up with
Article 2 cases almost immediately after the amendment came into
effect. 411 The Court's evasion tactics consisted of either striking down

409.
Gabr, supra note 21, at 217 (emphasis added); Lombardi, supra note 50, at
86. As one author reports, "[t]he provision contained in Article 2 of the Egyptian
Constitution is not peculiar to Egyptian constitutional law. Similar provisions are
found in numerous Arab constitutions." Kilian Balz, The Secular Reconstruction of
Islamic Law: The Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court and the "Battleover the Veil"
in State-Run Schools, in LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE ARAB WORLD 231 (Baudouin Dupret

et. al. eds., 1999).
410.
For a description of the Court, see Marie-Claire Foblets & Baudouin
Dupret, Contrasted Identity Claims Before Egyptian and Belgian Courts, in LEGAL
PLURALISM IN THE ARAB WORLD 63 (Bandouin Dupret et. al. eds., 1999). The authors
report that:
Egypt also has a constitutional court, the Supreme Constitutional Court,
established by the Constitution which has been active since the promulgation of
its organic law (Law No. 48 of 1979) and the adoption of its internal
regulation. . . The Supreme Constitutional Court is competent in issues with
regard to the interpretation of the law, monitoring constitutional issues and
deciding conflicts of competence between the courts. At the request of a judge it
can be called upon to decide on the constitutional status of a law.
Id. Authors have recognized the "crucial role of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional
Court in determining the nature of public life in Egypt as a modern state formally
governed by principles of Islamic Shari'a laws." Ran Hirschl, Resituating the
Judicializationof Politics:Bush v. Gore as a Global Trend, 15 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 191,
197 (2002). This same author, in another article, describes the establishment of the
Court as follows:
In 1979, President Anwar al-Sadat, with the support of the secular high-income
bourgeoisie, initiated the establishment of the Egyptian Supreme
Constitutional Court and granted a relatively wide authority of judicial review.
The constitutional reform of 1979 also ensured the Court's formal independence
from government, political parties, and other improper influences and
interferences. Given the fact that Egypt has a presidential system of
government in which the executive enjoys a wide range of powers, it is
somewhat surprising that the Supreme Constitutional Court was granted a
relatively wide authority of judicial review over administrative and presidential
legislative powers, and even more surprising that the Supreme Constitutional
Court has maintained and even fortified its relative independence since its
establishment.
Ran Hirschl, The Struggle for Hegemony: Understanding Judicial Empowerment
Through Constitutionalizationin Culturally Divided Polities, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 73,
114 (2000).
411.
See Hirschl, The Struggle for Hegemony, supra note 410, at 115 ("Following
the establishment of judicial review in 1979 and the 1980 constitutional amendment,
the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court has increasingly been called upon to
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legislation coming to its review under this Article on procedural
grounds, 412 thereby avoiding looking into the substantive ramifications
of the amendment to the Article, or of declaring the non-retroactivity
of the amendment, allowing the Court to treat all laws that had been
passed before it as being immune from challenges under the
Article.

4 13

Using the tactics described above, the Court was able to uphold
challenged legislation twelve consecutive times, buying itself precious
time until the moment came when it had to decide on the exact reach
of Article 2.414 That moment came in 1993,415 and from then on, the
SCC has produced a body of cases that are historic both for what they
say about Egypt's judicial elites' attitude toward the general project
of Islamicization and also for the ingenuity of the test developed by
the Court in adjudicating cases under Article 2.416

determine the constitutionality of legislative and administrative acts on the basis of
their adherence to the principles of the Shari'a.").
412.
See Foblets & Dupret, supra note 410, at 63. The authors report that an
examination of the jurisprudence of the Court demonstrates that, especially in its early
years, "when it comes to dealing with issues of un constitutionality, it has tended not to
become involved in interpreting shari'a, rather it has followed a strict technical
principle.
...
Id. One instance of this was Law 44 of 1979 (Jihan's Law), reforming
various aspects of family law. See Najjar, supra note 1, at 337; see also supra text
accompanying note 211 (discussing "Jihan's Law").
413.
See Foblets & Dupret, supra note 410, at 63. The authors report that in a
1985 decision, "the Supreme Constitutional Court formulated a principle which has
become law, that of the non-retroactive implementation of Article 2. Thus the Court
rejected the right to pass judgment on the constitutionality of texts pre-dating 1980."
Id.; see also Awad Mohammed El-Morr, Judicial Sources for Supporting the Protection
of Human Rights, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 8 (1997) (citing the Supreme Constitutional Court's decision that statutes need
only abide by Article 2 of the Constitution if enacted after "the current language of
Article 2 of the Constitution was adopted"); Scott Kent Brown II, The Coptic Church in
Egypt: A Comment on Protecting Religious Minorities from Nonstate Discrimination,
2000 BYU L. REV. 1049, 1085 (citing the Supreme Constitutional Court's "refusal to
apply Article 2 of the Constitution (the 1980 shari'aamendment) to any legislation that
was enacted before the article was adopted [amended] in May 1980"). Balz reports:
[T]he S.C.C. defined application of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution with
respect to time. In a leading case in 1985 concerning the constitutionality of
interest claims ('Azhar-case'), it was held that only 'with the day the
amendment ... of Article 2 of the constitution came into force on 22 May 1980,
the legislative power (sultat al-tashri')became bound when enacting new laws
or amending laws, which predated this day, to observe that these laws must
conform to the principles of Islamic law (mabadi'al-shari'aal-islamiyya). ...
Balz, supra note 409, at 234-35.
414.
Lombardi, supra note 50, at 90. ("[T]he SCC remained adamant. It
reaffirmed the non-retroactivity of the shari'aon twelve separate occasions.")
415.
Id. at 90, 97.
416.
See id. at 99-102 (summarizing the test); see also infra note 445 (discussing
the strategies taken by the Court in Article 2 cases).
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By looking at three important cases that came before the SCC
under Article 2 and the reasoning that the Court adopted in each
case, insight as to how the Court is handling the amendment and its
effects on legislation can be attained. These particular cases, in their
aggregate, delimit the Court's ideological position on the social
matters at hand. Each case, like the majority of such cases, presents
about the "battle of the
the Court with the question of what to do
4 17
sexes" and the fate of patriarchy in Egypt.
In the first case, decided in 1997, the SCc was presented with
the issue of the constitutionality of Article 11 of the 1929 Law on the
family, which gives the judge the right to grant a woman a divorce
upon a determination that reconciliation with the spouse is
impossible. 4 18 The Court agreed with the plaintiff that according to
the Quran, divorce is the absolute right of the husband. 419 However,
it contended that there was another determinate rule in the Quran
that was relevant to the dispute, the rule requiring the appointment
of an arbitrator from each spouse's family to reconcile the spouses in
the case of dispute. 420 The Court argued that while under this
particular rule it is clear that the task of the arbitrators is to attempt
to reconcile the spouses, it does not specify what the arbitrators

It is a fact worthy of mention that the absolute majority of cases presented
417.
to the Supreme Constitutional Court under Article 2 are related to family law and
inheritance, the two areas of the law that remain based on sharia (although in codified
form). It is interesting that non-religious laws are rarely brought to the attention of the
Court for non-conformity with Article 2. The reasoning that the Court adopts in these
cases is interesting because it demonstrates the judicial test that the Court developed
to examine the constitutionality of legislation under Article 2 of the Constitution. This
test embodies a choice that is only one among many that the Court could have made,
each such choice having its own variant "Islamicizing" imprint on the system. In other
words, the test speaks volumes on how far or near the SCC is willing to go to promote
the project of Islamicization. See infra note 445 (analyzing and describing the test).
Case No. 82, Judicial Year 17, 1997 (on file with author). The relevant
418.
provision of Article 11 reads as follows:
If the court is unable to bring about agreement between the spouses and it
becomes obvious to the court that they cannot live together, and if the wife
insists upon divorce, the court shall rule for their irrevocable divorce with the
forfeit of all or part of the wife's financial rights and her obligation to pay
appropriate compensation if this seems appropriate.
EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 57-58 (quoting Article 11 of Law No. 25 of
1929, as amended by Law No. 100 of 1985).
Case No. 82, Judicial Year 17, 1997, at 5 ("While Talaq has been legislated
419.
by God in his wisdom and gave the power to enforce it to the man since he is more
") (translation by author).
rational and wiser ..
See id. at 6 ("Since arbitrating between husband and wife when there is
420.
discord between them is based on God's command, 'And when you fear discord between
them, send them one arbitrator from his family and one from hers, if they desire
"') (citing verse 4:34 of the
reconciliation God will make matters well between them ..
Qur'an, found in the chapter (sura)titled Women (Al-Nisa)) (translation by author).
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should do if they fail in their efforts. 421 This being the case, the Court
argued, Article 11 is not unconstitutional because it grants the
422
arbitrators the power to recommend divorce to the judge.
Granting such powers to the arbitrators is within the realm of
human-made legislation (or ijtihad as the Court sometimes called it)
since it touches on the question of what extra powers arbitrators
should be given-itself a subject of dispute among the various
medieval schools of jurisprudence. 423 The Court completely glossed
over the fact that granting the arbitrators and consequently the judge
the respective powers of recommendation and divorce was
tantamount to constricting the husband's absolute power to divorce
his wife.
In the second case, decided in 1996, the Court was presented
with the infamous question of the veil or headscarf.4 24 The court was
charged with reviewing the constitutionality of an executive order
issued by the Minister of Education 425 prohibiting schoolgirls from
wearing the niqab and the hijab in all schools below the university
level. 426 The edict created such an outcry that the government
eventually amended it, confining the prohibition to instances where

421.

See id. (translation by author).

[Hiowever, jurists have differed as to who has the power to enforce divorce
when there is discord in the family and the husband refuses to divorce his wife.
• . . Some jurists have argued that the arbitrators who have the power to try
and make amends between the spouses have also the right to divorce the wife
from her husband and others have restricted their power to that of making
amends....
422.
The assumption is that the judge would then grant a divorce on behalf of
the husband.
423.
See Case No. 82, Judicial Year 17, 1997, at 6 (translation by author).
Since the legal provision under dispute-legislated within the power of the
legislature to deduce Sharia rules taking into account Sharia proofs-has treated
the arbitrators as having the power to study the cause of the dispute between
the spouses and to recommend to the judge the reasons for it, the respective
responsibility of the spouses, and whether separation should take place with (or
without) compensation according to the assigned responsibility of each ...
[T]his rule does not contradict a determinate rule of the Sharia, but legislates
an area that has been an object of controversy among the jurists ... and takes
into account the general welfare of the people as Sharia has recognized it...
424.
Case No. 8, Judicial Year 17, 1996 (on file with author). For a discussion of
this case, see Brown, supra note 414, at 1089. See also Balz, supra note 409, at 238-42.
425.
Edict #113, 1994 (on file with author).
426.
See Foblets & Dupret, supra note 410, at 67-68. Specifically, the decree
established that girls must wear particular school uniforms: "The decree in question
requires all girls to wear the uniform of the school they attend." Id. at 68. These
uniforms did not include a hijab or the niqab. Id.

20041

MODERNIZING MUSLIM FAMIL Y LA W

permission to wear the veil from the girl's parents was absent. 42 7 The
428
challenge to the edict by the Islamicists, however, was relentless.
The court read the various verses in the Quran that could be
relevant to the issue at hand and concluded that these verses
recommended that women should cover some parts of their body, but
it found no evidence that they required women to cover their hair or
face. 42 9 The Court also argued that the prophetic traditions were
equally ambiguous on this question. 430 Moreover, the medieval jurists
themselves disagreed on exactly which parts of the woman's body
should be covered. 43 1 The Court then sought to discover a principle

427.

Edict #208, 1994 (on file with author). As Lombardi reports:

Islamist lawyers promptly brought Article 2 challenges to the edict. Alarmed by
the popular reaction to the decree, the Minister of Education softened it. He
issued a new edict (#208/1994) which amended the earlier edict. Under the new
edict, schoolgirls could wear the hijab if they received permission from their
parents.
Lombardi, supra note 50, at 107-08. In addition to the consent of the parents, the
decree also established that veiling has to be based on the free will of the student "and
that it is not due to coercion from any other person or organization." Bi.lz, supra note
409, at 230. However, the niqab, which covers the face, was not allowed: 'The
ministerial decree stipulates that all students should be free to adopt the veil if they
choose, as long as it does not hide the face and their guardian can certify that this
decision has not been taken under duress." Foblets & Dupret, supra note 411, at 68. As
another author put it, "[t]he niqab, the facial veil covering the entire face, was banned
from state-run schools through this decree. To wear a hijab, a head scarf, was all that
remained permissible." Bdlz, supra note 409, at 229.
428.
See Lombardi, supra note 50, at 108 ("Under the new edict, schoolgirls
could wear the hijab. . . . Plaintiffs, however, continued to fight the decrees in
court .. ").For the specific facts concerning the father who brought the case, a man
named Mahmud Wasil, and his two daughters, Maryam and Hagir, who were not
allowed to attend school because they were wearing the niqab, see Foblets & Dupret,
supra note 410, at 67.
429.
Lombardi, supra note 50, at 108. As Lombardi reports, "[tlhe SCC first
identified two passages of the Qur'an which require women to cover up those parts of
their body that are sexually appealing to men, but it found none that specifically
required women to cover their hair or their faces." Id. See also Balz, supra note 409, at
238.
430.
See Lombardi, supra note 50, at 109. As Lombardi describes it:
In the sunna literature, there were reports that the Prophet had asked women
to cover everything but their heads and faces. But, said the SCC, there was no
evidence that the Prophet had required some women to wear the hijab or niqab.
Since there was no clear declaration in the Qur'an or sunna that women must
wear the hijab or niqab, the SCC declared itself fairly certain that the sharia
did not specifically require women to wear the veil.
Id.
431.
See E1-Morr, supra note 413, at 16 (reporting that "Islamic jurists disagree
as to the proper construction of the Qur'an and the confirmed or alleged sayings of
Mohammed the Prophet with regard to women's dress"). The author, Chief Justice ElMorr of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, describes the case in length. See
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behind these disparate evocations on women's dress and concluded
that it was the principle of modesty. 4 32 The purpose of modesty, the
Court explained, is to prevent illicit sex. 433 The Court decided that
banning the veil would not lead to illicit sex and therefore did not
violate the principle of modesty. 434 The edict, according to the Court,
43 5
was consequently constitutional.
The third case reviewed Article 11 of Law No. 100 of 1985, which
grants the wife the power to request a divorce if her husband takes
another wife. 436 The plaintiff argued that granting the wife such

id. at 14-19; see also Balz, supra note 409, at 238-39 (discussing the findings of the
SCC).
432.
See Bdlz, supra note 409, at 238. As Biilz reports, the Court stated the
following in regards to modesty and women's dress:
Islam elevates the standing of the woman, requires her to preserve her
modesty, and obliges her to cover her body from being despicable or sacrificing
her dignity in order to protect woman from whatever may damage, or be
detrimental to, her shame.( . . .) Therefore, she does not have the right to
choose her dress according to her entirely free will.
Id. For the Chief Justice's point of view on modesty and women's dress, see El-Morr,
supra note 413, at 16-17.
433.
See Lombardi, supra note 50, at 111. The Court reasoned that:
The way that a woman looks should express her modesty in a way that will
permit her legally to do what she needs to do in life, and which simultaneously
keeps her away from that indecency/immorality (ibtizal) which arises when
men approach her because of the way her body looks and which leads her to sin
(ithm) and affects her position and situation. The question then was whether
the niqab ban promoted immodest behavior in opposition to the fundamental
principle that women must dress modestly. The SCC evaluated the ban by
focusing on what ends the principles of modesty are to serve. The SCC found
that modesty is, at its heart, designed to prevent illicit sex.
Id.
434.
Id.
435.
See Foblets & Dupret, supra note 410, at 68. As one author put it, by ruling
as it did in this case, the Supreme Constitutional Court "advocated the 'middle course'
by refusing to impose an excessive dress code but upholding a very modest one." Brown,
supra note 413, at 1089.
436.
Case No. 35, Year 9, 1994 (on file with author). Article 11 of Law No. 25 of
1929, as amended by Law No. 100 of 1985, provides that "[a] wife whose husband takes
a second wife may petition for divorce from him if she is affected by some material or
moral harm of a kind which would make it impossible for a couple such as them to
continue living together, even if she has not stipulated in the contract that he should
not take further wives." EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 3, at 58 (quoting Article
11 bis of Law No. 25 of 1929, as amended by Law No. 100 of 1985). The Article also
provides that:
If the judge is unable to effect reconciliation between them he shall grant her
an irrevocable divorce. The wife's right to petition for divorce on these grounds
shall be forfeit upon the elapse of one year from the date of her knowledge of
the other marriage ....
Her right to petition for a divorce shall be renewed
whenever he marries another woman.
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powers was in clear violation of the husband's right, granted him by
the explicit dictates of the Quran, to marry up to four wives. 437 In
other words, he argued that the law was in violation of his right to
practice polygamy. The court went out of its way in this case to argue
that no such violation really existed. The court asserted that as a
constitutional court, it had the duty to "practice its role of
constitutional review in a limited way always trying to interpret the
legislation in such a manner that avoids striking it down. ' 438 This
assertion was quite striking, given the court's practice of overt
judicial activism when the question of constitutionality is not related
439
to the Shari'a.
The court agreed with the plaintiff that men have the absolute
right 440 to practice polygamy, to marry up to four wives, and that
such a right was universal and "transcended time and space." 44 1 The
court went even further by insisting that although treating wives
equally is a requirement of polygamy, this was only a "restriction of
the right and not a cause of it. ''442 By making this latter assertion,
the court seemed to be distinguishing its position from those who
argue that polygamy may be prohibited by law because the
requirement of fairness associated with the Quranic license to be
polygamous is impossible to achieve.
It is surprising that after asserting the absoluteness and
universality of the right to practice polygamy, the Court proceeded to
argue that granting the wife the right to request divorce cannot be
seen as jeopardizing the husband's right to practice the same. This is
so because the law stipulates that the wife has to prove to the court
that she has been harmed by the second marriage and that this harm
was "real not illusory, actual not imagined, demonstrable not
assumed, independent of the incident of the later marriage although
occasioned by it."'443 Had the law, the court argued, assumed harm

Id.
437.
See Case No. 35, Year 9, 1994, at 3 (on file with author). "The plaintiff
argues that the provision under dispute violates Quranic text that licenses polygamy
and that restricts it only with the requirement of fairness in treating wives. Moreover
the provision does not specify the kind of emotional harm that allows the wife to
(translation by author).
Id.
I.."
demand divorce .
438.
Id. (translation by author).
For a discussion of such cases, see, for example, El-Morr, supra note 413.
439.
440.
Sometimes the Court refers to it as a "license."
441.
Case No. 35, Year 9, 1994, at 3.
442.
Id. at 8 ("Since polygamy is based on the rule of fairness-which is a
restriction of the right and not a cause of it-injustice and bias will not take place and
no harm will befall the wife when her husband takes another wife.") (translation by
author).
Id. at 9 ("The right of the wife to demand divorce when her husband takes
443.
another wife is not based on her merely hating him or feeling repulsed by him, but
requires that she establishes harm prohibited by Sharia, such harm must be real not
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from the incident of polygamy, or alternatively, made the second
marriage contingent on the consent of the first wife, then it could
indeed have been read as seriously undermining the husband's right
to be polygamous. Granting the judge discretion on this question
ensured that the harm argued by the wife was "objective and not
444
whimsical."
One detects from the three cases discussed above that
underpinning the judicial passivism of the court is an ideological
position based on promoting what may be described as a moderate
social agenda.4 45 Of the two ideological positions that almost always
constitute the background to these cases, namely a religious one and
a feminist one, the court always takes an intermediate position

illusory, actual not imagined .. . which negates good treatment expected of marital
relationships .. ")(translation by author).
444.
Id. The cases above allow us to detect the various strategies taken by the
Court in the Article 2 cases. In the vast majority of these cases, the Court espouses
judicial passivism. It has an almost exaggerated reluctance to strike down legislation,
exerting an elaborate, though intelligible, effort to avoid doing so. Indeed, the very test
of constitutional review that the Court has developed is clear evidence of this judicial
passivism. According to this test, the Court first searches for determinate rules in the
Qur'an and sometimes in the prophetic traditions that might allow a reading of the
legislation under its purview to be in violation of the principles of the shari'a. The
Court often finds that no such rules exist. The Court is careful to assert that whatever
rules that do exist that contradict the legislation are not found in the primary textual
sources of Islamic law (i.e. the Qur'an and the Sunna) but instead have been
formulated by jurists and are the subject of controversy among the various medieval
schools of jurisprudence. Subsequently, the Court asserts the right of the legislature to
legislate outside the domain of the determinate rules in the name of public interest and
declares the law to be constitutional.
Alternatively, the Court reads into the various determinate, but ambiguous rules of
the shari'a a general principle and proceeds to decide that the legislation under review
falls short of violating this principle. In both cases, the Court's random references to
the views of the medieval schools of jurisprudence are designed to either prove that the
rule in question is controversial, meaning there exists a variety of positions on said
rule, or to support the validity of the legislation by showing that some medieval jurist
had advocated a rule similar to it.
The fact that this test is quite loose or flexible seems to express the Court's
commitment to the preservation of the legislative domain as it exists today in the
Egyptian legal system, as well as its desire to deliver it from the encroaching reach of
the interpretive arm of God's law.
The somewhat passive posture taken by the Court is rendered all the more striking
when one considers that the SCC manifests the radically different posture of serious,
almost brutal activism when deciding if a piece of legislation conforms to the other
articles of the Constitution. This is especially so in cases dealing with the "rights" and
"freedoms" of citizens in relation to the State. In these cases the SCC seems almost too
willing to strike down legislation that is in violation of the Constitution. For a
discussion by the Chief Justice of the SCC of several such cases, see El-Morr, supra
note 413.
445.
On this point, see Hirschl, The Struggle for Hegemony, supra note 410, at
115 (reporting that "the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court has demonstrated its
consistent policy by adopting a relatively liberal, middle-of-the-road approach in its
interpretation of the Muslim Shari'a rules").
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between the two. 446 While the religious position on polygamy is that
it should be an absolute, unrestricted right of the husband, and the
feminist one is that it should be prohibited, the court upheld a rule
that constricted the practice of polygamy and allowed the first wife a
way out. While the religious position is that divorce is the unilateral
right of the husband, and feminists argue for an equal right for
women to divorce, the SCC upheld a rule that allowed the judge to
intervene on behalf of the woman in certain cases, allowing her to
escape a bad marriage. In addition, while some religious groups think
that women should be veiled, and feminists believe that the law
should not regulate women's dress, the SCC affirmed the principle of
modesty as the limit of the legislature's reach and as a compromise
between the two positions.

V. CONCLUSION

Legislative and adjudicative reforms and interpretive strategies
that move from defining a martial relationship as one of status to one
of contract, as well as splitting the difference between the demands of
religious advocates and those of feminist reformers, represent the
ways in which the Egyptian secular male elites have introduced
reform in the area of family law and how they later, as judges,
defended it. These strategies attempt to strike a centrist compromise
so as to mediate the demands of the feminists and those of their
adversaries-the religious intelligentsia.
In addition, the cases decided by the Supreme Constitutional
Court, discussed above, raise two questions that are of particular
relevance to secular feminism. The first is related to the rule
outcome, whereby one must ask what to think about, for instance,
divorce being the absolute right of the husband while women must
apply to the courts and are only granted it in certain cases; or about
the fact that polygamy is an absolute right of the man, curbed only by
certain restrictions; or about no to veils, but yes to modesty.
The second question that these cases raise is related to the
legitimation discourse by which the Court arrives at its decisions.
One must ask what to think about the Court wanting to appear to be
doing a genuine reading of the religious texts, thereby representing,
for instance, polygamy as an absolute right of the husband, so as to
satisfy an increasingly disgruntled religious audience or movement.
One wonders if this was the only way the Court could have
demonstrated that it was genuinely engaging with the requirement of

446.
For example, see Chief Justice El-Morr's discussion on modesty and the
clothing of women, El-Morr, supranote 413, at 16-17.
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Article 2 of the Constitution, which requires that Islamic law be the
primary source of legislation. In other words, one questions whether,
in the case of polygamy, it was really necessary for the court to adopt
this form of representation to be able to later create an endless list of
exceptions that more or less make this so-called absolute, universal
right not so absolute and universal after all. Therefore, the question
becomes whether, in order to get the desired rule, the Court should
sacrifice what could be a liberal, reformist, or secular feminist
legitimation discourse for one that focuses on a reading of religious
texts. One may very well argue that in the case of polygamy, for
instance, this was the best rule possible under the circumstances but
that the legitimation course followed by the Court to reach the
outcome is not the most desirable; in other words, one may agree with
the outcome but oppose the methodology.
In addition, related more to the issue of secularism than to that
of feminism, one wonders if the test the Court has developed, in
attempting to seriously engage with the religious texts, panders too
much to the religious intelligentsia. This may be the best possibility
under the circumstances and thus the Court should not be attacked
for giving too much determinacy to the religious texts despite the fact
that its analysis typically uncovers that they contain few determinate
rules. But is there a way that the religious texts could have been
done away with altogether for representing a set of ethical teachings
or rules that are bound by their historical context? Such an act would
have furthered the cause of secularism in modern day Egypt.
The dilemmas that are raised by the Court's test and its strategy
to split the difference echo those of the legislative strategy adopted in
the vast majority of Islamic countries, in which reform takes place
within the framework of a religious text. Many argue that this is the
sole path reform can take because it is the most realistic. But an
equally plausible path to reform would be to do away completely with
the religious text and to use whatever resources the state has to
impose a secularization path. The complexity of such an approach
and the costs that might come with it is the subject of a future
article.©
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